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Abstract
The first part of the thesis establishes a link between medieval trade, agglomeration and
contemporary regional development in ten European countries. It documents a significant
positive relationship between involvement in medieval trade and regional economic devel-
opment today. The analysis indicates that a long-lasting effect of medieval trade on con-
temporary regional development is transmitted via its effect on agglomeration and industry
concentration. Further empirical analyses show thatmedieval trade positively influenced city
development both during the medieval period and in the long run; they also reveal a robust
connection betweenmedieval city growth and contemporary regional agglomeration and in-
dustry concentration. This research highlights the long-run importance of medieval trade
in shaping the development of cities as well as the contemporary spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity throughout Europe.
Next, a new city-level data set onpolitical institutions in pre-modernEurope is introduced.
It comprises of three variables reporting the prevalence of the different existing types of par-
ticipative political institutions between 800 and 1800 AD in 104 cities in the Holy Roman
Empire. According to historical studies, the three included measures (guild participation
in the city council, participative election procedures and the existence of institutionalized
burgher representation) represent the universe of political institutions in cities in this era.
Based on this data, the next chapter of the thesis investigates the origins of guild revolts
and participation in the government of late medieval central European cities. It finds that
structural factors, i.e. the prosperity of proto-industry and exogenous events like the agricul-
tural crisis were factors triggering the revolts. Medieval trade cities had a lower probability of
guild participation indicating that not economic prosperity per se is decisive but rather that
formerly poor groups of citizens like craftsmen profited from the economic upswing. The
study also finds evidence for the existence of spatial spillovers implying that strategic consid-
erations played a role in the spread of the revolts.
Finally, I investigate the effect of the rise of participative political institutions in late me-
dieval central European cities on city development. The results show, that the enlargement
of political participation is not always conducive to city development. The participation of
guilds in the city council, for example had an overall neutral or negative effect. Furthermore,
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the effect of guild participation is declining over time, implying that this form of PPI is prone
to institutional degeneration and increased rent-seeking. Election of city government by the
citizens, in contrast, shows a stable and robustly positive effect on city development. Hence,
the decisive point for more political participation being conducive for economic develop-
ment is that the increase in participation is accompanied by increased accountability of the
politicians and a politics that is oriented toward public welfare than the special interests of
particular groups.
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“[...]The master-economist must[...]study the present in
the light of the past for the purposes of the future.”
JohnMaynard Keynes
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Introduction
Why some regions in Europe are poor and others are rich? Why it happened that even
within the same country there are enormous and apparently persistent differences in the pros-
perity of cities and regions?1 Why it is the case that theGDPper capita ofMunich, the richest
district in Germany (82800 €) is more than six times larger thanGDP per capita of the poor-
est German district “Südwestpfalz” (13100 €)?2 And can one trace back a significant part of
1Studies documenting the persistence of regional development differences in Europe are—among others—
Guiso et al. (2013), Maseland (2014),Putnam (1993) or Tabellini (2010). A study that finds, to the contrast, that
in recent years there was significant political success in reducing regional development differences is Becker et al.
(2010).
2The GDP per capita values are for the year 2009 and originate from the Eurostat regional statistics data
base (see Appendix A). France, for example, shows a similar inequality in regional economic development with
the poorest (the departmentCreuse) having aGDPper capita of 18300€ and the richest district (the department
Haute-de-Seine) having one of 82400 Euros.
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these different regional fortunes to developments in the late medieval period? While there
is a sizable literature on the determinants of regional development that also sometimes looks
on historical determinants (e.g., Gennaioli et al. 2014, Tabellini 2010, von Ehrlich and Seidel
2015, Becker et al. 2015) the late medieval period is most often overlooked as possible source
of variation in regional development across Europe. However, the latemiddle ages were a pe-
riod were many technological, political and social innovations occurred that could possible
have long-lasting impacts on the development of cities and regions, e.g. the foundation of
universities, the printing press, participative political institutions, the discovery of the New
World etc. Nevertheless, among all those innovations, only the effect of the printing press on
long-run city growth was recently analyzed by Dittmar (2011) and recently also the impact of
the spread of the mechanical clock on city development is studied by Börner and Severgnini
(2015).3 Hence, there are still a lot of phenomena and events to study that are promising can-
didates for significant historical determinants of regional development.
This thesis studies two of these events, namelymedieval trade activities during the so called
“Commercial Revolution” (chapter 2) and the emergence of participative political institu-
tions in the cities of the late medieval Holy Roman Empire (HRE) (chapters 3–5). Both are
expected to have potentially long-lasting impacts on the development of cities and regions in
Europe. However, it does not only study the consequences of these events for long-run city
and regional development, it also explores the origins of these institutions inmore detail. The
origin of historical political innovations is of importance in its own right and can tell impor-
tant lessons for today. Furthermore, while all thee studies in this thesis are concerned with
3Cantoni (2014) also studies the impact of the foundations of new universities during the late medieval
period on market establishment and the commercial revolution. However, his time horizon is much smaller
and basically limited to the medieval period itself. Hence, his paper is not a study of the long-run impacts of
early university foundation on long-run regional development.
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historical determinants of regional economic development and their origins, they contribute
to several other scholarly debates and research areas.
Chapter two introduces a new and—with respect to its spatial coverage—uniquely com-
prehensive data set on medieval trade activities that could be worthwhile to use also in other
empirical studies onurban and regional development. Moreover, showing that centers ofme-
dieval trade activities are still richer today, it also investigates the channel through which the
initial economic advantages provided by trade activities in themedieval period translated to a
long-run, persistent advantage still visible today. It suggests thatmedieval trade activities cru-
cially influenced agglomeration and industry concentration patterns in Europe because they
enabled medieval trade cities to grow faster and larger thereby becoming the industrial core
areas of a country. Therefore, the analysis in chapter two expands the existing knowledge on
the determinants and persistence of agglomeration and industry concentration patterns and
underlines the importance of second nature (“man-made”) causes of agglomeration as high-
lighted by the “New Economic Geography” literature. In consequence, this chapter does not
only uncovering the medieval roots of contemporary regional development it also does sug-
gest why medieval trade plausibly could have a persistent effect—something that especially
in historical research is not considered to be trivial.
The data set on political institutions in late medieval cities in the HRE that is introduced
in chapter three does complement already existing data on political institutions (like parlia-
ments) and regime types on the level of territorial states. Furthermore, the data set provides
information on the universe of political institutions in cities and thus enables more detailed
and specific analyses thatwill yieldmore precise results than existing data sets (like e.g., that on
the existence of city councils introduced by Bosker et al. 2013). Examples of such analyses are
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the investigation of the causes of the late medieval guild revolts in chapter four and the study
of the impacts of the rise of participative political institutions on the long-run development
of cities in chapter five.
The research in chapter four is the first empirical analysis of the late medieval guild re-
volts the author is aware of and hence brings data to a previously purely qualitative historical
discussion. Finally, the studies also sheds new light on current debates in development eco-
nomics on the determinants of successful political change as it shows that to be successful
economic growth has to be “inclusive”, i.e. has to enrich formerly poor groups of the society
like craftsmen.
Chapter five finally, is the first study on the long-run evolution of political institutions over
1000 years. Thus, it enables to empirically test hypotheses about institutional degeneration
processes and political regime cycles as prominently proposed by Olson (1982) and recently
studied by Puga and Trefler (2014). Its finding that an increase in political participation, that
is not accompanied by a democratization of other aspects of the political system (e.g., equality
before the law or universal suffrage) has no long-lasting effects or even negative effects in the
long-rundoes not only support the notion of institutional degeneration as outlined byOlson
but alsoprovides and exampleof institutional changes in themedieval period that didnot lead
to persistent positive effects. Therefore, it is another contribution of this thesis to show that
sometimes, historical events can have persistent effects and sometimes not and to identify the
conditions and channels necessary for path-dependent developments. Furthermore, chapter
five adds to the literature on the impacts of democratization and the conditions for its success
(e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2014, Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). Finally, as participation of
guilds in the city council of late medieval cities was one of the major increases in political
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participativness in late medieval cities, chapter five contributes to the controversial debate
about the impact of guilds on economic outcomes (e.g, Epstein 1998, Ogilvie 2004). The
results of the empirical analysis suggest that the impact of guilds on economic development
was negative and not very large in general, supporting the more negative view of guilds.
All the studies in this thesis share a commonmethodological approach. All studies are em-
pirical studies and use quantitative methods to identify the effects of the studied variables.
However, the testedhypotheses are derived fromestablished economic theories likeNewEco-
nomic Geography or agglomeration economics or based on concepts from institutional and
public economics (like rent-seeking, inclusive and exclusive institutions etc.). Each chapter in-
cludes an informal section that derives the hypotheses and discusses the relationship between
them and the underlying theoretical reasoning.
As this is a dissertation in economic history, I also take into account the findings and dis-
cussions of historians. I attempt to connect the historical arguments to theoretical economic
concepts and analyze historical phenomena by applying modern economic theory to under-
stand their effects and origins. This synthesis of qualitative historical arguments, modern
economic concepts and empirical methods tries to combine the best of both “worlds”.
All the studies are based on city or regional (NUTS-3) level data sets. I rely on cross-
sectional as well as panel data sets. Microeconometric and estimation techniques (OLS, FE
estimation) are used to empirically identify the effects of the respective variables of interest.
The regional focus of the studies is central Europe (theHolyRomanEmpire and its neighbor
states). The focus on this area has two reasons. First, the studied events, like the guild revolts
or the rise of participative political institutions, only took place there. Second, the limita-
tion to this area reduces the amount of unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the results.
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Although still a heterogeneous area, central Europe is a more homogeneous study area than
the whole of Europe. TheHRE, for example was characterized by a unique institutional and
political framework different from that in other European countries at that time (e.g. the ex-
istence of Free and Imperial cities, archbishops and monasteries acting as secular rulers over
their own territory or an elected king). Therefore, comparisons between the HRE and other
medieval European kingdoms like France or Great Britain are not an easy task—and would
not always be historically meaningful.
However, the regional focus does also necessitate to cope with spatial autocorrelation,
spillovers between cities/ regions and other problems typically arising in empirical spatial eco-
nomics. Moreover, the hinterland of a city or the neighborhood of a region are important for
understanding the develop within the considered city or region. Hence, spatial econometric
techniques like spatial lag models, standard errors accounting for spatial correlation and the
characteristics of the area around a city/ region as well as its position in the city network (mar-
ket potential etc.) have to be taken into account in the empirical analyses.
The focus on regions or cities enables to identify empirical effects using variation within
comparatively small geographic areas (e.g., within a NUTS-2 region) that are less heteroge-
neous than countries or continents. Hence, concerns about unobserved heterogeneity are
further diminished by studying the regional level. Nevertheless, in all the studies endogene-
ity issues are addressed using several different strategies (use of extensive set of controls, fixed
effects, time trends, lag variables, matching etc.) that should ensure that the results are not
driven by omitted variables or reverse causality.
Finally, much of the recent economic development literature focused on using exogenous
variation often coming from natural experiments like historical accidents (e.g. Bleakley and
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Lin 2012, Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014, Iyer 2010) or randomly drawn borders (e.g, Dell 2010,
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2014, Wahl 2015b) . As it maximizes internal validity of
the results, this quasi-experimental identification of causal effects substantially improved the
quality and credibility of empirical economic research (Angrist and Pischke 2010). However,
this type of identification is often associated with a lower external validity of the estimated
results.4 This means that the generalization of the results of those studies is often not or
only partly possible. However, one important goal of investigations in economic history is
to show what we can learn from historical developments and events for better political and
economic decisions in the future. This is what Keynes meant with his statement that a good
economist has to “...study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future...”
(Keynes 1933, p. 170). Of course, comparing the present with the past to draw conclusions
for a better future is a heroic challenge as it requires many assumptions to hold. In any case,
it necessarily requires that we can generalize the result of economic history studies to other
than the particularly studied cases in the past as well as to the present. Studies using natural-
experiments do oftentimes not fulfill this condition. Furthermore, limiting economic history
to studies identifying effects fromnatural-experiments often limits it to the study of historical
accidents, idiosyncratic shocks or highly specific circumstances.
Yet, history is not only a series of random, unrelated events or determined only by fortune
ormisfortune. It also consists of endogenous developments that are caused by and connected
to other historical events and yet, can still have significant direct impacts on economic out-
comes. And more often than not, historical events relevant for economist are caused by the
interplay of exogenous shocks and more systematic, structural factors. This type of events
4An extensive discussion of the weaknesses and limits of quasi-experimental identification strategies are
Deaton (2010) and Leamer (2010).
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and developments cannot be neglected by economic historians, but are clearly less studied in
the economic development literature as for the explanation of such developments and phe-
nomena often no satisfying source of exogenous variation is available.5
That’s why this thesis—while clearly addressing exogeneity issues and aiming at identify-
ing causality—is focused on such phenomena and developments. This is also why each of
the empirical studies tries to understand or to explicitly test the historical factors and deter-
minants of the studied phenomena, like medieval trade or participative political institutions.
If one understands bywhich factors historical phenomena are determined and how their rela-
tion to other events and developments in the same period was, one should be able to separate
the direct effect of those activities from the indirect effect of their determinants—at least if
one can empirically measure these determinants. Credible identification of empirical effects
should thenbepossible evenwithout exogenous variation. This is particularly true, as inmost
of the cases one can sufficiently account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity—the
most likely type of unobserved heterogeneity in historical contexts—by using certain types
of fixed effects or by comparing only similar treated and non-treated observations (match-
ing approaches). This methodological choices reflect the guiding principle of the research in
this thesis, that good empirical research in economic history combines profound knowledge
about history with a thorough understanding of empirical methods and economic theory.
5Another reason for why the use of exogenous shocks or historical accidents is often not possible, especially
when focusing on periods prior to the 19th century, is that data e.g. on city populations is not available in such a
high temporal frequency (e.g. yearly) as itwould be necessary to exploit the exogenous variation caused by them.
Tomake an example, if a promising accident affecting someof the cities inmy sample andothers not—and that is
related to the probability of being treated or not—happened in 1245 (like the breakdown of the Staufer dynasty)
and I have population data for 1300 only, how much of the possibly existing effect of the accident I will still be
able to detect in 1300 AD? And if I detect one how I can be sure that it is actually the effect I wanted to identify
and not something that happened in between and is incidentally related to both my Staufer variable and city
growth?
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“The farther back you can look, the farther forward you
are likely to see.”
Winston Churchill
2
Does Medieval Trade Still Matter?
Historical Trade, Agglomeration and
Contemporary Economic Development.*
There is ample evidence that that trade is an important determinant of both long- and
short-run economic development. However, most of the existing literature focuses on the
impact of 19th century trade on market integration or the “Great Divergence” (e.g., Galor
*An earlier version of this paper was published as FZID Discussion Paper No. 82-2013 (Wahl 2013). The
author thanks seminar participants at Hohenheim, the University Madrid, the LSE and the HU Berlin. Fur-
thermore, he is indebted to Bas van Bavel, T. Matthew Ciolek, Aderonke Osikominu, Ulrich Pfister, Nadine
Riedel, Alfonso Sousa-Poza, Oliver Volckart, Nicole Waidlein and Nikolaus Wolf for their helpful suggestions.
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and Mountford 2008 or O’Rourke and Williamson 2002, Pascali 2013), or on the impact of
contemporary, Post-World War II trade activities on recent economic growth and develop-
ment performance across countries (Dollar andKraay 2003, Frankel andRomer 1999). There
are few studies (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2005b) considering the effect of cross country trade in
periods earlier than the 19th century. In this study, the authors investigate the impact of
long-distance overseas trade for institutional developments and the pre-industrial develop-
ment process across European countries.
Hence, until now there is no study exploring the long-lasting effects of trade and commerce
in European cities during theHigh and LateMiddle Ages. The importance ofmedieval trade
for the development of cities and regions in the Middle Ages and the following centuries is
widely accepted. Apart from this, no research has acknowledged the fact that medieval trade
might also have long-term influences on regional development persisting until today; this
despite the fact thatmedieval trade, through its potential impact on agglomeration and spatial
concentration of industry, could have led to path-dependent regional development processes
resulting in developmental differences surviving over the centuries.
The aim of this study is to provide evidence that medieval trade, as a result of its impact on
agglomeration, has caused differences in regional development that remain visible today. It
therefore provides a newexplanation for theunevendistributionof economic activity and sig-
nificant spatial concentration of industries throughout Europe (e.g., Chasco et al. 2012, Koh
andRiedel 2014,Roos 2005). It also contributes to theunderstandingof the still puzzlingper-
sistent differences in regional economic development (Becker et al. 2015, Maseland 2014 or
Tabellini 2010). Furthermore, the study offers an additional explanation for the rapid central
European urbanization process that started off in theMiddleAges, continues until today and
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led to the so called “Rise of theWest” (Bosker et al. 2013). Whywas the urban development in
central Europe since theMiddleAges not characterized by reversal of fortunes and stagnatory
phases like that in the Near and Middle East? Bosker et al. (2013) highlight the role of local
participative political institutions. I aim on showing that also medieval commercial activities
constitute a important corner stone of this development. Finally, this study contributes to a
growing literature reporting on the persistence and path-dependent nature of spatial equilib-
ria and city growth processes (Bosker et al. 2007, Bleakly and Lin 2012, Davis and Weinstein
2002, Davis and Weinstein 2008, Michaels and Rauch 2014, Miguel and Roland 2011 and
Redding et al. 2011).
To establish a link betweenmedieval trade, agglomeration and contemporary performance
I link the typical characteristics of medieval trade and cities to the determinants of agglomer-
ation suggested by New Economic Geography (NEG) and agglomeration economics (e.g.,
Krugman 1991, Glaeser et al. 1992). In a second step, based on studies combining NEG,
endogenous growth models, and the theory of path-dependence, I propose a positive con-
nection between agglomeration, industrial concentration and contemporary development.
The underlying idea is the following: While medieval trade activities clearly reflect the effect
of the determinants of medieval trade like e.g. location fundamentals and second nature ge-
ography on development I argue that trade activities themselves had a significant additional
effect through their direct influence on agglomeration patterns.
Afterwards, I test the causal chain from medieval trade through agglomeration and on to
contemporary regional economic development by using rich regional and city level data sets
and a wide range of empirical methods. In this empirical investigation I use three variables
to capture medieval trade activities. First, based on several historical sources and trade route
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maps, I construct a dummy variable identifying cities that were important centers of trade
during the medieval period. Second, I calculate a variable that shows the distance between
each region or city and the closest of these trade cities. This variable enables to test whether
trade activities lead to the emergence of spatial core-periphery patterns as implied by theoret-
ical considerations. Third, I compute a variable reporting the number of centuries a city can
considered to be an important trade city.
The results of the empirical estimations provide strong evidence for a significant relation-
ship between medieval trade and contemporary regional economic performance. Further-
more, a detailed empirical investigation on city level shows that medieval trade activities are
robustly positively associated with city development both during the medieval period and
in the long run. Therefore, the observed path-dependent development process of European
cities is partly rooted in the persistent effect of medieval trade activities. Moreover, I also find
that the effect of medieval trade on contemporary regional development can be explained by
its influence on agglomeration patterns. This is shown by the fact that medieval trade activi-
ties are strong direct predictors of today’s spatial distribution of economic activity.
Importantly, I show that the results are robust to the inclusion of many geographic, po-
litical, economic and historical covariates of development and medieval trade, as well as dif-
ferent samples, data sets and medieval trade measures. I also show that a bias arising from
unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely as the results hold also when considering only regions
that were historical urban centers. Even among this homogeneous group, historical urban
centers that also were centers of medieval trade show a higher contemporary GDP per capita
than urban centers that were not important in medieval trade.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, I theoretically establish the link
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betweenmedieval trade, agglomeration and the present-day’s economic development. After-
wards, I introduce and discuss the most important variables and data and explain the em-
pirical setting. Next, I conduct the empirical analysis and interpret and discuss the results in
detail. Finally, I conclude and summarize the main findings.
2.1 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature
It is awell established idea that tradewas a decisive factor in thedevelopment ofmedieval cities
and the revival of city growth during the period of the so called “Commercial Revolution”
(e.g., Lopez 1976, Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014). History provides many examples of cities
owing their importance primarily to their function as centers of trade, such as the German
cities of Nuremburg (Nicholas 1997), Frankfurt (Holtfrerich 1999), Cologne (King 1985) or
the Polish city of Gdansk.1
Using concepts developed by NEG (Krugman 1991) and agglomeration economics, one
can explain why medieval trade was important for the rise of cities in medieval Europe. This
is achieved by linking the characteristics of medieval trade and trade cities to second nature
causes of agglomeration (for an overview of these see, e.g., Glaeser et al. 1992, Henderson et
al. 2001). Inmedieval times, the economy, especially the urban economywas characterized by
a high degree of regional specialization (e.g., Postan 1952 or Pounds 2005). For instance, the
SouthernGerman cities that became important trade centers in the latermedieval era special-
ized in textiles (Barchent etc.) and paper production. The different regions exported what
they specialized in—or had a comparative advantage in, e.g., due to natural resources—and
1Obviously, there are exceptions to this story, i.e. cities and regions becoming large and important agglom-
erations without being important centers of medieval trade. Some of these exceptions are discussed in detail in
Appendix A.3.
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imported what they did not have themselves. This specialization of trade cities on a particu-
lar industry or sector gave rise to the existence of technological (non-pecuniary) externalities
like Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) externalities (Marshall 1890, Romer 1986) or Porter ex-
ternalities.2
A second important characteristic of medieval trade cities was the comparatively high va-
riety of goods that were available. Those assortments of goods were available first at the local
markets, then at the large trade fairs in theChampagne region andother important trade cities
(such as Frankfurt, Cologne, Ulm, etc.), and then, in the late medieval age, in the branches
and kontors of the Hanseatic League and trading companies (“super-companies”) like the
Fugger in Augsburg. The latter two in particular also supplied luxury goods and exotic com-
modities from the Far East, as long-distance trade was reestablished at the beginning of the
Late Middle Ages. I can consider this high variety of goods as an important demand-side
driven agglomeration force, as it makes a city more attractive to settle in.
Additionally, the large variety of goods andprospering industry gave rise to the self-reinforcing
circular causation causedbybackward and forward linkages and leading to agglomeration and
core-periphery patterns in NEGmodels (Krugman 1991, Ottaviano and Thisse 2004). These
forward and backward linkages constitute the virtuous circle that generates agglomeration
and uneven spatial distribution of population and economic activity.3
However, the main argument of this paper is that medieval trade had significant conse-
quences for economic development today. Reassuringly, the self-reinforcing nature of the
2Nicholas (1997) additionally points to the fact that over the course of theMiddle Ages the industry domi-
nating in a city, e.g. the textile industry, increasingly diversified. This intra-industry diversification could be an
additional channel through which technological externalities could have arisen.
3For these arguments to hold, it is crucial that theremedievalmarkets showed a certain degree of integration
and that I actually observed a urban-rural wage differential. Evidence on these aspects is provided in Appendix
A.3.2.
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described agglomeration and concentration processes implies a path-dependent process of
city development. This path-dependent development process resulted in differences in con-
centration of economic activity and population that remain evident today. Cities that were
involved in medieval trade activities over a sufficient period of time became locked onto a
superior development path by comparison to other cities without that history. This is a typi-
cal characteristic of processes caused by increasing returns or positive feedback (David 2007).
Several studies (e.g., Bosker et al. 2007 and Davis and Weinstein 2002, 2008) show that city
growth is characterized by a long-run persistence that is immune even to such shocks as the
Second World War. Thus, there is a fair amount of empirical evidence pointing towards the
path-dependent character of agglomeration processes and city development. In addition,
there are numerous examples of historical events and phenomena with long-run impacts on
economic development (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001, Nunn and Wantchekon 2011, Alesina et
al. 2013, Comin et al. 2010) I argue that medieval trade can be added to this list of events.
If this reasoning is correct it would mean that medieval trade—through its effect on ag-
glomeration patterns—affected development over and above the effect of location funda-
mentals and second nature geography that is also reflected in medieval trade activities. Fur-
thermore, it would be in line with evidence found by Roos (2005) and the predictions from
NEG. However, this contrasts the papers of Ellsion and Glaeser (1999) and Wolf (2009),
which emphasize the significance of first nature causes of agglomeration. Furthermore, I
trace back significant parts of today’s differences in regional economic development to the
differences in involvement in trade activities during themedieval period. Hence, if I find em-
pirical support for my conjectures, this shows that historical events (like e.g., the division of
Germany or WorldWar 2) or political measures in more recent times are not the main deter-
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minants of regional economic prosperity—despite the fact that these events have influenced,
for example, the location of airports in Germany (Redding et al. 2009). Instead, the theoret-
ical reasoning and its empirical confirmation would support the findings ofMaseland (2014)
who demonstrates that regional development disparities in Germany are persistent and are
largely explained by increasing differences between core areas and the periphery and not by
an “east-west divide” originating from the division ofGermany or other relatively recent pop-
ulation shocks (e.g. Schumann 2014).
2.2 Data and Setting
2.2.1 Setting and Level of Analysis
Becausemedieval trade took place in cities the empirical analysis should be based on city-level
data. However, until now, data on communal and local level is scarce and importantmeasures
(e.g., GDP per capita) are still not available on these level of aggregation. Hence, I base the
empirical analysis on regional level data. I adhere to the NUTS (“Nomenclature of Units
for Territorial Statistic”) regional classification, the official regional reference unit systematic
used in the EuropeanUnion (EU). I choose to conduct the analysis on themost disaggregated
level for which the essential data (e.g., GDP per capita) is available. Therefore, I conduct the
analysis with a NUTS-3 region as observational unit.
2.2.2 Dependent Variables and AgglomerationMeasures
As dependent variable I use the natural logarithm (ln) ofGDPper capita in aNUTS-3 region,
originating from the Eurostat regional statistics database. I take the latest available values
from the year 2009. All other time-variant variables also come from the year 2009 to enable
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comparability.
As measure of spatial industry agglomeration I follow Roos (2005), Chasco et al. (2012)
and others in using the ln of the relative GDP density as measure for the spatial distribution
of economic activity. The measure is calculated by dividing a region’s share of a country’s
total GDP through its share of the country’s total area. This means it shows whether the
concentration of economic activity in a region is below or above the country’s average. Addi-
tionally, I also will present results using population density as agglomeration measure. Table
A.1 in the Data Appendix gives a descriptive overview of all variables used in the following
empirical analysis.
2.2.3 Independent Variables
This study aims to investigate the impact of trade between cities during the medieval age. To
be able to identify the effect of medieval trade on agglomeration I collect data on important
trade cities in until 1500 AD. In the cross-sectional analysis I only consider the situation in
1500 AD, at the end of the medieval period while I take into account the date at which a city
became a trade center in the subsequent panel data analysis.
The main sources of information on important medieval trade activities are maps printed
in historical atlases (primarily Davies and Moorhouse 2002, King 1985, Magocsi 2002 and
Stier et al. 1956) and monographs (e.g., Spufford 2002).4 I collect information about cities
prominently involved in trade from four historical maps providing information about cities
located on “major” or “important” trade routes in around 1500 AD.
Because there is no consensus about the exact importance of trade cities and trade routes
4More information about the kind of information and the geographical and temporal scope of those maps
is provided in the Data Appendix.
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during the medieval period I consult several different sources to gather sufficiently reliable
data. Furthermore, I use other qualitative information in my judgment of the importance of
the trade cities included. For example, I look at whether a city was an important member of
the Hanseatic League or the capital of a quarter or a third (like, e.g. Dortmund or Cologne).
Information on this is provided by Dollinger (1966). Additionally, especially for less promi-
nent trade cities (Paderborn, Soest, Harfleur, Tarent etc.), I also look at whether they were
situated alongwell-known trade routes like the “Hellweg” inGermany (as is the case, e.g., for
Soest). Moreover, I consult several standard historical sources on medieval trade activities in
different Central European regions (e.g., Dietze 1923, Hunt and Murray 1999, Schulte 1966,
Spufford 2002 etc.) and look at whether they mention a city as being prominently involved
in trade or as having over-regional importance as a market, fair, or trading city. Finally, I also
draw on other historical atlases—such as that of Kinder and Hilgemann (1970)—and other
regional trade route maps (e.g., Schulte 1966) as sources for validating the information in the
primarymaps. In theData Appendix I report and discuss all these sources and provide infor-
mation about which city is mentioned by which sources.
Overall, these sources have left me with 119 trade cities located in 10 European countries.
The data set encompasses all 839 NUTS-3 regions in these countries.5 The Data Appendix
offers a detailed description of how the database of important late medieval trade cities is
constructed.
5I exclude the islands of Elba, Corsica and Sicily from the sample because they are not comparable with
regions on the continent with respect to trade flows. Furthermore I do not consider Spain or Denmark. The
reason for this is, that at first, I am not able to find enough sources about trade routes and activities in these
countries. Moreover, Spain was no major player in medieval trade. It became a leading trade nation not before
the early 16th century when over-seas trade began to rise. At last, the institutional and political environment of
Spain was considerably different from that in central Europe as parts of Spain were underMuslim rule until the
later 15th century.
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Predominantly, I use three different variables as measures of late medieval trade and its im-
pact on contemporary regional development. First, I use a dummy variable “Trade Center”
that is equal to one if a region includes at least one medieval trade city. The lack of quantita-
tive information and the limited availability of qualitative judgments led me to use a simple
dummy variable coding important trade cities. Second, the theoretical reasoning implies that
medieval trade affected city development through agglomeration. Because agglomeration is
a process that takes place over centuries, cities that became an important trade center might
therefore today be larger and richer on average because they were subject to agglomeration
forces for a longer time. Thus, I create a variable that reports the number of centuries since a
city in a region was recognized as an important trade city in my sources (see Data Appendix
Table A.4).
Finally, the construction of a dummy variable also allows for the construction of a third
variable “Distance to Trade Center” representing the distance (in degrees) between a region
and the closest medieval trade city. This variable offers a useful direct test of my hypothesis
that medieval trade contributed to the emergence of time persistent core-periphery patterns
and therefore can act as an explanation for contemporary regional income differences.6
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the trade city data. For each country, the total number of
NUTS-3 regions, the number of regions with trade cities, the share of trade center regions,
the average distance of a region to the closest trade city and the average number of centuries
since a region is coded as trade center is listed.
6It is no alternative to construct the variable as distance to nearest trade route instead of distance to nearest
trade city since on trade routes and smaller places along them no activity or economic transaction took place,
they simply were transit routes leading from one commercial center to another. Furthermore, there seems to be
a noticeable amount of uncertainty about the exact course of the trade routes. Hence, using distance to trade
routes would possibly create another source of bias.
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Table 2.1: The Data onMedieval Trade Centers
Country No. ofRegions
No. of Trade
Centers
Share Trade
Centers
Mean ln(Distance
to Trade Center)
Mean Centuries
of Trade
Austria 35 7 20 0.36 7.29
Belgium 44 3 6.8 0.41 7.67
Czech Republic 14 4 28.6 0.43 11.25
France 94 20 21.3 0.53 7.5
Germany 429 37 8.6 0.39 8.57
Hungary 20 2 10.0 0.69 6.5
Italy 90 25 27.8 0.41 7.46
Lithuania 7 2 28.6 0.56 6
Netherlands 40 7 17.5 0.29 6.29
Poland 66 12 18.18 0.55 6.58
Total 839 119 14.8 0.425 7.74
As reported in the table, the average distance to a medieval trade center is about 1.5 degrees
(e0:432) which is approximately 170 km. Overall, around 14% of all regions are considered as
containingmedieval trade centers. On average, a trade city became an important trade center
around 800 years ago (i.e, somewhere in the 14th century). Furthermore, Figure 4.1 shows
a map that depicts all included NUTS-3 regions and the regions with medieval trade centers
(reddish colored).
Finally, with this data it is possible to have a look at the determinants of medieval trade.
This is of interest as for empirical identification of the effect of medieval trade activities it is
necessary to control for the determinants of medieval trade in general and especially those
determinants, that could also affect agglomeration. In Appendix A.4.1 I therefore run probit
regressions where I make use of a city-level time-variant version of the medieval trade city
variable (as it is used in section 4.3) and the Bosker et al. (2013) data set to investigate the
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Figure 2.1: NUTS-3 Regions withMedieval Trade Cities
determinants ofmedieval trade.7 The results are reported in Table A.11. The results highlight
the role of location fundamentals and second nature geography (urban/ market potential,
number of trade cities in the neighborhood of a city) and of archbishops and bishops as well
as the existence of institutions of communal self-governance and the absence of a powerful
territorial ruler. These insights serve as basis for the further empirical analysis, in particular
for the panel data analysis using the Bosker et al. (2013) data set later.
7To get a cross sectional data set which reflects the different centuries in which the cities became trade cities,
I employed the following construction procedure to create the data set. Basically, I take the Bosker et al. (2013)
data set and supplement it with time-variant versions of the three medieval trade variables. The final data set
used for the regressions is then constructed as follows: First, for each city the century in which it became a trade
city is recognized. Next, the values of the variables before this century are included in the data set to circumvent
reverse causality issues. For Cities that did not become trade cities the values of 1500AD are included in the data
set.
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2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Medieval Trade and Contemporary Regional Development
2.3.1.1 Empirical Specification
To test themain hypothesis, that regions with cities involved inmedieval trade exhibit higher
levels of economic development today, I estimate the following regression using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS):
ln(GDP )cijk =  + TCcijk + 
0
1Xcijk + 02Xcij + i + j + cijk (2.1)
Where ln(GDP )cijk is the natural logarithmofGDPper capita inNUTS-3 region kNUTS-
2 Region j in NUTS-1 region i of country c. TCcijk is a dummy variable “Trade Center”
that is equal to one if a NUTS-3 region includes a medieval trade city and zero otherwise.
Alternatively, TCcijk represents a variable reporting the number of centuries since a trade
city in a region became an important center of trade. Xcijk andXcij are vectors of NUTS-3
or NUTS-2 level covariates, controlling for the determinants of development and medieval
trade, respectively. i and j are NUTS-1 and NUTS-2 region fixed effects. As NUTS-2
region’s are perfect subsets of NUTS-1 regions I include either NUTS-1 or NUTS-2 region
fixed effects. At last, cijk is the error term capturing all unobserved factors. Equation (1) is a
straightforwardway to establish a significant direct link between latemedieval trade activities
and contemporary economic performance. My expectation is that  > 0 and significantly
different from zero implying that there is a significant positive effect of medieval trade on
contemporary regional development even after controlling for the determinants of medieval
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trade and development originating from its effect on agglomeration.
Yet, even when medieval trade still matters today, does its impact transmit via agglomera-
tion and concentration of economic activities in the places it took place historically? A simple
way to test this additional hypothesis is to look at whether GDP per capita lowers when the
distance to medieval trade centers increases. Expressed differently, if the effect of trade works
through agglomeration a core-periphery pattern should emerge, with themedieval trade cen-
ter regions as core and the other regions as periphery. One can therefore modify equation (1)
by substituting the trade center dummy through a variable representing the distance between
a region’s centroid and the closest trade city. Equation (1) then becomes:
ln(GDP )cijk =  + ln(Dist_TC)cijk + 01Xcijk + 02Xcij + i + j + cijk (2.2)
WhereDist_TCcijk is the natural logarithm of the distance from a region’s centroid to the
closest trade city measured in degrees.8 I expect  to be negative and significant.
2.3.1.2 Controlling for Determinants ofMedieval Trade and Regional De-
velopment
Toensure that the significant positive relationshipbetweenmedieval trade and contemporary
economic development is not driven by omitted variables bias I control for relevant determi-
nants of bothmedieval trade and economic development. The choice of the control variables
is inspired by the insights about the determinants of medieval trade, as outlined in section 3.2
8I use logarithmized values of the distance variable to get a regression coefficient that is an elasticity and
therefore easy to interpret and comparable to the coefficient of the dummy variable. However, none of the
results dependon this choice as the resultswould be virtually identical if I insteadwoulduse the original distance
values. Results not reported but available from the author upon request.
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and existing research on these topics. Since some of the control variables vary on NUTS-2
level I will regularly include NUTS-1 dummies instead of NUTS-2 fixed effects. However,
I will also run a specification with NUTS-2 dummies and exclude the variables defined at
NUTS-2 level.9
At first, I add a set of basic geographic controls, including latitude, longitude and altitude
of a NUTS-3 region. This set of variables should capture the general geographic pattern of
development in central Europe. This means, that economic development roughly increases
from South to North (i.e., with increasing latitude) and decreases, in the sample, fromWest
to East (i.e., with increasing longitude). Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that regions
with higher altitude are more difficult to reach—which seems especially relevant for trade—
and have less favorable climates.
The second set of variables controls for the “Regional Environment and Location” of re-
gions. It includes variablesmeasuring the distance of a region to the closes physical geographic
features that are important first nature determinants of agglomeration (coastlines and major
rivers) and medieval trade (Börner and Severgnini 2014, Bosker and Buringh 2015, Ellison
and Glaeser 1999 and Wolf 2009). Additionally, the ln of the distance of each region to the
contemporary border of a country is included.10 Furthermore, I include the average GDP
per capita of regions within a 150–kilometer radius around the considered region (the GDP
9In Appendix A.4.2 I present estimates of a baseline specification including only latitude, longitude, alti-
tude and NUTS-1 or NUTS-2 dummies as controls. As Moran’s I indicates the presence of spatial autocorrela-
tion, there I also present stand errors estimated according to Conley’s (1999)method. In general, those standard
errors do not vary substantially from the heteroskedasdicity robust version. In view of this, heteroskedasdicity
robust standard errors are reported in all remaining estimations.
10These variables are also included to ensure that the distance to trade center variables does not actually
capture the effect of maybe correlated distances to other important agglomeration factors, like e.g. rivers. I
also run regressions including distance of a region’s centroid to railroads andmajor roads. These are not shown
because these variables are probably bad controls but the results do not change when including this additional
variables. Results are available upon request.
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of the neighboring regions is inversely weighted by distance).11 Finally, this set of controls
also incorporates four variables measuring the number of trade centers within four differ-
ent distance bands (0–50km, 50–100km, 100–150km and 150–250km) around a city.12 These
variables are intended to capture possible positive or negative spatial spillovers from nearby
trade centers and the economic development of neighboring regions. Thus, they account for
a regions second-nature geography and simultaneously allow to directly control for spatial
dependence.13
A third set of variables controls for relevant contemporary characteristics of the included
regions. It comprises dummy variables for for the regions that include a country’s capital and
additionally a categorical variable identifying thedegree towhich a regionmaybe considered a
“mountain region” is included. Furthermore, the set includes dummies for regions with coal
or ore mines (or mining firms).14 Finally, it includes the ln of a region’s area and suitability of
it’s soil for agriculture.
In consequence, the first two sets of controls accounts for important first and second na-
ture causes of agglomeration and medieval trade.
The next set of controls captures the historical characteristics of regions that could be
relevant for both present day’s agglomeration and economic performance. Here I consider
11I tested several other distance bands from 50km to 2500 km. They are all highly correlated with each other
and the results will not change substantially when these alternative measures are used.
12As before I tried several additional distance bands (250–350km and so on) and found that they are usually
insignificant when added to the specification and have virtually no impact on the results).
13Alternatively, I estimated regressions using a variable representing the sum of the inhabitants of all other
cities apart from the considered one (again weighted by the inverse distance). This measure is analogously de-
fined as the “urban potential” measure used to represent a city’s second-nature geography e.g., in Bosker et al.
(2013). Using this variable leaves the coefficient of the trade variables virtually unchanged (results not shown
but available from the author).
14This variable is also defined atNUTS-2 level and therefore only included in the specificationswithNUTS-
1 fixed effects.
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dummy variables indicating regions with a university founded before 1500 AD and regions
that adoptedprinting technologybefore 1500AD.AsCantoni andYuchtman (2014),Dittmar
(2011), and Rubin (2014) have demonstrated, both universities and printing technology are
important factors in explaining the late medieval commercial revolution and city growth.
What is more, I include a dummy variable reporting regions with a city acting as seat of a
bishop or archbishop in 1500 AD. Furthermore, I also incorporate dummies for regions con-
taining at least one imperial city, at least one city that was member of the Hanseatic League
or a residence of a secular ruler. Finally, I also control for the possible long-lasting effect of
a Roman Empire legacy and low transport costs for trade by including a dummy for cities
located along an important imperial road and a variable reporting the distance of a city to the
closest Roman road.
The fifth set controls for the most important covariates of economic growth and devel-
opment. Here I use the share of people aged between 25 and 64 with tertiary education (on
NUTS-2 level) as ameasure for regional human capital. As a variable tomeasure the quality of
regional economic and political institutions I use the quality of government index developed
by the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg, which provides a
measure for regional institutional quality design similar to theWorld Governance Indicators
(WGI) of theWorld Bank. Tomeasure for regional inequality I construct the ratio of average
workers compensation to GDP per capita. As measure of innovative activity within a region
I use the number of patents registered by a region’s firms at NUTS-2 level. Furthermore, I
include a region’s unemployment rate, ln of the average workers compensation and the ln
of the average fixed capital of a region’s firm (all on NUTS-2 level).15 The inclusion of these
15When including these variables to the regression specification I lose several observations since they are not
or not completely available for some countries. The unemployment rate for example is only available for 518 of
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controls might cause a “bad controls problem” (Angrist and Pischke 2009) as they are mea-
sured after the variables of interest and can additionally be considered as likely outcomes of
medieval trade activities. Thus, I only use them in one estimation and in all the other cases
I present estimates without these control variables. Nevertheless, as most of them turned
out to be significant it could be useful to explore how the coefficient of the medieval trade
variables changes when considering them.
The results of the regressions are shown in Table 2.2. First, I add the four sets of controls
separately to the baseline specification and then I include all set of controls jointly in one
regression. I see that the coefficient of the trade center dummy and the distance variable re-
main significant in each of the specifications, although the sizes of the coefficients are reduced
considerably when compared to the baseline estimates.
The coefficient is smallest (e.g., around 0.09 in the case of the trade center dummy) in the
specification with all covariates added jointly to the baseline geographic controls andNUTS-
1 dummies or alternatively, when the variables defined on NUTS-2 levels are removed and
instead NUTS-2 fixed effects are added. It suggests that medieval trade center regions today
have a GDP per capita of some 10% higher than other regions. Based on the average regional
GDPper capita in the sample this corresponds to aGDPper capita that is approximately 1900
Euros higher. Doing the same exercise for the centuries since importance in trade variable, a
region that is a trade center for the minimum number of centuries (i.e., since 1500 AD) has a
GDP per capita around 7% higher ([0.012*6]*100).
Overall, I see that the relationship between medieval trade and contemporary regional de-
velopment is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables and other important
the 839 regions.
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Table 2.2: Medieval Trade and Contemporary Regional Economic Development
Dep. Var. ln(GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Trade Center Dummy
Trade Center Dummy 0.222*** 0.167*** 0.178*** 0.130*** 0.0938*** 0.105***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025)
Adj. R2 0.787 0.843 0.79 0.878 0.904 0.853
Panel B: Distance to Nearest Trade Center
ln(Distance to Trade Center) -0.243*** -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.138*** -0.106*** -0.107***
(0.038) (0.32) (0.04) (0.0317) (0.029) (0.041)
Adj. R2 0.777 0.834 0.782 0.872 0.902 0.852
Panel C: Centuries of Trade
Centuries of Trade 0.0285*** 0.0212*** 0.0235*** 0.0169*** 0.012*** 0.0131***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NUTS-2 Dummies No No No No No Yes
Basic Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Environment and Location Yes No No No Yes Yes
Region Characteristics No Yes No No Yes Yes
Historical Region Characteristics No No Yes No Yes Yes
Growth Covariates No No No Yes Yes No
Obs. 839 839 839 518 518 839
Adj. R2 0.789 0.843 0.791 0.878 0.904 0.853
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1
%, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a NUTS-3 region. The basic geographic controls include a region’s
latitude, longitude and altitude. The “Regional Environment andLocation” controls include the ln distances of a region’s
centroid to the nearest border, coast point or river as well as the distance weighted sum of the GDP per capita of all
NUTS-3 region in a radius around 150 kilometers around the considered NUTS-3 region and four variables indicating
the number of medieval trade regions 0–50,50–100, 100-150 and 150–250 kilometers away. Region characteristic controls
include dummies for regions including a country’s capital, are classified as mountain regions and with ore or coal mines
(this latter variable is not included in column (6) as it would be collinear with the NUTS-2 fixed effects). Furthermore,
it encompasses the ln of a regions area and the ln of a regions agricultural suitability. The historical region characteristics
consist of a dummy variables indicating regions with a city serving as seat of a bishop in 1500 AD, with a university
founded before 1500 AD, that adopted printing technology before 1500 AD, contain cities that were members of the
Hanseatic League, with former imperial cities, that were residence cities of a secular ruler or were located on an Imperial
road. Moreover it includes the ln of the distance of a regions centroid to the closest Roman road. The growth covariates
encompass a region’s unemployment rate, number of registered patents, average firm ln fixed capital stock, averageworker
compensation. Furthermore, it includes the share of people aged between 25-64with tertiary education onNUTS-2 level,
thequality of government indexonNUTS-1/NUTS-2 level and the ratio of an averageworkers compensation to a region’s
GDP per capita as inequality measure. Each regression includes a constant not reported.29
determinants of agglomeration and economic performance.
2.3.1.3 Accounting for UnobservedHeterogeneity
The biggest obstacle for the identification of the causal effect ofmedieval trade on contempo-
rary economic development is unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, a third, unobserved
fundamental factor of development could have influenced both the location of medieval
trade centers as well as contemporary economic prosperity.
To furhter mitigate this possiblitiy I will focus on a sub-sample of cities that were impor-
tant urban centers around 1500AD. The crucial idea here is, that I will identify urban centers
based on criteria like political importance or ecclesiastical importance. Hence, not all—but
some—important urban centers will also be centers of trade. One can expect these cities to be
a comparatively homogeneous group, in particularly with respect to an unobserved historical
factor of development responsible for their status as urban centers. If I found a significant
positive effect of being a medieval trade center (i.e. not only being a political and/or eccle-
siastical center but also a commercial center) this would provide evidence that the effect of
medieval trade is not due to unobserved heterogeneity or captures a general developmental
advantage of important urban centers.
To build the sample of historical urban centers I first construct an urban centrality index in
the spirit of Escher and Hirschmann (2005). I create the index by simply summing up seven
proxy variables for the strategic, political or administrative and ecclesiastical importance of a
region in the later medieval period (i.e., if a city is of strategic importance). The selection is
based on insights from existing studies on the determinants of city development and the de-
terminants of urban centrality (e.g., Bosker et al. 2013, Bosker and Buringh 2015, Cantoni and
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Yuchtman 2014,Dittmar 2012, Escher andHirschmann 2005 andRoos 2005) I do not include
proxies for the economic or commercial importance of the city as cities that were important
ecclesiastical and or political centers but not commercial centers constitutemy control group.
Those seven variables are a dummy variable reporting the presence of a bishop or archbishop
in 1500 AD as proxy for ecclesiastical importance; dummy variables reporting imperial and
residence cities around 1500 AD as proxies for the political and strategic importance; the ln
of a region’s centroid to the closest major river or Roman road and a dummy equal to one
in regions with access to the sea representing a city’s geographic fundamentals, strategic im-
portance andRomanheritage.16 The resulting index is significantly positively correlatedwith
contemporary population density and relativeGDPdensity andGDPper capita.17 This once
again documents the persistence of urban centrality over centuries. If I still find a significant
and persistent effect of medieval trade for these group of cities it can probably be attributed
to medieval trade and not to other causes of persistence of urban centrality.
In the next step, I re-estimate the specifications in Table 2.2 column (6) for each of the
three medieval trade measures and three different sub-samples. The results are reported in
Table 2.3. In columns (1)–(3) of Table 2.3 I report the results when using the sub-sample of
regions with an above average index of urban centrality. In columns (4)–(6) I only consider
regions in the 4th quantile of the urban centrality index and in columns (7)–(9) finally I run
the regressions on the regions in the 90th percentile of the urban centrality index, i.e. the 83
regions with the highest urban centrality scores. In the latter case, it is not possible to include
16The distance variables are rescaled so that they are positively correlated with urban centrality and take
values between 0 and 1. Hence, the index can have a maximum value of seven and a minimum value of zero.
However, the actual mean of the index is 1.066, with a minimum of 0.20, a maximum of 4.438 and a standard
deviation of 0.702.
17The correlations with relative GDP and population density are 0.17 and 0.18, respectively. Additionally,
the correlation with regional GDP per capita is around 0.21
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all the control variables used inTable 2.2 column (6) due to the substantially lower number of
observations. To safe degrees of freedom I therefore include NUTS-1 fixed effects instead of
NUTS-2 fixed effects and only three additional control variables (district-free city and capital
dummies as well as the agricultural suitability measure).18
Regardless of which sub-sample is used, the three medieval trade measures remain signif-
icant. Furthermore, they actually show larger coefficient values implying that if unobserved
heterogeneity biased the estimated effect of medieval trade it downward biased it. Neverthe-
less, all the coefficients remain within the range of Table 2.2 and especially the coefficient of
the centuries of trade variable turns out to be stable across different samples and specifica-
tions.
All in all, these results provide suggestive evidence that evenwithin a relatively small group
of historical urban centers, those urban centers that were also commercial centers had an ad-
ditional and persistent development advantage. This advantage is possibly not caused by one
or more unobserved historical factors making some places “big and rich” and others “small
and poor” but actually by medieval trade activities.
2.3.2 MedievalTradeandContemporaryAgglomerationand IndustryCon-
centration Patterns
The next step is to establish the relationship between medieval trade and contemporary eco-
nomic agglomeration.
I will achieve this by conducting regressions relating the medieval trade variables to mea-
18These additional controls are selected based on the following procedure: First, I include each set of control
variables separately to the NUTS-1 dummies. Next, I include all the variables that were significant in the first
step jointly. Finally, I retain only the variables that remain significant in step two,which are those three variables.
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sures of present-day agglomeration and industry concentration. Namely, I will estimate the
following cross-sectional equation using OLS:
AGGcijk =  + TRADEcijk + 
0
1Xcijk + 02Xcij + i + j + cijk (2.3)
WhereAGGcijk represents the agglomerationmeasures,i.e. either the ln of the relative GDP
density of a region or the ln its population density. TRADEcijk represents one of the three
medieval trade measures and the remaining terms of the equation are identically defined to
equation (1) and (2). 19 The results are presented in Table 2.4.
I see that all three medieval trade measures are highly significant and show the right signs
in for both the case of population density as well as relative GDP density. The reported coef-
ficients are large implying economic relevance of the estimated statistically significant effects.
The results indicate that, as proposed by my theoretical hypotheses, medieval trade is posi-
tively associated with contemporary agglomeration and industry concentration measures.
In Table 2.5 I additionally see that the significant impact of medieval trade on agglomera-
tion exists even when I consider only the sub-sample of urban centers in 1500 AD, i.e., only
cities in the 90th percentile of the Urban Centrality Index. Hence, even in the group of im-
portant urban centers, those urban centers that additionally were prominently involved in
medieval trade show a higher degree of agglomeration today. This makes it more unlikely,
that the results are driven by unobserved heterogeneity and primarily reflect unobserved dif-
ferences between large cities and the countryside. In fact, I found even larger effects indicating
that whatever speculative unobserved heterogeneity exists in the overall sample it downward
19As there is a mechanical correlation between the a region’s area and both its population and relative GDP
density I do not control for a region’s area in these regressions.
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Table 2.4: Medieval Trade and Contemporary Agglomeration Patterns
Dep. Var. ln(Population Density) ln(Relative GDPDensity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Center 0.514*** 0.924***
(0.124) (0.278)
ln(Distance to Trade Center) -0.669*** -1.261***
(0.164) (0.367)
Centuries of Trade 0.0666*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.033)
NUTS-2 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Environment and Location Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical Region Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 839 839 839 839 839 839
R2 0.596 0.593 0.598 0.431 0.429 0.432
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10
% level. The unit of observation is a NUTS-3 region. The “Regional Environment and Location” controls include the ln distances
of a region’s centroid to the nearest border, coast point or river as well as the distance weighted sum of the GDP per capita of all
NUTS-3 region in a radius around 150 kilometers around the considered NUTS-3 region and four variables indicating the number
of medieval trade regions 0–50,50–100, 100-150 and 150–250 kilometers away. Region characteristic controls include a dummies for
regions including a country’s capital and are classified asmountain regions. Furthermore, it encompasses the ln of a region’s agricultural
suitability. The historical region characteristics consist of a dummy variables indicating regions with a city serving as seat of a bishop
in 1500 AD, with a university founded before 1500 AD, that adopted printing technology before 1500 AD, contain cities that were
members of theHanseatic League, with former imperial cities, thatwere residence cities of a secular ruler orwere located on an Imperial
road. Moreover it includes the ln of the distance of a regions centroid to the closest Roman road. Each regression includes a constant
not reported.
rather than upward biases the estimated effect of medieval trade.
In Appendix A.4.3 I additionally conduct a mediation analysis using night light intensity
as proxy for regional GDP per capita and population density as variable mediating the re-
lationship between medieval trade and present days economic development. As night light
intensity is notmechanically correlatedwith the agglomerationmeasures—asGDPper capita
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Table 2.5: Medieval Trade and Contemporary Agglomeration Patterns—Subsample of His-
torical Urban Centers
Dep. Var. ln(Population Density) ln(Relative GDPDensity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade Center 0.632*** 0.813***
(0.172) (0.184)
ln(Distance to Trade Center) -1.035*** -1.232***
(0.278) (0.304)
Centuries of Trade 0.0727*** 0.0943***
(0.018) (0.018)
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 83 83 83 83 83 83
R2 0.855 0.866 0.867 0.954 0.955 0.86
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 %
and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a NUTS-3 region. The set of robust controls is selected according to the procedure
described in the text. It comprises of the capital dummy, the ln of a region’s area and the number of trade cities 50–100kms
around a city. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
is—the use of this variable allows to directly relate the agglomerationmeasures to a proxy for
economic development. Moreover, this provides a robustness check for whether the results
are sensitive to a different measure of economic development. The results of the mediation
analysis fully support my theoretical reasoning and show that the effect of medieval trade on
economic development is significantly mediated by its influence on agglomeration patterns.
2.3.3 Medieval Trade and City Development—Panel Data Evidence
Until now I found evidence that medieval trade activities significantly affect today’s regional
GDP per capita via their impact on agglomeration patterns. However, the observed relation-
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ship could be incidental. To show a persistent effect of medieval trade explicitly leading to a
path-dependent regional development process I have to document that the positive relation-
ship exists over a longer time period. Thus, I have to show the positive relationship between
medieval trade and economic development in a panel data set. This also enables me to esti-
mate the effect of trade more precisely since I can allow for the fact that some cities became
important trade centers earlier or later in a more direct way than with the centuries of trade
variable. Furthermore, it allows to show that the relationship actually existed in the medieval
period itself.
Hence, I run regressions using theBosker et al. (2013) city level panel data set supplemented
by time-varying versions of the three measures of medieval trade. The Bosker et al. (2013)
data set spans the period from 800–1800 AD and provides data for every one-hundred years
(i.e., 800, 900, 1000, 1100 etc.) and European cities for which Bairoch et al. (1984) provide
city figures. I include every city in the Bosker et al. (2013) data set that is located in one of
the ten countries I considered in the previous analysis. This leaves me with a sample of 362
cities of which 91 are coded as trade cities.20 This leads to 3982 city-century pairs and—as city
population data is not available for each period in many cities—an unbalanced panel of 1533
observations I will use for the subsequent empirical analysis.
To uncover the long-run relationship between medieval trade and city development in a
first step I estimate the following regression equation:
ln(POP )cit =  + TRADEcit + 
0
1Xcit + 02Xci + c + t + cijk (2.4)
20The Data Appendix reports every city coded as trade city and also reports the date since it is considered
as important trade center. Table A.2 in the Data Appendix provides a descriptive overview of the variables
employed in these panel data estimations.
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Where ln(POP )cit is the natural logarithm of a population of city i in country c in year
t (with t being 800,900,1000...). TRADEcit represents time variant versions of the three
measures of medieval trade. Xcit is a set of time-varying control variables. Among them are
dummy variables indicating whether a city was plundered in the previous century, had a uni-
versity, held the status of a capital of a territorial state, was located in or surrounded by a state
with a large territory (i.e., no city state), was located in a territory ruled by a non-absolutist
monarch, residence of a bishop or archbishop and a variable representing the presence of a
local participative government (dummy variable equal to one if a city had a city council and
zero if not). Furthermore, a variable of a city’s urban potential according to the definition of
De Vries (1984) is used. This variable represents the distance weighted sum of the size of all
Christian cities around a particular city additionally taking into account the accessibility of
a city by sea or navigable river. The variable accounts for the urban environment in which a
city is embedded. All these variables are taken from the Bosker et al. (2013) city-level data set.
Three supplementary variables are included capturing the number of trade cities 0–50km,
50–100km and 100–150km around a city. Both the urban potential measure and the number
of neighboring trade cities capture the second-nature geography of a city and spatial spillovers
arising from nearby trade activities. Xci is a vector of time-invariant control variables primar-
ily encompassing geographic and biogeographic features of a city and the surrounding region
(i.e., first-nature geography). Those variables include a city’s latitude, longitude and altitude,
the standard deviation of elevation in the region 10km around the city, as well as dummy
variables indicating location at a navigable river, sea, Roman road or hub of a Roman road.
Additionally, a variable indicating whether a city belongs to one of four different ecozones
is included (see Bosker et al. 2013 for more details). Those controls are chosen because they
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are correlated with both city development and medieval trade (Bosker et al. 2013, Cantoni
and Yuchtman 2014, Börner and Severgnini 2014 among others). c are country fixed effects
and t are century fixed effects absorbing temporal shocks which affected all countries (such
as the Black Death). All control variables and the city population figures originate from the
Bosker et al. (2013) data set.
I estimate equation (4) for the whole sample period from 800–1800, for the medieval
(800–1500) and the early modern period (1600–1800) separately. This tests whether the ef-
fect of medieval trade differs remarkably between different historical eras and whether there
is an effect of trade on city development during the medieval era. If the latter is not the case,
I cannot in fact attribute the effect of the medieval trade variables to medieval trade activi-
ties but to something else. Because after 1500 the trade measures (apart from the centuries of
trade measure) are time-invariant I estimate equation (4) using random effects for reasons of
comparability.
Nevertheless, I also estimate equation (4) using fixed effects (FE) estimate, i.e. I add city
fixed effects to the specification and remove all time-invariant variables. Equation (5) then
becomes:
ln(POP )cit =  + TRADEcit + 
0Xcit + i + t + cijk (2.5)
With i being the city fixed effects and everything else identical to equation (4). I run FE re-
gressions for thewhole observation period, but this time also using first and second order lags
of the trade variables to account for reverse causality problems, i.e. equation (5) is modified
to:
ln(POP )cit =  + TRADEci;t j + 0Xcit + i + t + cijk (2.6)
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Where TRADEci;t j with j = 100; 200 stands for first and second order lags of the me-
dieval trade measures. Hence, in this specification I account for both reverse causality and
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. The results of these regressions are shown in Table
2.6.
All three trade measures are statistically and economically significant in all estimations.
The coefficient in column (4), i.e. the FE regression using contemporary values of the trade
city dummy implies that throughout the complete sample period, trade cities on average had
a population about 26 % larger than non-trade cities. This effect is larger than in the cross-
sectional estimations conducted in the previous sections. However, the obtained coefficients
are more or less identical regardless of whether random or fixed effects are used for the esti-
mation or which observation period is considered. The coefficient of the first order lags is
larger than that of the contemporary values. However, the coefficient of the second order
lags is lower. Since there are 200 years between the values of the medieval trade variable and
the city population this is nevertheless a strong effect. These conclusions also hold true for
the other two trade variables although the negative effect of distance to a trade city is lower
than in the cross-sectional analysis.
The results are in line with a persistent effect of medieval trade on city development and
they additionally show that trade did influence city development in the medieval period.
To further illustrate the persistent temporal effect of medieval trade on city development,
I interact the trade city dummy with the century dummies and re-estimate the FE specifica-
tion in column (4) of Table 2.6 including the interaction terms. Therefore, I estimate this
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Table 2.6: Medieval Trade and City Development—Panel Data Estimations
Dep. Var. ln(Population)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Method RE FE
Period 800–1800 800–1500 1600–1800 800–1800
1st lag 2nd lag
Panel A
Trade City 0.331*** 0.269*** 0.383*** 0.230** 0.261*** 0.199***
(0.056) (0.065) (0.075) (0.094) (0.08) (0.076)
R2 0.453 0.426 0.523 0.368 0.369 0.358
Panel B
ln(Distance to Trade City) -0.0718*** -0.0553*** -0.0867*** -0.0477** -0.0524*** -0.0329**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.02) (0.017) (0.016)
R2 0.45 0.424 0.518 0.368 0.367 0.355
Panel C
Centuries of Trade 0.0581*** 0.0734*** 0.0486*** 0.0514** 0.0518** 0.0458**
(0.011) (0.017) (0.01) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
Century Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Geography Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
City Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,533 709 824 1,533 1,512 1,488
R2 0.457 0.432 0.522 0.372 0.366 0.356
Notes. Standard errors clustered on city level in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the
***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. The geographic controls include a city’s latitude,
longitude and altitude, the standard deviation of elevation in the region 10km around the city, as well as dummy
variables indicating location at a navigable river, sea, Roman road or hub of a Roman road. Additionally, those
controls include a variable indicatingwhether a city belongs to one of four different ecozones (see Bosker et al. 2013
formore details). City characteristics incorporate dummy variables indicatingwhether a city was plundered in the
previous century, harbors a university, had the status of a capital, was located in a state with a large territory and
was located in a territory ruled by a non-absolutist monarch. Furthermore, they include a cities urban potential
according to the definition of De Vries (1984) and three variables capturing the number of other trade cities 0–
50km, 50–100km and 100–150km around a city. In the case of random effects estimation (column (1)–(3)) the
overall R2 and in the case of the fixed effects estimation the within R2 is reported. Each regression includes a
constant not reported.
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equation:
ln(POP )cit =  +
X
t2T
0tTRADEcit  t + 0Xcit + i + t + cijk (2.7)
With t = 800; 900:::; 1800 and TRADEcit  t representing the interaction term. All re-
maining elements of equation are identically defined as in equation (5). At first, I estimate
this equation for all cities in the sample. Additionally, for the purpose of constructing amore
valid control group, I construct a city-level, time-varying versionof theurban centrality index.
The index is constructed in a similar way than its cross-sectional counterpart. This is, I add
up nine variables representing the centrality/ importance of a city with respect to different
aspects like politics or the church—but not trade or commerce. These nine variables are the
archbishop, bishop, capital, communal institutions, imperial city, sea, river, hub of a Roman
road and university dummies.21 I then also estimate equation (7) for all cities withmore than
10000 inhabitants in 1500 AD, for all cities with above average urban centrality in 1500 AD
(i.e., the sub-sample of historical urban centers) and for all cities in the 90 % percentile of the
urban centrality index in 1500AD (87 cities remain).22 The estimated coefficients of the inter-
actions terms and the confidence intervals are depicted in Figure 4.2.23 The general pattern is
the same for all four samples: Until 1300 the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant
and declining, afterwards it increases until around 1500 AD and then stays roughly constant
until 1800 AD. The coefficients are a little bit lower in the case of the sample of cities with
21Those variables are significant predictors of city population ensuring that the variables actually are relevant
predictors of the importance of a city.
22The average of the urban centrality index in 1500 AD is around 2.7 meaning that I consider all cities with
more than 3 of the included characteristics. In the case of the 90 % percentile I consider all cities with four or
more of those characteristics.
23The coefficients are not reported. However, the are available from the author upon request.
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above average historical centrality but nevertheless are at least marginally significant. All in
all, the temporal evolution of the coefficient of the trade center dummy shows a meaningful
pattern that is in line with the hypotheses of a persistent effect of medieval trade, an effect
already during the medieval period and an insignificant effect before. The latter confirms the
idea that it takes some time until trade unfolding its effect. Furthermore, it is probably due
to the overall small number of important trade centers in these earlier periods.24
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Figure 2.2: Temporal Heterogeneity of the Impact of Medieval Trade on City Development
24An alternative strategy would be to use a time-invariant trade city dummy and to interact this with the
century dummies. In this case, the results would be similar to those shown in Figure 4.2. This results are not
reported but are available from the author.
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2.3.4 Additional Robustness Checks
The results have proved to be robust to the inclusion of many important covariates and to
endogeneity issues. However, there remain some additional concerns about the robustness
of the obtained estimates. To account for these issues, I conduct various robustness checks.
The results of these tasks are reported in Appendix A.2 (Tables A.5 to A.9). In Table A.5 I
show that the results remain intact when I use alternative samples of trade cities, accounting
for the uncertainty of the historical information on which the original coding is based.
In Table A.6 I account for the considerable differences in the size of NUTS-3 regions in
various ways. First, I additionally include a country’s average NUTS-3 region area as control
variable. Second, I run regressions excluding Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (the
countries with much smaller NUTS-3 regions) and third, I run regressions inversely weight-
ing the observations by their area (weighted least squares). And finally, I present estimates
only considering regions that are comparatively homogeneous with respect to their size (i.e.,
have an area that is located within the 40th to 80th percentile of the region size distribution).
In Table A.7 and A.8, I estimate the regressions including neighbor GDP per capita and
urbanpotentialmeasures (in the panel data case) using a spatial lag, a spatial error and amixed
spatial model. These are employed to show that spatial autocorrelation (whether explicitly
modelled or in the error term) does not bias the estimates and also that simultaneity arising
from the spatial lag variable does not lead to a distortion of the results.
In Table A.9, finally, I account for the fact that I do not include trade cities in some of the
neighbors of the considered countries (e.g., I donot include Spain in the analysis, but France is
included). For the border regions to these not included countries the distance variable might
therefore be biased as the closest trade center is actually located in Spain and not in France
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(but I have not included cities in Spain). To overcome this issue, I delete the 50 regions that
are located at a border to a country that is not included in the analysis and re-estimate the
specifications in Table 2.2 Panel B.
It turns out that all the results remain valid when using alternative samples of trade cities
and accounting for systematic differences in the area of the observational units.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper argues that medieval trade led to agglomeration and a concentration of economic
activities within the region it took place. It further postulates that the observed spatial dis-
tribution of population and economic activity across Europe today is still shaped by the self-
reinforcing and long-lasting agglomeration processes that have their origins inmedieval trade
activities.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses confirmed, as expected, that there is a statistically and
economically significant positive relationship between medieval trade activities and contem-
porary regional economic development. The analysis further provides evidence that this re-
lationship is indeed caused by the influence that medieval trade exerted on the emerging pat-
terns of agglomeration and spatial concentration of industrial activities throughout Euro-
pean regions. Based on the result of this paper, I found evidence for a causal chain running
from medieval trade activities through medieval city growth to contemporary industry con-
centration and regional economic development. Medieval trade can therefore be considered
as an important determinant of modern economic development and long-run city develop-
ment. Further quantitative analyses of medieval trade activities based on detailed historical
datawill clearly improve the understanding of the sources of long-lasting economic and social
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prosperity—a subject that is of interest to researchers in a number of academic fields.
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3
Participative Political Institutions in
Pre-Modern Europe. Introducing ANew
Database*
Until nowtherehas been no systematic data about political institutions in pre-modern
European cities. This is somewhat surprising given that there is a large and growing literature
on the impact of political institutions and regimes on economic outcomes (e.g., Acemoglu
et al. 2005a, Acemoglu 2008, Bosker et al. 2013, De Long and Shleifer 1993, Stasavage 2007,
*This chapter is forthcoming in Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary His-
tory. It is printed with kind permission of Taylor & Francis.
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Van Zanden et al. 2012). However, these debates have focused on differences in political in-
stitutions and regimes at the regional or national level, or are concerned with differences in
institutions between city and territorial states (Stasavage 2007,2011). What have beenmissing
are systematic empirical investigations on the origins and consequences of differences in po-
litical institutions and regimes in cities. Cities were the centers of the pre-modern economy
and the germ cells of societal and economical innovations. Hence,the study of the emergence,
evolution and consequences of their political institutions provides valuable insights and ad-
vances the literature with respect to several aspects.
Recently, Bosker et al. (2013) were the first to present a measure for the existence of insti-
tutions of self-government (“local participative government”) in European cities from 800
AD until 1800 AD. Their measure constitutes a useful starting point for analyses of histori-
cal political institutions in cities. However, more detailed and comprehensive data about the
different features and types of political institutions is necessary for the study of more specific
questions.
The aim of this paper is to introduce and describe a data base on political institutions in
104 central European cities in the German-speaking area of the Holy Roman Empire and
the Low countries for the period from 800 to 1800 AD. This database is an attempt to pro-
vide measures for political institutions in the pre-modern central European city and their
characteristics. Based on the review of more than 100 historical sources and studies, I coded
three variables that report the existence and characteristics of political institutions in the se-
lected cities. These variables measure the existence and degree of guild participation in the
city council, the existence of participative election procedures of the city government and the
prevalence of institutionalized burgher representation. Thus, the database allows to assess
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many research questions concerning the origin and evolution of political institutions and
their impact on economic institutions and development. For example, the data enable the
assessment of the impact of guilds on city development, a question that is intensely debated
among scholars (e.g., Epstein 1998, Ogilvie 2004). In this context, the subsequent chapters
represents a first application of the database on the question of the origins of the latemedieval
guild revolts. Furthermore, the database allows to closer investigate the interaction between
economic and political institutions (as e.g., in Puga and Trefler 2014). The data can be fully
integrated into the comprehensive city-level data set of Bosker et al. (2013) and therefore en-
ables the use of an extensive set of control variables to assess the research question at hand in
an elaborate way by simultaneously ensuring comparability to other studies.
In what follows, I first give a general overview of the evolution of city governance in pre-
modern Europe. Next, I define the term “participative political institutions” and provide an
overview of the different types and characteristics of those institutions. Afterwards, I explain
the construction procedure and the sources on which the coding of the measures is based.
Next, I provide an overview of the spatial distribution and temporal evolution of the differ-
ent participative political institutions. This should provide a first idea about the data, the
underlying patterns and possible determinants. Furthermore, I discuss bivariate correlations
between the participative political institutionsmeasures and economic outcomes. These cor-
relations offer preliminary insights into the relationship between the different participative
political institutions, as well as their consequences. Finally, section six concludes.
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3.1 The Evolution of City Governance in Pre-Modern Europe
The existing knowledge on city governance in pre-modern Europe (as summarized by e.g.
Planitz 1966 or van Werveke 1963) suggests that in the early middle ages until the 9th cen-
tury, there existed almost no legal difference between the countryside and the city (the so
called “pre-constitutional period”). From the middle of the ninth century onward the ur-
ban independence movement slowly gained momentum, beginning in Northern Italy and
then spreading to Germany and the Netherlands with increasing pace after the “Great In-
terregnum” in the 13th century. With the autonomy, city constitutions appeared (so called
“constitutional period”) and with them the first political institutions (like e.g. city councils)
emerged and replaced the older community assemblies in the cities. These newly indepen-
dent cities were ruled by a class of merchants or land owners that became rich and powerful
because of the economic and industrial upswing of the medieval commercial revolution.
Over time, the renewed economic prosperity enriched not only the ruling merchant elite
but also the craftsmen that produced export goods trade by the merchants. Furthermore,
the ruling class became more and more an enclosed patriciate consisting of a relatively fixed
number of families that exclusively had the political power in the city. Beginning in the 13th
century, these developments—together with external events like the Black Death or the late
medieval agrarian crisis—lead to burgher and guild revolts. If such a revolt was successful
it often resulted in participation of craftsmen (and sometimes also other groups of citizens)
in the government of the city.1 Hence, while cities previously were exclusively ruled by the
patriciate the government of the latemedieval city often sawpolitical participation of broader
1For more information on the guild revolts in the German-speaking area the reader is referred to Luther
(1968). Information on guild uprisings in the Low Countries is summarized by Dumolyn and Haemers 2005).
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groups of the city population.
In the early-modern period, the institutions and government of the cities, remained more
or less stable, at least de jure. De facto, however, the independence of the cities was increas-
ingly diminished by the renewed power of absolutist rulers, that sometimes intervened to
abandon the participation of craftsmen in the city government or succeeded in regaining the
control over a city. Evenmore, structural changes in the nature of trade and internal conflicts
further weakened the position of the guilds (e.g. Haupt (ed.) 2002).
3.2 Participative Political Institutions in Pre-Modern Central Europe
3.2.1 Types of Participative Political Institutions in Pre-Modern Europe
I define participative political institutions as those political institutions that are open to one
or more groups of citizens. Alternatively, participative political institutions can constitute
rules or constitutional procedures (like e.g. electoral procedures) ensuring that citizens have
an influence on the composition and/or political decisions of the government.
A review of the existing literature on city histories (e.g. Keyser and Stoob 1939–1974,
Planitz 1966, Isenmann 1988) and studies on the constitutional and institutional history of
pre-modern cities and countries (e.g., Blockmans 1978, Bolland 1977, Borck 1988, Bräuer 1994,
Endres 1994, Fritze 1994, Göldel 1999, Hegel 1882, Hegel 1891, Herborn 1994, Maschke 1959,
Pounds 2005, Posse 1876,Prak 1994, Schlotterose 1953 and Van Zanden and Prak 2006) sug-
gest the existence of three types of participative political institutions in pre-modern central
European cities:
• City Councils with Guild Participation. As a result of the guild and burgher revolts of
the late middle ages (e.g., Blickle 1988, Boone and Prak 1995, Czok 1966, Dumolyn and
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Hamers 2005, Jecht 1908, Kluge 2009, Luther 1968, Prak 1994 and Schubert 2008) in
many cities craftsmen or guild representatives became electable for the city council—
often called “KleinerRat” (small council) or “InnererRat” (inner council))—andwere
also granted a certain number of fixed seats in the council. Sometimes, successful re-
volts resulted in a complete takeover of the city governments by the guilds (i.e., a “guild
constitution”was implemented in these cities) and a displacement of the old patricians
from political power. Example of such cities are Ulm,Magdeburg and also Zurich and
Bruges. Successful revolts resulted in a kind of “turn towards more inclusive institu-
tions” and brought the political emancipation of larger groups of the population that
were previously excluded from the political process. In some cases, successful revolts
were accompanied by the enlargement of political rights in other areas, for example,
sometimes the city councils dominated by the guilds replaced the usual co-optive elec-
tion mode of the council by election procedures that allowed at least some groups of
citizens to elect the members of the council (Schlotterose 1953, Planitz 1966).
• Institutionalized Burgher Representation. A relatively early form of political partici-
pation of the citizens was institutionalized burgher representation, e.g. through a reg-
ularly meeting community assembly or the so called “Große Rat” (great council) or
“Äußere Rat” (outer council). These institutions were usually a compound of a com-
paratively broad cross-section of different groups of citizens. This also included groups
of citizens that where not part of the ruling elite (e.g. no only merchants or guild mas-
ters). Hence, they ensured relatively broad public participation on the city govern-
ment. Often these institutions met only once or twice a year, but sometimes they met
more frequently or, alternatively, they came together in extraordinary circumstances
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when an important decision was pending. In many cities, these kinds of institutions
did notmeet on a regular basis or have fixed or constitutionally granted rights. In these
cases, it can be assumed that their actual political influence was evenmore limited than
that of the institutionalized assemblies or burgher councils. I therefore do not consider
such “un-institutionalized” burgher representation as a serious form of political par-
ticipation. In some instances, these community assemblies or burgher councils were
implemented as a result of an unsuccessful guild revolt or to prevent such guild up-
risings. In contrast to this, when a guild revolts was successful burgher representation
was sometimes even limited or completely abandoned, especially in the citieswhere the
guilds gained complete control of the government.2
• Participative Election Procedures. The last kind of participative institutions are “par-
ticipative elections”, i.e. an electoral procedure, where the city council or the magis-
trate of the city was not elected by the ruler or by the members of these institutions
themselves. In the early middle ages, the election of city officials by the citizens was the
norm. With the development of city constitutions and the installation of city councils
these electionswere usually replaced by co-option.3 The election procedures of council
andmagistrate differedwidely between cities. On the one hand, these differences arose
due to the different legal families the respective city constitutions belonged to.4 On the
other hand, there were also differences between the south and the north of Germany.5
2Although there are exceptions to this rule like, e.g. Cologne in which institutionalized representation of
the citizens was maintained and even enlarged after the successful guild revolt (Isenmann 1988).
3This holds true at least for city councils. The magistrate of the city was still elected more often (especially
in the Low Countries , see Prak 2006a,b)
4There was the “Magdeburger Recht” (the family of city constitutions for which the constitution of
Magdeburg acted as blueprint) or the “Lübecker Recht” etc.
5In the south of Germany it was usual that people elected representatives or electoral delegates that be-
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As already mentioned, in some cases, participative election procedures were the result
of guild revolts (Isenmann 1988). In most of these cases however, the guild council
eventually returned to co-option after a while (Schlotterose 1953).
3.3 Construction Procedure andDescriptive Overview
3.3.1 Sources and Construction Procedure
The variables for late medieval, early modern participative political institutions are measured
on city level. I focus on countries in the German speaking areas of the Holy Roman Empire
and the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands) that were part of the Holy Roman
Empire in the period around 1500 AD (the Dutch Republic became an de facto independent
state in the 16th century) and are relatively similar with respect to their institutional setting
(e.g., Luther 1968). I also includeGeneva despite the fact that it is located in the French speak-
ing part of Switzerland. This nevertheless seems to be justified since it belonged to the Holy
RomanEmpire formost of the observationperiod andwas thus part of the same institutional
setting as the other cities included (e.g.,it was a imperial city from 1162 onward). As already
described in the main text, the observation period is 800–1800, while I have data for eleven
hundred-year intervals (i.e., I have data for 800, 900, 1000 and so on). This allows the data to
be matched with the Bosker et al. (2013) panel data set of historical city characteristics. I code
the dummy and categorical variables as one or zero in one of those eleven intervals if a certain
rule or institution was in place their in this year and within 5 years of this date. However,
many cities inWesternGermany (especially in theRhine area) became parts of France shortly
longed to the same societal group while in the north people voted for electoral delegates according to the urban
district they belonged to. Moreover, there were minor differences due to “institutional drift”.
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before the end of the 18th century due to the Coalition Wars. The French usually replaced
the old constitutions of the cities and restricted their independence. However, in these cases I
nevertheless code the cities in 1800 as if the French had not invaded them a few years earlier—
since it is very likely that the actual political and economic outcomes in 1800 were primarily
influenced by the situation in the decades before the invasion and not by the few years under
French rule.
Overall, I collected information for 104 cities located in today’s Austria (7 cities), Belgium
(10 cities), Germany (67 cities), France (3 cities), theNetherlands (13 cities) and Switzerland (4
cities). I include all cities in these four countries that are contained in the data set of Bosker
et al. (2013). However, for Belgium, France and the Netherlands I was unable to find enough
reliable information about political institutions for all the cities in the Bosker et al. (2013)
data set and hence not all cities in these countries are part of my data set. Furthermore, I only
consider those French cities that were under German influence (i.e., part of theHoly Roman
Empire) for most of their history (Colmar, Metz and Strasbourg).
The principal source on which the coding of the variables is based for Germany is the
“Deutsche Städtebuch” (Handbook of German Cities) edited by Keyeser and Stoob (1939–
1974) a systematic collection of encyclopedic articles about the history of all German cities
(within the 1937 borders of the German Empire). Each city history article has a section with
often very detailed information about a city’s political and administrative history, its consti-
tution, laws and institutions from the beginning of its history until the 20th century. The
occurrence of significant burgher or guild uprisings during the early modern period, as well
as the outcome of these “revolts”,is also mentioned in this section. I use this information to
code the three variables (election of council ormagistrate, institutionalized burgher represen-
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tation and guild participation in the city council). The “Deutsche Städtebuch” represents a
reliable and—in terms of its information—uniquely comprehensive historical source for the
history of German cities.It is also used, for example, in Cantoni (2012,2013), Cantoni and
Yuchtman (2014) or Hornung (2014). A similar handbook is available for Austria, the so-
called “Österreichisches Städtebuch” (Hoffmann and Pickl (eds.) 1968–1999) which I used
to code Innsbruck, Vienna, Schwaz and Linz. However, the Austrian version of the “Städte-
buch” is not complete (e.g., there is not yet a volume for Kärnten or Salzburg).
However, even the ”Städtebücher” do not always contain every piece of information I am
interested in (or at least they are not explicit or detailed enough) and the available informa-
tion about medieval political institutions is generally scarce and potential unreliable. More-
over, no comprehensive handbook of cities exists for Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland. Therefore, I relied on more than 100 additional sources to code the variables,
validate the information provided by the German and Austrian “Städtebücher” and obtain
the additional information about cities in the lowcountries, the French cities ofColmar,Metz
and Strasbourg and towns in contemporary Switzerland.
The cities in the LowCountries are primarily coded according to various articles and stud-
ies byMaarten Prak (e.g., Prak 2006a,b), Lis and Soly (2006) and the two volumes of Hegel’s
(1891) monograph about the “Städte und Gilden der Germanischen Völker im Mittelalter”
which also provides detailed information about constitutional arrangements and the political
situations in many German towns. Other sources that provide information about political
institutions in the Dutch and Belgian cities are e.g., Escher and Hirschmann (eds.)(2005), an
overview article by Dumolyn and Hamers (2005), and Auty’s (ed.)(2002) “Lexikon des Mit-
telalters” (“Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages”).
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For Germany, Austria and Switzerland I furthermore relied heavily on the information
about the outcomes of guild revolts given in Planitz (1966), and Czok’s (1966) review of
burgher uprisings in southern and western Germany in the 14th century. However, I also in-
corporate information from various city histories (like, e.g., that of Borst (1996) for Stuttgart,
or Csendes and Opll (2001) for Vienna).
Other sources include monographs and articles about city constitutions, city councils or
burgher/ guild revolts in particular regions or cities, e.g.: Blaschke (2002) dealing with the
administrative and constitutional history of Saxony, Endres (1994) about the constitution in
late medieval and early modern Nuremberg, or Jecht (1908) considering craftsmen uprisings
in medieval Görlitz.
A final kind of sources I take into consideration are city histories on the official websites
of a city or reliable online encyclopedias like the “Historisches Lexikon Bayern” (Historical
Encyclopedia of Bavaria) an online encyclopedia developed by the federal library of Bavaria
and financed by the federal BavarianMinistry of Education and Science.
In some cases, the information provided by the various sources is inconsistent. Most often
this is because not every source gives equally detailed and explicit information about e.g., the
electionmode of the city council andmagistrate or the existence of institutionalized burgher
representation. Furthermore, not all sources contain information for the entire period of
observation from 800–1800. In these cases I generally rely on the information given by the
“Deutsche Städtebuch” unless all other sources agree on another version. In the cases where
the “Deutsche Städtebuch” does not provide information (e.g., in the case of the LowCoun-
tries) I follow the opinion of the majority of the sources or, if there is no majority opinion,
choose themost conservative option, i.e., when two different dates arementioned for the im-
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plementation, e.g., of a community assembly I choose the later one. This should guarantee
that I do not measure the effect of an institution that was not actually working in the period
in question. What is more, there are considerable differences between the cities in the sam-
ple concerning the availability of data. For some large cities, e.g. Cologne or Vienna there
are many sources that provide detailed and reliable evidence about the particularities of the
respective institutions and their evolution. However, for many cities, especially smaller ones,
very few or sometimes (as in the case of Schwaz or Geneva) only one source was available that
provided evidence. In addition, this evidence might not be as detailed or comprehensive as
that existing forCologne,Nuremberg orVienna. More information about how I coded these
cities and why I nevertheless included them into the data set is available in Appendix B.2.
As a general rule, I assumed that the particular institution or constitutional right existed,
once implemented, until the end of the observation period (1800). However, the sources I
consulted (e.g., the “Deutsche Städtebuch”) often mentioned when a particular rule or elec-
tion was changed, a city lost its independence or the guilds were abandoned from the city
council. If this information is provided, I take it into account.
Finally, I validate some of the information in the sources for the German cities by look-
ing at the primary sources on which they are based (if available). For example, I looked at
Bodemann (ed.) (1883) or Philippi (1890) which collected, edited and commented on the his-
torical public records of the guilds in Lüneburg and Osnabrück, respectively. I also looked
at Keutgen (1901) a collection of official documents reporting the constitutional history of
several German cities (like e.g., Cologne). From comparing these with the information inmy
sources they seem to be in line with the documents in these and other primary sources.
Table B.2 reports all cities in the sample (in alphabetical order) and the respective sources
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consulted to code the three main variables for the particular city.
3.3.2 Descriptive Overview
Table 3.1 provides a descriptive overview of the three participative political institutions vari-
ables and also for the guild constitution dummy (guild participation index=2). Table 3.2
presents bivariate correlations between the three variables as well as important economic and
social outcome variables like the natural logarithm of city population (from the Bosker et al.
2013 data set), a dummy representing early (i.e., before 1500 AD) adoption of printing and a
dummy indicating whether a city was an important medieval trade center.6
Table 3.1: Descriptive Overview of the Participative Political Institutions Measures
Variable Obs.Mean Std. Dev.MinMax
Guild Participation Index 1144 0.242 0.563 0 2
Inst. Burgher Representation 1144 0.150 0.358 0 1
Participative Elections 1144 0.102 0.303 0 1
Guild Constitution 1144 0.062 0.241 0 1
These bivariate correlations show, that there are significant, but comparatively modest,
positive correlations between the different measures of participative political institutions.7
The highest correlation exists between participative elections and the guild participation in-
dex (0.27). This indicates that while there is a positive relationship between the different
participative political institutions, their determinants and origins might be different. Fur-
thermore, each of the participative political institutions measures is significantly related to
6The sources and exact definitions of these variables are given in the Appendix.
7The only exception is, of course, the high correlation between the guild participation index and the guild
constitution dummy.
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the early adoption of printing or being a trade city. But only the guild participation index
shows a significant and positive correlation to the main proxy of economic development in
the pre-industrial world, city population. And even this correlation is relatively low (0.11)
when compared to ,e.g., the correlation of guild participation and early adoption of printing
(0.3). Thuswhile theremaybe apositive impact ofmore participative political institutions on
technological adoption and commercial activities, their impact on city development remains
unclear, at least when looking at bivariate correlations. Of course, these correlations do not
reveal anything about causal relationships and they should therefore not be over-interpreted.
3.4 Distribution and Evolution of Participative Political Institutions in
Medieval Central Europe
3.4.1 The Distribution of Participative Political Institutions in Central
Europe
To get an overview of the distribution of participative political institutions and to discover
potentially existing spatial patterns that could contribute to the understanding of their ori-
gins it is useful to look at maps showing the spatial distribution of these institutions in the
considered countries.8 I have not created a map with cities that have developed communal
institutions, since this is true for all but 5 of the cities in the data set and thus a map would
hardly be informative.
Figure 3.1 maps the distribution of guild participation in the city council in the Holy Ro-
man Empire in 1500 AD. Cities with no guild participation are gray, cities with at least some
8The map is created by the author. The borders of the Holy Roman Empire originate from the shapefile
“Georeferenced Historical Vector Data 1500” created by Christos and Marc-Antoine Nüssli (Copyright 2008,
Christos Nüssli, Euratlas – www.euratlas.com, reproduction prohibited, license of October 29th 2014).
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participation of guilds or craftsmen in the council are blue and cities with a guild constitution
(i.e., where the guilds were a major political force) are red colored.
Figure 3.1: Participation of Guilds in City Council
I can infer from the map that there were almost no cities with guild participation in the
north of Germany and the Netherlands, i.e. in core area of the Hanseatic League (Dollinger
1966). This is in line with historical evidence that theHansetic League often successfully sup-
pressed guild revolts and defended the ruling merchant elite in its member cities (e.g. Luther
1966). I also see that guild participation was mainly concentrated in south-west Germany,
today’s Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium (the duchies of Flanders and Brabant). In central Ger-
many there is a medium frequency of guild participation and there are only a few cities with
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a guild constitution (Brunswick, Goslar and Magdeburg) all of which were members of the
Hanseatic League and important political, commercial or ecclesiastical centers and therefore
predestined for the outbreak of a guild revolt. In those cities the guilds succeeded in their
attempts to gain political power despite the opposition of the Hanseatic League. There are
almost no cities with guild participation in Bavaria which is due to the comparatively strong
position of the Bavarian ruler and to the fact that bishops or archbishops (as e.g. in Passau)
were often successful in suppressing the guilds.
Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution pattern of institutionalized burgher representa-
tion (where cities with burgher representation are colored in dark-gray). As burgher repre-
sentation was comparatively widespread throughout the German speaking area of the Holy
Roman Empire there is no obvious pattern. Perhaps one can say that in the south-west of
Germany and in Switzerland—where guild participationwas especially prevalent—burgher
representation was not as common as it was in, e.g., in Saxony. In general, it seems that in
northernGermany (in particular in the north-east apart from the cities on theGerman-Czech
border) the frequency of burgher representation is slightly higher. This could be the case be-
cause the trade cities of the Hanseatic League often had a kind of institutionalized burgher
representation. What is striking is the virtual absence of burgher representation in Belgium
and the Netherlands. There was a weaker tradition of such representative institutions in the
Low Countries compared to the German speaking areas.
Figure 3.3 visualizes the distribution of participative elections. Of all participative insti-
tutions participative elections are the least widespread. What emerges from the map is that
participative elections are almost absent in Austria and Bavaria and less prevalent in Belgium,
an area in the middle of Germany today belonging to Thuringia, Lower Saxony and Saxony-
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Figure 3.2: Existence of Institutionalized Burgher Representation
Anhalt and historically consisting ofmanymembers of theHanseatic League, residence cities
like Hanover, and commercial centers like Erfurt or Magdeburg.
The spatial distributionpatterns of the threeparticipative institutions are remarkablydissimilar—
pointing to a different evolutionary history of these institutions. Nevertheless, some gen-
eral insights emerge from the detected spatial patterns. They preliminarily suggest a role of
the Hanseatic League, commercial and ecclesiastical importance as well as regime type and
state capacity for the existence or non-existence of such institutions. The patterns discovered
might also be interpreted as providing evidence for the importance of rivers and distance to
the coast for the development of participative political institutions. Because proximity to the
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Figure 3.3: Burgher Participation in the Election of City Governments
sea and rivers was connected to e.g. the commercial importance of cities, these factors are
likely candidates for the main predictors of participative political institutions.
3.4.2 The Evolution of Participative Political Institutions in Central Eu-
rope
It could be instructive to look at the temporal evolution of the different types of participa-
tive political institutions. To do so, I plot the share of cities with one of the four types of
participative political institutions for every 100 years from 800 AD to 1800 AD.
The temporal evolution of the share of cities with the respective participative political in-
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stitutions is depicted separately in Figure 3.4 for four of the threemeasures but I draw separate
picture for cities with guild participation (Guild Participation Index=1 or 2) and guild consti-
tutions (Guild Participation Index=2). The general temporal evolution pattern is the same
for each of the four institutions. Their spread began somewhere in the later medieval period
and their diffusion continued until the end of the 15th century (consistent with e.g., Pirenne
1964 or van Werveke 1963). From the 16th century onward their prevalence remains roughly
constant. But the prevalence of guild participation, guild constitutions and also of partici-
pative elections did significantly decline in the early modern period (e.g., the share of cities
with guild participation declined from around 50 % to around 30 %). These types of partic-
ipative institutions were often abolished in the early modern period when local rulers or the
emperors became strong again or the cities lost their commercial and strategic importance.
Conversely, institutionalized burgher representation prevailed at pretty much the same
level of roughly 30 % after 1500 AD. And the share of cities with communal institutions even
increased somewhat after 1500 AD.
Another peculiarity worth mentioning is the different timing of the diffusion of the re-
spective institutions. While communal institutions developed from the 12th century onward
as institutionalized burgher representations and participative elections did, guild participa-
tion in the city council did not occur before the 13th century. These latter two institutions
are thus closely connected to the rise of communal institutions and reflect the rise of urban
Europe that went along with—and was the prerequisite for—the development of other so-
phisticated economic and social institutions responsible for the growth of trade, commerce
and human capital that central and northern Europe experienced in the later medieval and
earlymodernperiod (e.g. Greif 2006, Lopez 1976). In effect, the development of participative
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Figure 3.4: The Evolution of Participative Political Institutions
communal political institutions documents the beginning of the “rise of the west” leading to
Europe taking over both the Muslim and the Asian world.
By contrast, participation of guilds in the city council did not exist before the 13th century.
As this largely resulted from the guild and burgher revolts of the later medieval era the causes
and origins of these revolts are of interest themselves. It could be that the rise of communal
institutions that started earlier and the guild revolts were symptoms of the same economic
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rise of Europe that—together with temporal shocks like the Black Death— later resulted in
the “Great Divergence”. On the other hand, they might have contributed to a further rise
of other participative political institutions and could therefore be considered as a separate
factor.
All in all, the data is pretty much in line with previous historical knowledge about the
evolution of city governance in pre-modern Europe (as outlined in section 2).
3.5 Final Remarks
This paper has introduced and described a new database on participative political institu-
tions in pre-modern central Europe. Thedatabase provides newopportunities for researchers
working on questions related to the impact of political institutions and regimes on economic
outcomes, the effect of guilds, and on the connections between economic and political insti-
tutions. As far as I am aware, it is the most comprehensive and specific database on the po-
litical institutions in early modern European cities currently available. The present database
only constitutes a starting point and researchers are invited to enlarge the data set with in-
formation on other types of institutions or information for cities in other countries or other
years. Nevertheless, the existing database already has a useful application, as demonstrated for
example in the next chapter, where it is used, together with other data to explore the origins
of political change—i.e., the late medieval guild revolts.
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“We used to think that revolutions are the cause of change.
Actually it is the other way around: change prepares the
ground for revolution.”
Eric Hoffer
4
Origins of Political Change. Structural vs.
Exogenous Factors as Cause of the Late
Medieval Guild Revolts*
Inthelastdecadestherehas been an increasing interest in the role institutional innova-
tions in the later medieval and early modern period played in the so called “Rise of theWest”
*This chapter is in the revise and resubmit at the Journal of Economic History. An earlier version of this
chapter appeared as EHESWorking Paper in EconomicHistory No. 69 (Wahl 2014). The author is indebted to
Tobias Jopp, Miguel Laborda-Peman and Aderonke Osikominu as well as seminar participants in Hohenheim
and Regensburg especially Jan Bauer, Benjamin Fuchs, Robert Jung and Mark Spoerer for helpful discussions
and suggestions.
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and the so called “Great Divergence”. This literature, is usually concerned with the conse-
quences of the changes that occurred in this period in national or communal level political
institutions and regimes (e.g. Allen 2003, Bosker et al. 2013, De Long and Shleifer 1993, Greif
2006, Stasavage 2007,2011,2014 or Van Zanden et al. 2012). However, these studies rarely
provide a systematic empirical analysis of the origins of these institutional innovations. Yet,
uncovering the roots of participative (or inclusive) institutions in later medieval central Eu-
rope is essential for understanding themedieval roots of the “GreatDivergence”(VanZanden
2008) and, even more important, the origins of political change.1 Furthermore, it can also be
informative about the relationship between economic and political changes as the political
change of this period paralleled a notable economic recovery, the so called “commercial rev-
olution” (Lopez 1976).
By investigating the origins of the late medieval guild revolts this study seeks to shed light
on these issues. It is supposed that the guild revolts constituted an important trigger for the
turn towardsmore inclusive political institutions documented for the later medieval period.2
They often resulted in craftsmen and other groups of citizens gaining political rights to have a
say in the city council and in election procedures that gavemore groups of citizens the right to
vote. Therefore, the study of their causes is informative about the origins of the “institutional
revolution” in late medieval cities. Furthermore, while there is a vast historical literature on
the causes and consequences of the late medieval guild revolts (e.g., Dumolyn and Hamers
2005 or Luther 1966) there is no quantitative empirical assessment of their causes. Hence,
1During the later medieval period many other institutional, social, economic and educational innovations
emerged that contributed to a renewal of prosperity and growth. Among those innovations are the rise of
Protestantism (Cantoni 2012), the invention of the printing press (Dittmar 2011) and the foundation of univer-
sities (Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014).
2Under guild or burgher revolts I understand the uprisings of craftsmen—and oftentimes other group of
burghers—against the rulers of the town (e.g. a merchant elite) .
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this study also provides an empirical test of the existing qualitative historical arguments.
Historians identified two types of factors primarily responsible for the outbreak of a re-
volt. First, many historians consider structural factors as main determinants of the guild re-
volts. They argue that the renewal of economic prosperity during the commercial revolution
shifted the economic but not political power away from the merchants to craftsmen. Hence,
the guild revolts are understood as an attempt of newly enriched craftsmen to gain not only
economic but also political power. Furthermore, an often enclosed, degenerated and quarrel-
ing ruling class promoted the emergence of revolts. On the one hand, this was due to the fact
that this elite found itself in a weaker position and on the other hand because their excessive
expenditures financially ruined the cities (e.g Luther 1968, Planitz 1966).
Second, exogenous factor or shocks are are given major responsibility for the revolts. Pro-
ponents of this view argue that, most importantly, the interplay between the late medieval
agrarian crisis and the Black Death alongside more regional events like the double election
of the German king or the persecution of Jews (often the context of the plague) caused the
revolts (e.g. Blickle 1988, Cohn 2008).
While some scholars put forward one kind of factors as primary source of the guild revolts,
most research (e.g. Luther 1968, Planitz 1966) consider both kind of factors to be important
for the outbreak of the revolts. Thus, this study seeks to investigate empiricallywhether struc-
tural or exogenous factors or both accounted for the occurrence of guild revolts.
The study is based on uniquely large and systematic data on the prevalence and outcomes
of guild revolts in 104 cities in Germany, Austria, the German-speaking area of Switzerland
(plus Geneva), Alsace-Lorraine and the Low Countries for every hundred year period be-
tween 800 and 1800 AD (i.e., it covers the German-speaking parts of the Holy Roman Em-
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pire and the institutionally and culturally similar Low Countries). This data is part of the
“Participative Political Institutions in Medieval Europe Database” introduced in chapter 3.
The collected data is the most comprehensive and detailed collection of information about
the late medieval guild revolts that the author is aware of. Furthermore, it is the first data
set on political institutions on city-level and thus making it possible to exploit variation in
political institutions between cities.
Based on this data set the article first provides an overview of the temporal evolution and
spatial distribution of successful guild revolts. Afterwards, I conduct an empirical analysis of
the origins of the guild revolts. For the empirical analysis I supplement the database on par-
ticipative political institutions with variables from the city level panel data set of Bosker et al.
(2013) and further variables coded bymaking use of other sources and the participative politi-
cal institutions database. I conduct cross-sectional regressions, accounting for endogeneity by
regressing pre-treatment values of the explanatory variables on the guild revolts/participation
measures.
A first important results is that cities that were centers of proto-industry had a higher and
important centers of medieval trade had a lower probability of guild participation in the city
council. This shows that structural factors played a significant role in triggering the guild
revolts and the political change towards more participative political institutions. However,
I also find that being located in a rural area—but not agricultural productivity—mattered,
suggesting that the agricultural crisis and the Black Death were important. Being located in
the countryside made a city more severely affected by rural-to-urban migration flows that in-
creased intra-urban conflicts between craftsmen and the ruling elite. At last, the empirical
analysis suggests a certain role of neighborhood spillovers, i.e. there is a higher probability
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of guild participation if the share of neighborhood cities with such a participation is higher.
Therefore, strategic considerations and expectations about the probability of a success or fail-
ure of the revolts were of relevance.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section two, an overview of the guild revolt data is given
and the temporal evolution and spatial distribution of successful guild revolts is discussed.
Then, the causes of guild revolts identified by the historical literature are discussed and con-
nected to arguments from the theoretical economic literature on political institutions. In
section four, I conduct the empirical analysis of the causes of the guild revolts and discuss
their implications. Finally, section five concludes.
4.1 LateMedieval Guild Revolts—Data andDescriptive Patterns
4.1.1 Data on Guild Revolts
The data on guild revolts and other types of political institutions in cities stems from the
“Participative Political Institutions in Pre-Modern Europe Database” created by the author
and introduced in the previous chapter. Among others, the database includes information
on the occurrence and outcome of guild revolts for theGerman-speaking area (i.e., Germany,
Austria and Switzerland) as well as the Netherlands, Belgium and three cities located in the
Alsace-Lorraine region of today’s France (Colmar, Metz and Strasbourg) but historically be-
longing largely to the Holy Roman Empire (for reasons of simplicity, in the following I will
call this area “central Europe”).3 The inclusion of the Netherlands and Belgium is justified
because parts of those countries belonged to the Holy Roman Empire throughout the later
3Furthermore, I include Flensburg in the dataset. Flensburg was Danish until it became Prussian in 1846.
Nevertheless, it is contained in the “Deutsche Städtebuch” and its history and development is closely connected
with Germany and e.g., the Hanseatic League. Due to this I decided to include Flensburg.
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medieval period. The institutional environment and economic and social developments in
these countries were comparatively similar to that in the German-speaking area as, for ex-
ample, there were also guild revolts and there also existed imperial cities and cities of the
Hanseatic League. In including the territory of today’s Belgium and theNetherlands I follow
other historians, like Luther (1968), who have previously studied the guild revolts.
The starting point for the collection of data was the city level panel data set on European
and Muslim cities assembled by Bosker et al. (2013). They follow Bairoch et al. (1984) and
consider a place to be a city if it had more than 10000 inhabitants at least one time in its
history. Each of the variables in this data set has a value at the beginning of each 100 year
period from 800 AD to 1800 AD (i.e. there is data for 800, 900, 1000, 1100 and so on). The
rationale for choosing this data set was that the variables it contains are used to conduct the
empirical investigation on the origins of participative political institutions later on. For each
city in the sampling area described above and included in the Bosker et al. (2013) data set I
tried to find information on whether and when their was a guild revolt in a city and what its
outcome was.
Mymain source for the codingof the variableswas the “Deutsche Städtebuch” (Handbook
of German Cities) edited by Keyser and Stoob (1939–1974) an eleven volume encyclopedia
with systematic information on various aspects of the history of all German cities within the
1937 border of theGerman Empire. I coded the cities inAustria primarily according to a simi-
lar handbook forAustria, the “Österreichisches Städtebuch”, or frommonographs about city
history. The cities in Belgium and the Netherlands were coded primarily according to Prak
(2006a,b), Lis and Soly (2006), the second volume of Hegel (1891), Dumolyn and Hamers
(2005), Van Zanden and Prak (2006) and various other sources.
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Since the coding requires comparatively detailed data and because there is a considerable
amount of uncertainty in information about developments and institutions in the medieval
and early modern period I additionally consulted sources about the history of each individ-
ual city (e.g., Borst 1968 or Csendes and Opll 2001) and about their historical constitutions,
guilds or political institutions (such as Blaschke 2002, Endres 1994 or Jecht 1908). Overall,
I consulted more than 100 sources for the coding of the variables. The city specific sources
on which the coding is based are reported city-wise in Appendix B, Table B.2. In chapter 3 I
elaborate on the data and discuss its construction in more detail.
Table 4.1: Guild Revolts and Participation in the City Council—Descriptive Overview
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800
Successful Guild Revolts 14 28 11
Guild Participation (cumulated) 13 25 29 21 18 18
Guild Constitution (cumulated) 1 13 19 16 14 13
Share of Cities with
Guild Participation 12.50% 36.50% 46.20% 35.60% 30.80% 29.80%
However, even when using such a large amount of sources, I was unable to find reliable
information for each of the cities considered in Belgium and the Netherlands. Overall, I was
able to collect information on participative political institutions in 104 cities. In 51 of them
successful guild revolts took place somewhere between the 13th and the 15th century.4 In
eleven cities, primarily in the north of Germany, unsuccessful revolts were recorded.5 An
4In two cities, Berlin andChemnitz, two successful revolts took place, the first in the 13th century and then,
after the guilds lost their participation in the council the regained it in the 15th century.
5Apart from a few cases (Nuremberg in 1348/49) it is not possible to two identify how many unsuccessful
revolts took place as the information on this is often very unspecific. Thus, I cannot meaningfully attribute
these events to one of the observation years. Furthermore, I am primarily interested in the triggers of economic
change and therefore in successful guild revolts.
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overview of the number of revolts and the number of cities with participation of the guilds
in the city government in each century is given in Table 4.1.
It could be instructive to look at the temporal evolution of the guild participation as de-
picted in Table 4.1. The general temporal evolution pattern is the same for both kinds of
revolt outcomes. Their spread began after 1200 AD and their diffusion continued until the
end of the 15th century (consistent with e.g., Pirenne 1964 or van Werveke 1963). From the
16th century onward their prevalence declines remarkably . Both types of participative insti-
tutions were abolished, often in the early modern period when local rulers or the emperors
became strong again or when the cities lost their commercial and strategic importance.
4.1.2 The Spatial Distribution of Guild Revolts and Participation
Toget an overviewof the distribution of guild revolts and guild participation in the city coun-
cil and to discover potentially existing spatial patterns that could contribute to the under-
standing of their origins it is useful to look at maps showing the spatial distribution of these
revolts in the considered countries and across different waves.
Figure 4.1 therefore maps the distribution of cities with successful revolts in the 13th and
14th century, i.e. in the first two waves of the revolts. Cities that had at least some participa-
tion of craftsmen in the council for any period are blue colored and cities with a guild consti-
tution are red. Themaps show that the first wave of guild revoltswas concentrated inwestern
and northern Germany, i.e. in the later Upper Rhenish Circle of the HRE and in the Lower
Saxon Circle. The Upper Rhenish Circle in particular was highly politically fragmented and
thus lacked a strong central authority that could probably prevent successful revolts.
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Figure 4.1: Spatial Distribution of the First TwoWaves of Guild Revolts
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This first wave is perhaps also connected with a lack of central power and the anarchic
situation after the collapse of the Staufer dynasty and the subsequent “great interregnum”.
It is also visible that in this first wave the guilds were only able to gain some participation in
city government but not to become the dominant political force.
More than half of all revolts took place in the second wave of the revolts in the 14th cen-
tury. This time, the geographic focuswasmore in the south of the empire (i.e., in the Swabian
Circle and in today’s Switzerland as well as in theWestphalian and Burgundian Circle). Con-
trary to previous revolts, this time the guilds succeeded in a complete take over of the city
government inmany cases. The newly gained strength of the Southern andWesternGerman
imperial and trade cities as well as the outbreak of the Black Death were likely to have been
responsible for this wave of revolts.
Figure 4.2 maps the third and last wave of the revolts (the upper map) and also visualizes
the overall picture of guild participation in 1500 AD, a date after which no new successful
guild revolts are recorded (the lowermap). The last wave of the revolts in the 15th century saw
only a few revolts, mainly in the Low Countries (Burgundian Circle) and in the Franconian
Circle. In general, the shift of the revolts to the South and in particular to the north mirrors
the regional economic and social development patterns in this period. Again, none of the
revolts in the third wave resulted in a complete take-over of the city government.
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Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of the Guild Revolts and Their ThirdWave
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In Table 4.2, I conducted OLS regressions to predict the occurrence of a revolt in a respec-
tive wave by the geographic coordinates of the cities and Imperial circle dummies.6
These linear probability models complement the visualization of the evolution of guild
revolts in Figure 4.1. They confirm that the first wave of revolts in the 13th century were
concentrated in the upper Rhenish circle while the subsequent wave in the 14th century pri-
marily took place in the south west of the sampling area (in low latitudes and longitudes)
especially in the Swabian circle (probability of a successful guild revolt is around 50 % higher
than for the Bavarian circle constituting the base group). But the second wave seems to have
had another north-eastern regional core in the SaxonCircle (later separated into the lower and
upper Saxon circles). Finally, the last wave of revolts in the 15th century was geographically
concentrated in the LowCountries (i.e., the Burgundian Circle) and in the Franconian Circle
(nowadays in Hesse and the north of Bavaria) although the significant negative coefficient of
Longitude in column (5) indicates that the main center of revolts was in the Low Countries.
Finally, the overall picture of guild participation after the end of the revolts in 1500 AD is
depicted in the lower map of Figure 4.2. When looking at this map one can infer that there
were almost no cities with guild participation in the north of Germany and the Netherlands,
i.e. in core area of the Hanseatic League (Dollinger 1966). This is in line with historical evi-
dence that the Hansetic League often successfully suppressed guild revolts and defended the
ruling merchant elite in its member cities (e.g. Luther 1968). I also see that guild participa-
tion was mainly concentrated in south-west Germany, today’s Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium
6Imperial circleswere established as administrative units in theHolyRomanEmpire in 1512—that is shortly
after the period of the revolts. Nevertheless, they could capture much of the heterogeneity between the areas
of the Holy Roman Empire in the previous centuries. Furthermore, as the 104 cities in the data set are located
in 73 territories it is no alternative to use territory fixed effects instead. I also include a separate dummy for the
“electorate” territories, the so called “Kurfürstentümer’, i.e. the territories of the “Kurfürsten” the secular rulers
and archbishops who were allowed to elect the German king.
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Table 4.2: Geographic Evolution of the Guild Revolts
Dependent Variable Successful Revolt in
13th century 14th century 15th century
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Latitude -0.012 -0.011 -0.057*** -0.096** 0.006 -0.026
(0.017) (0.030) (0.022) (0.037) (0.009) (0.023)
Longitude 0.011 -0.008 -0.035** -0.020 -0.009 0.02
(0.008) (0.025) (0.013) (0.029) (0.011) (0.016)
Electorate 0.138 0.205 0.204*
(0.136) (0.157) (0.111)
Upper Rhenish Circle 0.393* 0.07 0.068
(0.227) (0.225) (0.059)
Saxon Circle 0.150 0.389* 0.105
(0.184) (0.224) (0.1)
Swabian Circle -0.100 0.523* 0.004
(0.096) (0.264) (0.023)
Franconian Circle 0.083 -0.118 0.35*
(0.178) (0.12) (0.207)
Westphalian Circle -0.095 0.264 0.234
(0.175) (0.271) (0.149)
Austrian Circle 0.055 0.154 -0.083
(0.222) (0.248) (0.063)
Burgundian Circle -0.112 0.369 0.420**
(0.231) (0.305) (0.173)
No. of Revolts 14 28 11
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 0.017 0.163 0.111 0.201 0.011 0.132
Notes. Heteroskedasdicity robust are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero
at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. The base group for the Imperial circle
dummies is the Bavarian circle. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
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(the duchies of Flanders and Brabant). In central Germany there is a medium frequency of
guildparticipation and there are only a few citieswith a guild constitution (Brunswick,Goslar
andMagdeburg) all of which weremembers of theHanseatic league and important political,
commercial or ecclesiastical centers and therefore probably predestined for the outbreak of
a guild revolt. In those cities the guilds succeeded in their attempts to gain political power
despite the opposition of the Hanseatic League. There are almost no cities with guild par-
ticipation in Bavaria which could be due the comparatively strong position of the Bavarian
ruler and to the fact that bishops there (e.g. in Passau) were often successful in suppressing
the guilds.
4.2 OriginsofGuildRevolts—HistoricalDiscussionandTheoreticalCon-
siderations
Broadly spoken, existing historical research on the causes of the guild revolts identified two
kind of factors as playing a major role in the occurrence of the late medieval guild revolts.
First, many scholars highlight the role structural (or endogenous) factors played in the cau-
sation of the revolts (e.g. Blickle 1988, Czok 1966, Epstein 1991, Luther 1968, Maschke 1959 or
Pirenne 1963). Hence, the guild revolts are understood as consequence of the revival of trade,
commerce and the institutional innovations connected with this “commercial revolution” of
the late medieval period. Many researchers (e.g. Blickle 1988, Luther 1968) have pointed to
the stark contrast between the economic importance of the craftsmen and their non-existent
political rights as major cause of the revolts. The theoretical framework of Acemoglu et al.
(2005a) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) is useful to understand this argument. While
the de jure political powerwas concentrated in the hand of the patriciate, the de facto political
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power shifted to the craft guilds and non-patriciate merchants. This shift was the outcome
of the economic institutions, which allocated more and more resources to the guilds. This
was true not only for economic resources but also for military resources, as the guilds often
also provided the city’s military. Consequently, the guilds aimed on gaining de jure political
power by making a revolt—and they actually most often succeeded at least temporarily.
This story also fits with a second often-mentioned structural reason for the guild revolts:
the decline or degeneration of the elite (Blickle 1988, Luther 1968, Planitz 1966, Pirenne 1963).
What began as the rule of economically successful and sometimes even philanthropic mer-
chants engaged in long-distance trade activities usually ended-up in an enclosed, oligarchic
rule of a few families. This oligarchic rule increased inequality, which is a major cause of re-
volts and revolutions (Acemoglu andRobinson 2001, 2006). Furthermore, this degeneration
had various other effects giving rise to the occurrence of a revolt.
At first the families often fought against each other often resulting in the deaths of impor-
tant members of such dynasties leaving both a vacuum of power and a rational reason—the
restoration of peace—for the guilds and burghers to take over government. Second, corrup-
tion,misgovernment andwars led by the elites resulted in financial problems and tax increases
not for the elite but for themajority of peoplewithout political rights (e.g. Wissell 1971). This
increased inequality and the likelihood of revolt. Last, the elites lost their economic and edu-
cational advantages since they stopped being engaged in long-distance trade and lived as gen-
tlemen of leisure or pensioners (Luther 1968). The degeneration of patrician and oligarchic
rule is in line with the theoretical considerations of Acemoglu (2008),the empirical findings
on that matter for a cross-section of European cities (e.g. Epstein 2000 or Stasavage 2011,
2014) for particular cases like e.g. Venice (Puga and Trefler 2014) and classical ideas about a
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“political” or “regime cycle” going back to Plato andAristotle andwhich are also emphasized
by Pirenne (1963). More generally, this picture underlines that economic opportunities and
institutions are essential prerequisites for political change and the emergence of participative
political institutions. If this is true, the guild revolts can be seen as a phenomenon similar to
the increase ofAtlantic trade in the earlymodern period that laid the ground for further insti-
tutional improvements (Acemoglu et al. 2005). To sum up, according to this argument, the
elite became the victims of the prosperity, economic and social complexity it had generated
by itself.
Second, historians discuss several exogenous factors potentially important for the occur-
rence of guild revolts. Most prominently, they argue that the outbreak of the Black Death in
the 14th century was connected to the occurrence of guild revolts in various way (e.g., Blickle
1988, Cohn 2008, Luther 1968 or Planitz 1966). For example, it led—together with climatic
changes at the end of the medieval warm period—to a severe agrarian crisis resulting in a de-
cline in the prices of agricultural goods and a corresponding increase in the prices of industrial
commodities and real wages in cities—as mortality form the plague was higher in cities than
in the countryside. This divergence of living standards between rural and urban areas led
to massive migration movements of people from the countryside to the cities. This influx
of people, especially craftsmen, resulted in a conflict about the restrictiveness of migration
policy between the urban craftsmen and the city council controlled by the merchant elite.
7 Moreover, the persecution of Jews was often connected with an upheaval of the old elites
(Luther 1968) and was also connected with the Black Death epidemics (Cohn 2007). Finally,
the double-election of the German King in 1314 ADwas a source of intra-city conflicts as the
7More on the nexus between the Black Death, the Agrarian crisis and its impact on the economy can be
found in Henning (1994).
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guilds and the elite were often loyal to other kings and were strategically supported by the
king to which they were loyal. Sometimes the guilds used this conflict to revolt against the
elites and to come to power themselves (Luther 1968).
What is more, most scholars agree that probably both type of factors jointly contributed
to the emergence of the guild revolts (e.g. Luther 1968). Hence, it is likely that the both
exogenous and structural factors are jointly responsible for the causation of the revolts.
Therefore, it is the aim of this article to test whether structural or exogenous factors or
both were responsible for the occurrence of the late medieval guild revolts.
4.3 Explaining the Guild Revolts—Empirical Evidence
4.3.1 Variables
4.3.1.1 Dependent Variables
To explore the roots of the guild revolts in the 14th and 15th century I make use of three
different dummy variables acting as dependent variables.
The first dependent variable is a dummyvariable equal to one if a city experienced a success-
ful guild revolt and the guilds participated in the city council (“GuildParticipationDummy”).
Second, I use a dummy variable reporting the occurrence of guild revolts in a city, i.e. it is
equal to one if the sources indicate a guild upraising, regardless of whether it was successful
(i.e. the guilds participated in the city government after the revolt) or not (“Guild Revolt”
Dummy). Third, a dummy variable serves as dependent variable indicating cities with a guild
constitution, i.e. cities inwhich the guilds not only participate in the city council but also had
the majority or all of the seats (“Guild Constitution Dummy”).
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The three different guild revoltmeasures are chosen because using only one of themwould
potentially lead to erroneous conclusions. This is because focusing only on successful revolts
could give the wrong picture of their underlying causes. This is especially true if there were
systematic reasons behind the failure of some revolts. The choice to consider separately those
cities under full political control of the guilds is justified for several reasons. First, the influ-
ence of guilds on the actual politics of a city was much lower when they only had e.g., one
third of the representatives in the city council instead of the majority. Even if the guilds held
half of the seats the actual influence of those representativeswas often limited (Maschke 1959).
Hence, the effect of successful guild revolts is expected to be lower in those cities than in cities
where the triumph of craftsmenwas absolute and they became the dominant political force.8
4.3.1.2 Main Explanatory Variables
Themain explanatory variables are proxies for the structural and exogenous factors discussed
in the previous section. Structural factors are proxied by economic variables.
If it is correct that the guild revolts endogenously emerged as a byproduct of the commer-
cial revolution they should have occurred primarily in the commercial and economic centers
of the late medieval HRE. To test this, I collected data on the centers of proto-industry in
the HRE, i.e. I construct a variable that is equal to zero if a city was not an important cen-
8Some historians, e.g. Luther (1968) argue for the necessity of a even more fine-grained categorization
scheme of the political influence of guilds. He distinguishes between five categories of cities: (i) Cities where
the majority of the seats in the city council is held by the patriciate, (ii) cities in which guilds and the patriciate
havehalf of the seats respectively, (iii) citieswhere the guilds provide themajority of the representatives in the city
council, (iv) cities where the guilds have all seats in the city council and (v) cities that remain under the complete
control of the patriciate. However, it is not obvious what the difference between e.g. category (iii) and (iv)
actually is. In conclusion, these five categories seem to be much more arbitrary than necessary. Moreover, for
many cities the information provided by the sources is not detailed enough to code the cities according to such
a categorization scheme. This is why I follow e.g. Fuhrmann (1939) and stick to a three category scheme (i.e., (i)
no guild participation, (ii) some guild participation and (iii) guilds are the major political force).
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ter of proto-industry, one if it was a center of textile (cloth, linen, silk or woolen industry)
or metal industry and two if it was a center of both industries.9 As second measure, I in-
clude a dummy variable indicating whether a city was an important supra-regional center of
trade. Being an important trade center could raise the probability of a guild revolt since me-
dieval trade and commerce created the economic opportunities and high inequality that were
conductive for guild uprisings. On the other hand, the local merchant elite had a strong in-
centive to suppress these revolts and to defend its power by all available means and it can be
assumed that the power of guilds was higher in industrial centers than in commercial centers
primarily engaged in trade but not production (e.g. Maschke 1959). Furthermore, it is justi-
fied to consider the interaction of commercial and industrial importance (i.e. a city that was
both a center of industry and trade) as it was probably decisive for the outbreak of a revolt.
This for example can be illustrated with the case of Brunswick—that was a notable center
of production—there was a successful guild revolt despite the fact that it was a member of
the Hanseatic League. Actually, many of the important members of the Hanseatic League
were only engaged in large-scale trade and not production activities. In effect, the craft guilds
were not that powerful in these cities. Hence, it was easier for the merchant elites to prevent
a revolt of the craft guilds there.
Themost important exogenous trigger of the revolts is the nexus of the latemedieval agrar-
ian crisis and the Black Death. To capture the effect of these events I use two variables. First,
I include a variable reporting the suitability of the soil around a city for agriculture. Agricul-
tural suitability serves as a proxy for the agricultural productivity of a city’s hinterland which
could be decisive for the outbreak of guild revolts because of the agrarian crisis. It is supposed
9Details about the construction of these variables (sources etc.) is provided in the Appendix C.1.2.2.
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that areas with better soils showed a higher agricultural productivity and were not so severely
affected by the crisis and its consequences. Furthermore, I consider a measure of a city’s ur-
ban potential, i.e. the distance-weighted sum of the population of all other cities in the data
set of Bosker et al. (2013).10 “Urban Potential” serves as a measure for the centrality of a city
within the European city network and therefore as a proxy of e.g. the size of its potential
markets but also of the characteristics of its surrounding hinterland (Bosker et al. 2013). As
it proxies for the importance of a city relative to its hinterland, it is related to the extent to
which a city was affected by the agricultural crisis, the Black Death and the migration from
rural areas to cities following both events. For example, if a city was located in a rural area, it
is supposed to be subject to larger flows of migrants from the countryside and thus it should
be more affected by the agricultural crisis (especially, as the mortality rates due to the Black
Death were considerably higher in the cities than in the countryside).
4.3.1.3 Further Explanatory Variables
Following insights of the historical and economic literature I include several variables to di-
minish concerns about omitted variables.
First, I take into account the pre-existing political institutions in cities and territorial states.
I include dummy variables that indicate the existence of institutionalized burgher represen-
tation and participative election of city government. These variables also originate from the
“Participative Political Institutions inMedieval Europe Database”. They should account for
the pre-existing institutional environment in the city. Furthermore, they consider the fact
10For a detailed description of the variables originating from Bosker et al. (2013) the reader is referred to
their data appendix, available online at this url http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST
_a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_data_appendix.pdf; accessed onMarch 12th, 2014.
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that the outbreak of a revolt is less likely if the political institutions in a city are already rela-
tively inclusive.
Third, I include several other variables that proxy for the political and ecclesiastical im-
portance of a city. All these variables are considered to be relevant factors in the causation
of the guild revolts by some of the consulted historical studies and were relevant in some of
the studied cases of revolts. Among them are variables indicating the presence of a bishop
or archbishop, whether a city had the status of a free or imperial city or was a residence of a
secular ruler. A city had to have a relatively large degree of autonomy for a guild revolt to oc-
cur. Due to this, imperial cities should have a high probability of a guild revolt (Blickle 1988,
Kluge 2009) . Complementary, a residence city of a secular ruler might have a lower proba-
bility for a revolt since the autonomy of such cities was usually limited—although kings in
general had a relatively pragmatic attitude toward guild participation. A special case are the
residences of archbishops. While archbishops were sometimes on the side of the guilds, sup-
porting them to regain power in the city, they sometimes fought against the attempts of the
guilds. Thus, it is not a priori certain what the effect of the presence of an archbishop should
be. The effect of archbishops is also unclear because their military strength was more limited
than those of secular rulers. Moreover, their relationship with local secular rulers was often
conflicting. These aspects strengthen the arguments for a positive effect of archbishops on
the occurrence of guild revolts (Isenmann 1988). It is also possible that negative and positive
effects offset each other leading to no detectable effect of archbishops.
Finally, Kluge (2009) mentions that successful revolts inspired revolts in neighbor cities,
although the revolts in general remained a local phenomenon. This gives rise to the conjecture
that spatial spillovers and strategic considerations played a certain role in the diffusionof guild
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revolts similar to, for example, the case of the spread of Protestantism (Cantoni 2012). Hence,
it is likely that the institutional arrangements of neighboring cities could have influenced the
introduction of participative political institutions and the occurrence of guild revolts.
Yet, it is not clear in which direction these strategic spatial spillovers worked. On the one
hand, a guild revolt in a neighbor citymay have increased the probability of a successful guild
revolt, e.g. because the guilds, craftsmen and other burghers saw higher chances of success or
found support from their neighbor city in their revolutionary attempts. On the other hand,
the elites of a city that saw a successful guild revolt in a neighbor city could try to prevent it
by forming an alliance with the elites of other cities. If this was the case, I expect negative
neighborhood spillovers. Such negative neighborhood spillovers will also occur when the
elite, in order to prevent a likely revolt, introduce some kind of institutions giving the citizens
a right to have a say in the political matters of the city. At last, if significant neighborhood
spillovers existed this means that the individual observations are not independent from each
other, making it necessary to account for this fact to have unbiased estimates.
To consider the impact of such spatial spillovers, I will include a variable for the share of
neighbor cities with guild participation within a 150km distance band around the city under
consideration to some of the regressions.11
Appendix C.1 provides an overview of these variables, their sources and definitions.
11I also tried a 250 and 500km buffer distance band around a city. The result was that with an increasing
distance band the influence of the neighborhood spillovers become smaller and smaller indicating that—as pro-
posed by Kluge (2009)—revolts more far away than 150km did not matter much for the outbreak of a revolt in
a city.
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4.3.2 Empirical Approach and Results
Tounravel the origins of guild revolts and thepolitical change connectedwith successful ones,
a straightforward strategy consists in running probit regressions where the above mentioned
independent variables are regressed on one of the three dependent variables. Such estimates
are probably biased by reverse causality since the dependent variable are likely to influence
some of the included regressors. A first approach to avoid these kind of endogeneity problem
is to use pre-treatment values of the regressors in the estimation. To achieve this I created,
based on the panel data set, a cross-sectional data set containing the values of the regressors
in the immediate period before the revolt before a (successful) guild revolt broke out in a
city. For cities that did not experience guild revolts I keep the observations in the year 1500
AD. This is because after 1500 AD no new guild revolts occurred and the treatment period
ended (probability of a new revolt becomes zero after 1500 AD). A descriptive overview of
this cross-sectional data set is given in Table C.1.
I investigate which pre-treatment characteristics of cities determined the occurrence and
success of guild revolts by estimating variants of the following equation using the probit
method:
Pr(GUILDPARTci; tjSTRci;Pre Treat; EXOGci;Xci;Pre Treat)
= (+ 0STRci;Pre Treat + 0EXOGci;Pre Treat + 0Xci;Pre Treat
+ c + ci)
(4.1)
WhereGUILDPARTci represents the three dummy variables measuring guild revolts and
guild participation in the city council, STRci;Pre Treat is a vector containing proxies for the
structural triggers of the revolts, EXOGci;Pre Treat represents the variables capturing the
most important exogenous factors and Xci;Pre Treat is a vector of control variables. c are
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imperial circle fixed effects and electorate fixed effects and ci is the error term capturing un-
observed factors. I choose to estimate this equation using probit estimation. For each of the
three dependent variable the results are presented in a separate Table.
Additionally, I will investigate whether and how structural factors interacted in the cau-
sation of the revolts by interacting the trade city dummy and the proto-industry variable.
Hence, equation one becomes to:
Pr(GUILDPARTci; tjSTRci;Pre Treat; EXOGci;TRADE  PROTOINDci;Xci;Pre Treat)
= (+ 0STRci;Pre Treat + 0EXOGci;Pre Treat + 0TRADE  PROTOINDci
+ 0Xci;Pre Treat + c + ci)
(4.2)
WhereTRADE  PROTOINDci is the interaction term and the rest of the equation is iden-
tical to equation (1).
Results of estimating equations (1) and (2) are presented in Tables 4.3–4.5. In all three ta-
bles, the variables proxying structural and endogenous factors are introduced separately first
and then they are included simultaneously. Afterwards, the regressions form first columns are
repeated but this time including he neighborhood spillover variable (share of cities with guild
participation in a radius of 150km around a city). Each regression additionally includes all
mentioned control variables and imperial circle dummies. The tables report averagemarginal
effects.
In Table 4.3, the dependent variable is guild participation in the city council, the main
variable of interest in this study. With regard to the structural factors, columns (1) and (2)
of Table reveal that both important trade cities as well as centers of proto-industry played a
significant role for explaining guild participation. Both variables are individually and jointly
(as indicated by the Chi2 test reported at the bottom of the Table) significant and show a
sizable positive effect on the probability of guild participation in the city council. However,
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in line with the discussion in section 3, the estimates suggest that while industrial centers had
a significantly higher probability of a successful revolt, trade cities had a smaller. Therefore,
it is confirmed that the commercial revolution strengthened the craft guilds and lead them
to make revolt to get political rights to say in cities where their position was strong as they
were centers of proto-industry. In contrast, cities that primarily concentrated on trade (and
not production) like most of the cities of the Hanseatic league, had a lower probability of a
successful revolt. This is in line with historical evidence and supports the argument that a
strong merchant elite could successfully handle to remain in power after a revolt or to pre-
vent a revolt in the first place. This ambiguity in the effect of structural factors is interesting,
as it tells us, that not economic prosperity per se but mainly the upswing of proto-industry
was conductive to political changes and a transition towards more inclusive political insti-
tutions. Hence, only when economic growth enriched new, formerly poor groups of the
society it sometimes resulted in political changes. Finally, when the proto-industry and trade
city dummy are interacted (column 2) there is no evidence for a significantly different revolt
probability of cities that are both centers of proto-industry and trade (like e.g. Brunswick).
However, as there are only 6 cities that are identified as centers of proto-industry and trade the
insignificance of the interaction term (that actually shows a comparatively large coefficient)
is probably due to the small amount of variation.
The agricultural crisis and the black death also matter jointly (Chi2 = 14:24) but only
the urban potential variable shows a significant negative coefficient throughout all observa-
tions, while agricultural productivity is always insignificant. Thus, it seems that cities with
a low urban potential, i.e. that are surrounded by a rural area have a higher revolt probabil-
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ity than cities in urbanized areas while agricultural productivity seems not to play a role.12
Nevertheless, this result delivers evidence in support of those historians that argue for the
revolt-triggering effect of the considerable urban-rural migration following the agricultural
crisis and the Black Death. In column (4) both kind of variables are included together in one
regression. Urban potential and the proto-industry variable remain significant with a virtu-
ally identical coefficient while the coefficient of the trade city dummy becomes smaller and
insignificant. Most likely, this loss of significance can be attributed to the fact that there is
an intuitive significant positive correlation between urban potential and and the trade city
dummy.13 Hence, the urban potential variable takes away some of the effect of the trade city
variable.
In sum, the results suggest that both, exogenous factors like the agricultural crisis and struc-
tural factors like the commercial revolution and the prosperity of proto-industrywere promi-
nent factors in the causation of the revolts.14
In columns (5)–(8) I additionally add the share of cities with guild participation within
a 150km radius around the city to the specification. It always enters with a significant and
large positive coefficient providing evidence for the existence of neighborhood spillovers and
the importance of strategic considerations in the spread of the revolts. Existing participa-
tion of guilds as result of a successful revolt increases the probability of a successful revolt
in the city under consideration by around 38%. Interestingly, the spillover variable reduces
12Apossible interactionof both factorswould also not yield a significant result andhence, the effect of urban
potential and agricultural productivity do not depend on each other.
13The bivariate correlation between both variables is around 0.2
14I ran additional regressions were I interact the agricultural productivity dummy and the proto-industry
variable or the urban potential and proto-industry variable. In both cases the interaction term was always in-
significant and had a low amount of additional variation. I therefore decided not to include this regressions in
the main text. However, the estimations are available from the author upon request.
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the significance and robustness of the proto-industry and trade city dummy. Again, this is
expectable and follows from the fact that not only the guild revolts but also trade and proto-
industry was clustered in space and therefore, the spillover variable is significantly correlated
with both structural variables. Nevertheless, the existence of neighborhood spillovers and
hence, the non-independence of the observations, does not change the overall conclusions
drawn before.
Table 4.4 repeats the regressions of Table 4.3 but with the guild revolts dummy, i.e. also
including unsuccessful revolts that did not lead to participation of the guilds in the city coun-
cil. Here, the interaction between trade and proto-industry is not included as the interaction
term would be a perfect predictor and hence is excluded from the probit model.15 The re-
sults are identical, but the trade cities and neighborhood spillovers are not significant here.
Additionally, the effect of urban potential is also considerably reduced yet remains statisti-
cally significant. Despite this, especially when both structural variables and crisis variables
are included jointly (as in column (3)) the differences between the results with and without
unsuccessful revolts (Table 4.4 column (4)) are minor suggesting that there are no systematic
differences between cities with successful and unsuccessful revolts responsible for success or
failure of a revolt. However, it is to mention that according to the estimates revolts per se
are significantly more likely in imperial cities, what is not the case for guild participation. In
conclusion, while there seems to be no connection between the success of a revolt and impe-
rial cities, the outbreak of a revolt per se is significantly more likely in an imperial city. This
finding confirms the reasoning of historians and the conclusion of many quantitative case
studies (e.g. Blickle 1988 or Kluge 2009). It also suggests that the revolts were primarily intra-
15Alternatively, I estimated the specification as linear probability model using OLS. The results are similar
to the probit model with the interaction and the interaction term itself is clearly insignificant.
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urban power struggles taking place in independent city states and not somuch revolts against
a territorial ruler and its representatives. The insignificance of the neighborhoods spillovers
indicates that the revolts per se were less spatially clustered and that, the preventive effect of
failed revolts might had offset the reinforcing effect of successful ones.
Table 4.4: Explaining Guild Revolts (Successful & Unsuccessful)
Dep. Var. Guild Participation (Successful Revolt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
With Local Spatial Spillovers
Proto-Industry 0.301** 0.271** 0.291** 0.255**
(0.126) (0.125) (0.130) (0.126)
Trade City -0.032 0.048 -0.022 0.073
(0.103) (0.098) (0.105) (0.101)
Urban Potential -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Agricultural Productivity 0.063 0.051 -0.000 -0.008
(0.200) (0.198) (0.207) (0.208)
% of Cities with Guild
Participation (150km radius)
0.109
(0.165)
0.190
(0.162)
0.147
(0.155)
Imperial Circle Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electorate Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104
Chi2 5.716 13.24 18.64 5.026 13.35 16.59
p-value 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.081 0.001 0.002
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 %
and *10 % level. In all columns average marginal effects (AME) are reported. The unit of observation is a city. Each regression
includes a constant not reported as well as a set of control variables including a dummy variables reporting whether a city was an
imperial city, a residence of a secular ruler or of a bishop or archbishop as well as dummy variables showing whether there were
participative election procedures or institutionalized burgher representation in a city.
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Finally, in Table 4.5, I consider only the cities in which the guilds succeeded in completely
taking over the government (i.e., gained the majority or all seat in the city council). To con-
sider these cities separately could be useful if there were systematic differences in the deter-
minants of revolts that resulted in such a complete success of the guilds. Furthermore, in
considering only these cities I avoid themore gray areas of guild participation were the guilds
are only aminority in the council and there actual political influence remains unclear. Hence,
in Table 4.5 I only look at cities in which a guild revolt resulted in considerable actual political
influence of the guilds. As in Table 4.3, being a center of proto-industry is robustly and posi-
tively associated with having a guild constitution after a successful revolt and neighborhood
spillovers also have a positive and significant influence. However, urban potential is insignif-
icant and exogenous factor were not decisive for the implementation of this type of political
change after a successful revolt.
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4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
What caused political change towards more participative city governments in late medieval
cities? Was it the result of exogenous circumstances like the plague or climatic changes or
was it a consequence of economic prosperity and the improvement of economic institutions
during the commercial revolution, or both? The result of this study suggest that both fac-
tors played a decisive role in the causation of the late medieval guild revolts and the political
changes towards participation of the guilds. Being a center of proto-industry as well as being
located in a rural area are significant predictors of guild participation in the city council and
the outbreak of a revolt. This means, that purely institutional explanations of the transition
towards more inclusive institutions according to which a virtuous cycle of better economic
institutions leading to better political institutions leading to even better economic institution
and so forth, tell only one part of the story. Nature, History and strategic considerations of
guilds and elites tell the rest. Given this results, it seems that political change in the late me-
dieval neither was the pure result of structural factors nor of purely exogenous events.
However, the fact that only structural factors seem to be significant predictors when the
guilds achieved the full control of a city’s government indicates that structural factors might
have played the more prominent role giving credit to the institutionalist view of political
change as outlined, among others, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Yet, the interesting
result that trade cities are less likely to have guild participation in the city council, suggests an
evenmore differentiatedpicture: Itwas not the economicupswingof the latemedieval period
itself that caused the emergence of participative political institutions, it was the prosperity
of proto-industry that enriched new groups of the society, namely the craftsmen and their
political and economic associations, the craft guilds. The lesson here is, that not economic
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prosperity per sematters, but that all groups of citizens profit from economic growth and not
only the ruling elite. A top-down diffusion of wealth, so called inclusive growth, therefore
was the key for the political emergence of participative political institutions in late medieval
cities.
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“Die Summe aller Einzelinteressen ergibt nicht Gemein-
wohl sondern Chaos.”
Manfred Rommel
5
Political Change and Economic
Development. Evidence from the Late
Medieval German Lands*
When political change towardsmore democracy can successfully increases long-run
prosperity? Under which conditions does an increase in the participativeness of the polit-
*An earlier version of this chapter was published as EHES Working Paper in Economic History No. 73
entitled “Participative Political Institutions and City Development, 800—1800” (Wahl 2015). The author is
indebted to Davide Cantoni, Edward Glaeser, Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Alexander Opitz and Aderonke
Osikominu as well as seminar participants at the 30th EEA Congress in Mannheim, in Esbjerg, the LSE and at
the Trinity College Dublin for helpful discussions and suggestions.
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ical process such as the extension of franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Lehmann-
Hasemeyer et al. 2014) and the political empowerment of common people in general, have
positive consequences for economic development? Previous research comes to inconsistent
conclusions about the effects of democracy or democratization on economic development
(for a review see Przeworski and Limongi 1993, or Acemoglu et al. 2014) by working out the
possible negative and positive growth effects of democracy (e.g., secure property rights and
increased economic stability vs. susceptibility for rent-seeking or harmful redistribution).
Yet, what is lacking is a study linking these positive and negative aspects of democracy to spe-
cific political institutions and exploring their effects on long-run development.1 Information
about which type of political institutions/ framework should be implemented to make de-
mocratization beneficial for long-run economic growth is useful for a better understanding
of how to transition successfully to democracy, as well as for a better understanding of the
different development effects of various aspects of democracy and the political institutions
associated with it
This paper tries to address these questions by looking at the rise of participative political
institutions (PPIs) in the cities of the late medieval German Lands. These participative polit-
ical institutions can be defined as ”political institutions that are open to one or more groups
of citizens. Alternatively, participative political institutions can constitute rules or constitu-
tional procedures (like e.g. electoral procedures) ensuring that one or more group of citizens
have an influence on the composition and/or political decisions of the government” (Wahl
1The study closest to this is that of Papaioannou and Sourounis (2008). However, unlike the present study,
they consider only the short-run effects (10 years after transition) of a transition from autocracy to democracy.
Furthermore, they focus on the 20th century and consider a complete regime changewhile this study is only con-
cerned with an increase in participativeness of the political process that is not identical to a complete transition
to democracy.
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2015d, pp. 5).2 An example of participative political institutions are universal (passive and
active) suffrage. In consequence, universal suffrage is more participative than adult male suf-
frage (which clearly excludes women). Thus, the turn towards more participative political
institutions can be seen as the enlargement of political rights to larger groups of the popula-
tion; and the rise of such institutions is associated with an increase of democracy or the rise
of the middle class. Yet, unlike inclusive institutions, these participative political institutions
are less frequently studied, especially for periods before the 19th century.
According to historical sources there were three major types of participative political insti-
tutions (Wahl 2015d): (i) the existence and degree of craft guild participation in the city coun-
cil, (ii) the existence of a participative election mode of the city government, i.e. an electoral
procedure, where the city council or the magistrate of the city was not elected by the ruler or
by the members of these institutions themselves but by at least a sub-group of citizens and
(iii) whether there was some kind of institutionalized burgher representation (e.g. a regularly
meeting community assembly deciding on important matters of city policy). Furthermore,
as the implementation of participative political institutions did not result in a completely
democratic government and not all cities implemented all types of PPIs. Hence, an advan-
tage of the historical setting is that it enables to assess the effect of the introduction of some
aspects of democracy in isolation as well as their interactions.
The data set used for the empirical investigation in this paper, the ”Participative Polit-
ical Institutions in Pre-Modern Europe Database” (Wahl 2015d) contains information on
these three types of participative political institutions in 104 cities in Germany, Austria, the
German-speaking area of Switzerland (plusGeneva), Alsace-Lorraine and the LowCountries
2The idea of participative political institutions is also related to the idea of ”generalized” vs. ”particularized”
institutions as discussed in Ogilvie and Carus (2014).
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for every hundred year period between 800 and 1800 AD. Yet, in this study, the focus will be
on the ”GermanLands”, i.e. I will not consider the LowCountries as their political traditions
and development diverged from the rest of the HRE after 1500 AD.3 This leaves me with 83
of the 104 cities in the database that will be the subject of the later empirical investigations.4
The extensive margin of participative political institutions is already studied by Bosker et
al. (2013) who find a positive effect of the existence of city councils on city development in
Europeor compare the growthperformance of autonomous (oligarchic) tonon-autonomous
cities in Europe (Stasavage 2014). Furthermore, there are studies comparing the economic
performance of oligarchic city states with absolutist territorial states (De Long and Shleifer
1993, Dincecco 2009b Putnam 1993, Stasavage 2011). Those studies find the extensive margin
of participative political institutions, for example, associated with limited government and
better checks and balances leading among other things to a better provision of public goods.
However, the present paper goes one step further, as it takes into account the intensive
marginofPPIs, i.e., the varyingdegrees ofparticipativeness of thepolitical institutions among
cities. As there is a considerable heterogeneity in the degree of participativeness of political in-
stitutions among the cities, this enables amore precise picture to be gained of the actual effect
of political participativeness. Furthermore, the data set utilized by this study allows different
types of participative political institutions to be identified. This makes it possible to investi-
gate whether there are varied effects of these types of institutions. Given the different nature
of the three kinds of PPIs (i.e., their association with different aspects of democracy) it could
be expected that they have other effects on city development.
3For example, the role and nature of the craft guilds differ from those in the rest of theHolyRomanEmpire
and their political centralization began considerably earlier than in the rest of the HRE.
4An earlier version of this study (Wahl 2015c) shows results including the Low Countries and discusses the
differences to the German lands and their possible causes in more detail.
107
Participation of craft guilds in city councils or the establishment of burgher assemblies
could for example give rise to increased checks-and-balances and an orientation of policy to-
wards the interests of larger segments of the population. Furthermore, the political empow-
erment of guilds could be positive for economic prosperity, as they, e.g, helped to overcome
market failures (Epstein 1998). But, given the character of the political system of medieval
cities, they could also lead to rent-seeking, oligarchisation and, in the longer-run, also increas-
ing conflicts within different groups of burghers (e.g., Olson 1982, Puga and Trefler 2014 or
Stasavage 2014, Ogilvie 2008). The actual effect of guild participation in the city council is
thus not a priori clear and this study can contribute to resolving this debate.
The election of the city government by different groups of citizens,conversely, is expected
to increase the accountability of the government members and orientation of politics away
from particular interests to public welfare–similar to the extensive margin of PPIs. Thus,
it probably had a positive effect on city development. Generally speaking, I expect that the
effect of an increase in participativeness has a positive effect only when it was associated with
changes in the political framework like stronger orientation on public welfare or a higher
degree of accountability. If higher participativeness only meant that more groups of citizens
engaged in rent-seeking or a different/enlarged oligarchy this effect was probably negative or
neutral.
Finally, as my database contains information about PPIs from 800 AD to 1800 AD sheds
light on the long-run evolution patterns of these institutions and their effects. This makes
it possible to test for e.g., the existence of an ”Olson effect” (i.e, a declining positive effect of
PPIs due to increased rent-seeking and stagnation (Olson 1982), over a long time. It can also
add more evidence to recent economic research concerned with the interaction of political
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institutions and economic (like the rise of long-distance trade in the 16th century) or historical
arguments of historians about oligarchisation and elite degeneration taking away the initially
positive effect of more participative political institutions (e.g., Puga and Trefler 2014, Luther
1968) and leading to a democracy “captured” by the elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).
One important finding is that, pooled over all cities and centuries, there is indeed a positive
effect of participative election procedures on city development. When I look closely at the
temporal evolution of the effects, by interacting the PPI measures with century dummies I
find that the effect of participative elections is significant during the late medieval period but
not after the 15th century. These results underline the significance of participative election
procedures in the later medieval revival of trade and commerce. It also supports the more
skeptical views of guild government as I additionally find a negative effect of city councils
with a craft guild majority on city development that vanished afterwards. In general, guild
rule shows an increasingly negative effect over time. When investigating the existence of an
”Olson effect” (i.e., institutional degeneration) more directly by interacting century dum-
mies with variables reporting the number of centuries a particular PPI already exists in a city,
the results suggest the presence of institutional degeneration in the case of guild rule with in-
creasingly negative coefficients the longer the guilds ruled a city. For the case of participative
elections I do not find such a declining coefficient until the 5th century of existence implying
that this type of institution is—unlike guild participation or burgher assemblies—likely to
have a persistent positive impact on city development.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical, empirical and
historical literature and formulates the research questions this study seeks to answer. Section
3 proceeds by describing the data used and the setting of the empirical analysis. In Section 4,
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I conduct the empirical analysis and interpret the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
5.1 Participative Political Institutions and City Development
In medieval Europe, political institutions in which citizens could participate first emerged in
the cities of theHolyRomanEmpire as a consequence of the deterioration of central political
power following the break-down of the Staufer dynasty in the 13th century. Often the par-
ticipativeness of these institutions increased as a result of the revolts of craftsmen and other
groups of burghers in the late medieval era that occurred as a consequence of both exoge-
nous shocks like the Black Death and the late medieval agrarian crisis and the enrichment
craftsmen as a consequence of the commercial revolution (e.g., Blickle 1988 or Luther 1968).5
When such revolts were successful, craftsmen and other groups of burghers gained politi-
cal rights and sometimes even completely took over the government of cities. As a result of
those revolts the other types of participative political institutions emerged, such as burgher
assemblies and participative election of the city government.6
There is a large literature investigating the institutional advantages early-modern city-states
had compared to large territorial states. Guiso et al. (2013) and Putnam (1993) for example
found that cities that were city states in themedieval period have a higher level of civic capital
today. Stasavage (2007,2011) finds that city states with constitutional constraints on the elites
had easier access to credit and a more solid fiscal policy than territorial states without checks
and balances or representative assemblies. This enabled a better provision of public goods,
necessary for commerce to prosper (like e.g. a functioning system of justice).7 Finally, Avner
5Wahl (2015b) provides a discussion of the revolts and their causes.
6In fact, burgher assemblies were often implemented to prevent the outbreak of a revolt in the first place.
More on the origins and evolution of political institutions in central Europe can be found inWahl (2015d).
7These findings mirror the evidence of De Long and Shleifer (1993) that regions under non-absolutist
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Greif (e.g., Greif 2006) has shown the role that newly developed and sophisticated political
and economic institutions played in fostering long-distance trade and impersonal exchange
in general.
In contrast, differences in political institutions among cities (and not compared to territo-
rial states) and their consequences have not been investigated in any depth until now. Bosker
et al. (2013) look at the consequences of participative political institutions on the extensive
margin, i.e. they find that cities with institutions of communal self-governance (i.e., a city
council) developed better than cities without. They argue, that those participative govern-
ments enabled, among others things, the pursuit of policies fostering industry and trade ac-
tivities. The only other study in this direction that I am aware of is Stasavage (2007) who
also showed that city-states with high levels of checks-and-balances had easier access to credit
than city-states with less checks-and-balances. However, here again, the difference studied is
the kind of regime, that is, oligarchy vs. city states ruled by a territorial ruler. Hence, Stasav-
age’s study still does not exploit the different degrees of participativeness within oligarchic
city states—which is what this paper is able to do.
To summarize, this strand of research finds positive development effects of inclusive polit-
ical institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) associated with checks-and-balances, higher
fiscal capacity, better provision of public goods and favorable institutional arrangements for
trade and commerce. Transferring these insights to urban participative political institutions,
it can be expected that they also have positive effects if they are associated with this kind of
inclusiveness (or general welfare orientation). This is typically the case, as, e.g., themore sub-
(“free”) rule experienced better economic and social development during the medieval and early-modern pe-
riod. De Long and Shleifer trace this development advantage back to a better tax policy of merchant ruled
oligarchies.
111
groups of the population are allowed to vote the less easy it is for powerful individual groups
to enforce their special interests. Hence, I would expect that participative election of city
government had a positive effect on the subsequent development of the city.
However, the nature of the political framework in the medieval Holy Roman Empire (i.e,
a political system characterized by clientelism, elitism and class consciousness) makes it likely
that the effect of enlarging the number of groups participating in the political process can
also have negative effects. Most of the arguments suggesting negative or neutral effects of the
participativeness of political institutions in this setting refer to the “conflict view” of political
institutions, understanding institutions as the outcome of conflicts about redistribution and
as the product of changing political power (Ogilvie 2007, Acemoglu et al. 2005a).
A first argument in this context refers to the fact that city councils with participation of
guild representatives were one of the most important types of participative political institu-
tions. Hence, the question about the impact of guilds and the nature of their actual policy
(rent-seeking for theirmembers vs. policy that helped to overcomemarket failures to the ben-
efit of the guilds and the rest of the burghers) is important for the direction of the impact of
guild participation in the city government on development. One view, associated with Ep-
stein (e.g., Epstein 1998, 2004) argues for a positive effect of guilds on economic development
as, among others, they fostered the adoption of useful innovations and blocked that of harm-
ful ones, ensured high quality of products, provided standardized and high-quality training
of new craftsmen and increased social capital within the city. The other view is connected to
Ogilvie (e.g. Ogilvie 2004, 2008, 2011) and rejects the idea that they were efficient institutions
helping to resolve market failures. According to this line of thought, they were inefficient
rent-seeking institutions, upheld by a small group of powerful members to enforce their po-
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litical and economic interests. They erected market entry barriers andmonopolies, restricted
migration and blocked innovations. The debate is still ongoing and there is no consensus
view on guilds. In consequence, the impact of guild representatives participating in the city
council on the development of the city is a priori unclear.
Additionally, there are theoretical and empirical insights of, for example,Acemoglu (2008),
Puga and Trefler (2014) and Stasavage (2014). These papers are concerned with the tempo-
ral evolution of the impact of oligarchic rule. They show that oligarchic rule initially had a
positive effect on city development. After some time, however, oligarchic city-states tended
to become stagnant or economically declining. This could be explained by some process of
elite degeneration as the initially active long-distancemerchants in the elite end up becoming
pensioners or gentlemen of leisure. Alternatively, it could be that the prosperity generated
by the virtuous circle of growth, enhancing political and economic institutions carried the
germs of declinewithin itself from the beginning. The latter would fit with the case of Venice
as analyzed by Puga and Trefler (2014) where newly enriched craftsmen posed a danger to the
power of the old elites. To prevent a revolt and preserve their power, the elites first gave the
most powerful craftsmen a political voice and afterwards restricted the level of participation
of political institutions. As a result, a larger but enclosed patriciate emerged. Participation
in long-distance trade was monopolized by the most influential families and the access to
the city council became hereditary. Thus, inequality and social stratification increased and
production activities replaced long-distance trade as the most important economic activity.
If processes following this logic were typical for the development of political institutions in
cities, I would observe an initial positive impact of participative political institutions on city
development that declines as time elapses and at somemoment becomes insignificant or even
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negative.
Such logic could also be valid if the participative political institutions maintain their level
of inclusiveness de jure but not de facto. Such a situation can occur, for example, after in-
complete democratic transitions, i.e. democratic reforms that only introduced some aspects
of democracy but not all. As shown by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) it is then likely that
the elite invests more in the de facto political power as the common citizens and prevents
economic policy contrary to its interest.
Alternatively, such a temporal heterogeneity of the participative political institution’s ef-
fect could arise from a typical “Olson effect” (Olson 1982), i.e. the positive initial effect van-
ishes the longer the same institutions exist because they become increasingly vulnerable to
rent-seeking and the special interest of powerful but small groups of citizens. As a conse-
quence, the city stagnates as its institutions are no longer orientedon thewelfare of all citizens.
Monopolies, cartels and regulations in favor of specific lobby groups (i.e., powerful guilds or
families) will lead to a degeneration of perhaps de jure still participative political institutions,
resulting in the same, or even a worse policy as in cities with no government controlled by the
guilds.
In consequence guild participation in the city council or burgher assemblies that simply
enlarged the groups of citizenswho could participate in the political processmight have a neg-
ative or neutral effect on city development. Alternatively, their positive effect could only be
short-lived in nature and, thus, the broadening of political rights to formerly rightless groups
could not have been an effective political innovation to sustain inclusiveness of institutions
and prosperity.
Hence, this study aims to investigate the effect of different PPIs on long-run city develop-
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ment but is also concerned with the temporal evolution of their effect.
5.2 Data and Empirical Setting
5.2.1 Dependent Variable andObservation Period
As I am interested in the effects of participative political institutions on city development and
economic prosperity, the most suitable—and the only systematically available— variable to
measure development is city population. For the present paper I rely on the city population
figures provided byBosker et al. (2013). This city population data is an updated version of the
Bairoch et al. (1988) data. It includes all cities inBairoch et al. (1988) that reached apopulation
threshold of 10,000 inhabitants.8
The Bosker et al. (2013) data set includes centennial population figures for every included
city starting with 800 and ending in 1800.9
5.2.2 Independent Variables and Sampling Area
The main explanatory variables representing measures of the different kinds of participative
political institutions that I use are three different variables originating from the “Participative
Political Institutions in Medieval Europe Database” (Wahl 2015d).
First, I use a binary variable indicating the existence of institutionalized burgher represen-
tation, i.e. equal to one if there was some form of institutionalized burgher representation in
a city (e.g., a regularly meeting community assembly that has the right to decide, e.g., about
8As they only include population figures larger than 5,000 inhabitants I supplement lower figures from
Bairoch et al. (1988).
9The population figures for 1100 AD are interpolated by Bosker et al. (2013) as for this year no estimates
from Bairoch et al. (1988) are available.
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the increase of taxes or the declaration of war).
Second, a dummy variable reporting the existence of a participative election mode of the
city government is considered. In other words, the variable indicates whether citizens of a
townwere able to elect all or parts of the city government either directly or indirectly (through
a community assembly or through an electoral college).
Third, I use a categorical variable called guild participation index equal to zero if guilds
were not allowed to participate in the city council, which was normally the most important
and powerful political institution of the city. The variable is equal to one if the guilds partic-
ipated at the council, i.e. had a constitutionally guaranteed number of council members, but
did not have the right to send more than half of the members. The variable is equal to two
in cities with a so-called “Zunftverfassung” (“guild constitution”), that is, where themajority
or even all members of the city council were representatives of a guild.
I also include a dummy variable “guild constitution” that is one if a city had such a guild
constitution as an additional measure. There are several reasons to consider separately those
cities under full political control of the guilds. For example, the influence of guilds on the
actual politics of a city was much lower when they only had, e.g., one third of the representa-
tives in the city council instead of the majority. Hence, the effect of successful guild politics
is expected to be lower in those cities than in cities where the craftsmen became the dominant
political force.
These variables represent the universe of participative political institutions in themedieval
city and should thus offer a complete picture of their effects on city development.
I collected information for the codingof the three variables fromavailable historical sources.
The relevant information is primarily provided by the “Deutsche Städtebuch” (Handbook
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of German Cities) edited by Keyser and Stoob (1939–1974).10
I code these variables for cities in today’s Germany, Austria and the German-speaking part
of Switzerland as well as Alsace-Lorraine. The consulted sources provide information for 83
of the cities located in these countries and included in the Bosker et al. (2013) data set.
5.3 Spatial Distribution and Temporal Evolution of PPIs
o understand the origins of participative political institutions in late medieval central Europe
it is useful to look at their spatial distribution. For this purpose, Figure 1 shows maps of the
distribution of the three kinds of participative political institutions in 1500 AD.11 Figure 1a
shows the distribution of guild participation in the city council in 1500 AD. Cities with no
guild participation are colored gray, cities with at least some participation are blue and cities
where the guilds were a major political force are red. It is evident from the maps that guild
participation was less widespread in the north of Germany and the Netherlands—that is in
the core areas of the Hanseatic League and in Bavaria. This shows that the Hanseatic League
was often successful in suppressing the uprising of the guilds. Additionally, the cities of the
Hanse were not usually centers of production which implies a weaker position of craft guilds
there. Most cities with guild participation were located in south-west Germany and today’s
Alsace-Lorraine. Central Germany shows a medium frequency of guild participation and
10To account for the uncertain nature of the (often limited) information I additionally consulted primary
sources (e.g., official documents, charters, etc., as collected by, for example, Gengler 1867) and monographs
about the history of individual cities or their constitutions and political institutions (e.g., Borst 1986, Csendes
and Opll 2001, Dopsch and Lipburger 1983 or Endres 1994). All these sources, a detailed description of the
construction procedure and an overview of the coding of each variable are provided inWahl (2015d).
11The maps show the borders of the Holy Roman Empire in 1500 AD. The map is created by the author.
Political borders are from the shapefile “Georeferenced Historical Vector Data 1500” provided by Nüssli and
Nüssli (2008).
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only a few cities with guild constitutions.12
Figure 1b maps the spatial distribution of institutionalized burgher representation (cities
with burgher representation are colored in dark-gray). Institutionalized burgher representa-
tionwaswidespread in theGerman speaking area of theHolyRomanEmpire and sometimes
implemented by the ruling elite of a city to prevent the outbreak of a burgher revolt. In conse-
quence, there is no obvious spatial distribution pattern. However, it seems that in the south-
west of Germany and in Switzerland–where guild participation was especially prevalent—
burgher representation was not so common as in the northern part of the HRE. Figure 1c
presents the distribution of participative election procedures. They are the less frequent than
the other types of PPIs. Again, they are less prevalent in Bavaria and Austria and are concen-
trated in the north-west in the Rhine area and Lower Saxony.
The visual impression is validated by probit regressions where the latitude and longitude
of each city location, sea and river dummies, soil quality, a measure for urban potential (all
from theBosker et al. 2013 data set) and imperial circle dummies are regressed on fivePPImea-
sures (guild participation and guild constitution, participative elections and institutionalized
burgher representation dummies) in 1500 AD—when the spread of PPIs reached its peak.13
The results are reported in Table 1. The regressions confirm that guild participation was sig-
nificantly more frequent in the south-west of the HRE, less prevalent in Bavaria and Austria
and in highly urbanized areas (i.e., in places with a high urban potential). They also show
that institutionalized burgher representation seems not to follow a clear geographic pattern
12The three cities with a guild constitution in Lower Saxony (Brunswick, Goslar and Magdeburg) were all
important political, ecclesiastical and proto-industrial centers and therefore likely candidates for a late medieval
burgher revolt, despite being members of the Hanseatic League.
13Imperial circleswere established as administrative units in theHolyRomanEmpire in 1512—that is shortly
after the period of the revolts. I also include a separate dummy for the “electorate” territories, i.e. the territories
of the “Kurfürsten”—the secular rulers and archbishops who were allowed to elect the German king.
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(a) Participation of Guilds in City Council 1500 AD (b) Existence of Institutionalized Burgher Representation in
1500 AD
(c) Burgher Participation in the Election of the City Govern-
ments in 1500 AD
Figure 5.1: Spatial Distribution of Participative Political Institutions
and that participative elections were significantly less prevalent in cities located at rivers and
with a high urban potential and in the east of the HRE. As Wahl (2015b) shows, trade cities
and cities in highly urbanized areas are less likely to have guild participation, which probably
explains these findings.
Figures 5.2(a)–(d) depict the temporal evolution of the prevalence of different kinds of par-
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Table 5.1: Geographic and Biogeographic Determinants of PPIs—Probit Regressions
Dep. Var. Guild
Participation
Guild
Constitution
Participative
Elections
Inst. Burgher
Repr.
Communal
Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Latitude -0.172*** -0.100** 0.018 0.048 0.004
(0.062) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.045)
Longitude -0.014 -0.049** -0.009 -0.004 0.007
(0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.029) (0.014)
River 0.074 0.161 0.188 -0.233 -0.062
(0.170) (0.133) (0.172) (0.180) (0.111)
Sea -0.002 0.201 -0.587*
(0.272) (0.270) (0.329)
Soil Quality 0.003 0.048 0.278 -0.000 0.108
(0.225) (0.173) (0.228) (0.237) (0.153)
Urban Potential -0.008 -0.010 -0.030 0.024 0.003
(0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009)
Austrian Circle 0.196 0.207 -0.084 -0.703***
(0.225) (0.181) (0.228) (0.231)
Burgundian Circle 0.945** 0.174 0.047 -0.700**
(0.388) (0.304) (0.312) (0.295)
Electorate 0.663** 0.223 -0.311* -0.124 -0.698***
(0.266) (0.215) (0.175) (0.193) (0.258)
Franconian Circle 0.485** 0.103 -0.196 -0.747***
(0.237) (0.187) (0.224) (0.247)
Lower Saxon Circle 0.870** 0.555* -0.379* -0.217 -0.667**
(0.339) (0.294) (0.229) (0.245) (0.268)
Upper Rhenish Circle 0.660** 0.307 -0.343 -0.271
(0.261) (0.208) (0.232) (0.223)
Swabian Circle 0.517* 0.455** -0.165 -0.002
(0.265) (0.208) (0.244) (0.251)
Westphalian Cirlce 0.652* 0.363 -0.074 -0.208 -0.755***
(0.356) (0.280) (0.259) (0.263) (0.277)
Obs. 104 98 97 104 70
Psuedo-R2 0.1814 0.2575 0.1052 0.1059 0.0954
Notes. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 %
and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. Reported are average marginal effects (AME) instead of coefficients. Each
regression includes a constant not reported.
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ticipative political institutions. The spread of all these institutions began in the highmedieval
period and their diffusion continued until the end of the 15th century. From the 16th century
onward their prevalence remains roughly constant. But particularly the share of cities with
guild participation, guild constitutions, and participative elections declined significantly in
the early modern period. These types of participative institutions were often abolished after
the 16th century when local rulers or the emperors became strong again or the cities lost their
commercial and strategic importance. Institutionalized Burgher Representation, on the con-
trary, prevailed at almost the same level of roughly 30% after 1500 AD. And the share of cities
with communal institutions even increased a little after 1500 AD.
In conclusion a look at the spatial distribution and temporal evolution supports a close
connection between the existence of PPIs and guild revolts.14 Hence, the determinants of the
guilds and revolts like the Hanseatic League, commercial and ecclesiastical importance of a
city as well as political fragmentation and the economic structure of cities seem to be relevant
for the existence or non-existence of such institutions.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Baseline Results
A strategy to empirically investigate the impact of participative political institutions on city
development is to regress the fourmeasures of participative political institutions on the natu-
ral logarithm of city population and control variables using a fixed effects panel estimator to
account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This amounts to estimating variants
14Note also the significant positive correlation especially betweenparticipative electionprocedures and guild
participation (0.265).
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(a) Share of Cities with Guild Participation (b) Share of Cities with Guild Constitution
(c) Share of Cities with Institutionalized Burgher Rep-
resentation
(d) Share of Cities with Participative Election
Figure 5.2: The Evolution of Participative Political Institutions
of the following equation:
ln(POP )ci;t =  + 
0CITYINSTci;t + 0NATIONINSTci;t + 0CITYCHARci;t
+
X
2 
0GEOGci;   + HISTORYci;t + i + t + c;t + ci;t
(5.1)
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With  = 1200; 1300; 1400; :::; 1800. ln(POP )ci;t is the natural logarithm of the popula-
tion of city i, in country c, in year t (t = 800; 900; :::; 1800)). CITYINSTci;t represents one
or all of four measures of participative political institutions. NATIONINSTci;t represents a
set of control variables capturing the effect of national-level political institutions on political
institutions in cities. This set incorporates the Free-Prince dummy of DeLong and Shleifer
(1993), a dummy variable reporting the existence of an active parliament and dummy variable
indicating whether a city is located in a large territorial state (according to the definition of
Bosker et al. 2013).
CITYCHARci;t is a vector of control variables capturing specific city characteristics that
are potentially important for both the existence of participative political institutions (see
chapter four) and city development (e.g. Bosker et al. 2013, Bosker andBuringh 2015). Among
them are dummy variables equal to one if a city served as capital, as residence of a bishop or
archbishop, dummy variables indicating whether a city was an imperial city or an important
trade center, a member of the Hanseatic League, had a university or adopted printing tech-
nology before 1500 AD. Additionally, it includes a variable reporting the number of times a
city was plundered in the previous century and the urban potential of a city (according to the
definition of De Vries 1984).15
GEOGci;  is a set of time-invariant geographic variables interacted with century dum-
mies, consisting of a sea and river dummy as well as agricultural productivity (cultivation
probability of the land around a city) and terrain ruggedness (standard deviation of eleva-
15For the exact definition of this variable consult the Bosker et al. (2013) study and their Data Ap-
pendix available here: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_
a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_esupp.pdf; accessed on April 14th, 2014. It shows the
population of a city’s in the data set of Bosker et al. (2013) apart from the city under consideration inversely
weighted by the distance from the considered city to the other cities. Additionally, it takes into account (by
assigning lower weights) whether cities are located at sea or on a navigable river.
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tion).
HISTORYci;t is a vector of control variables that are included to account for the possi-
ble effects of historical events on both the emergence of PPIs and city development. These
variables include a binary variable for cities located in the sphere of influence of the Staufer
Dynasty. Three members of this noble lineage served as emperors of the HRE throughout
the 12th and 13th centuries. The dynasty suddenly collapsed with the death of King Conrad
IV in 1254, leading to a rapid decline of central authority and a vacuum of power with no
elected emperor for more than two decades. This so called “Great Interregnum” was a deci-
sive factor in the rise of independent city states during the 13th and 14th centuries. Second,
the vector also includes the ln of each city’s geodetic distance to Wittenberg to account for
the possible effects of Protestantism on city development.
i are city fixed effects,t are century fixed effects accounting for temporal shocks common
to all cities in the data set, c;t are interacted country and century fixed effects accounting
for country-specific temporal shocks and ci;t is the error term capturing unobserved factors.
These controls should capture factors relevant for both the existence of participative political
institutions and city development and thus aremeant to reduce omitted variables bias (OVB).
They are selected according to insights from previous literature (Bosker and Buringh 2015,
Bosker et al. 2013, Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014, Dittmar 2011 etc.) and the result of Table 5.1.
First, I estimate equation one without the interacted time-invariant variables. The results
are shown in Table 2. First, city population and the control variables are regressed on each of
the four participative political institutions measures. In columns (5) to (8) I include three of
the four political institutions variables jointly. In column (6) all control variables that are in-
significant in column (5) are removed and also those becoming insignificant after this removal
124
(i.e., only significant control variables are kept in column (6)). These are the archbishop and
bishop as well as the capital, Hanseatic League, residence and trade city dummies and the ur-
ban potential measure. I remove the non-robust covariates to reduce white noise and to keep
the regression as parsimonious as possible.
Participative Elections show a robustly significant and positive effect, implying that cities
with participative election of city government are on average around 30% larger (assuming
the coefficient in column (4)). The guild participation index and institutionalized burgher
representation remain insignificant in all specifications. When added jointly with the elec-
tions and burgher representation, cities where the guilds were the dominant political actor
(i.e, cities with a guild constitution) are on average significantly smaller (again around 30%).
Hence, the results support the skeptical view of the guilds as they seem to have a negative
effect on city development when they ruled a city and at least no positive effect if they partic-
ipated in the government of the city. Additionally taking into account the insignificance of
institutionalized burgher representation, the results provide supporting evidence for the ar-
gument that—given the hierarchical and collectivist nature of the society and political system
in the latemedieval cities—a simple enlargement of the number of groups/ citizens that could
participate in the political process has a positive effect. Furthermore, the results confirm my
expectations of a positive effect of participative elections of city government.
Hence, the results contribute to explaining why Fürth (a city without participative elec-
tions) today is roughly five times smaller than nearby Nuremberg (a city with elections).
The result of the regressions including the interacted time-invariant variables (terrain rugged-
ness, river and sea dummies as well as soil quality) are reported in Table 5.3. They are similar
to those of Table 5.2. If anything the coefficients slightly increased in size and significance.
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If it is true that participative elections hamper rent-seeking and decrease oligarchisation
tendencies, I would see that cities with guild participation and participative elections should
do better than cities with guild participation but without elections. I test this by interacting
the guild constitution and participative election dummies and including the interaction term
to Table 5.3 column (7), the regression with a full set of covariates. Including the interaction
termmakes it possible to compute the difference between cities with a guild constitution and
participative elections and cities with guild participation but without elections. It turns out
that cities with both guild constitutions and elections are on average around 50% larger than
cities with guild constitutions and no elections (coefficient=0.470, p-value=0.044).16 Ac-
cordingly, participative elections seem to mitigate the negative effect of guild participation
which is in line with the notion that the, e.g., increased accountability decreases the negative
tendencies of guild rule. It also confirms the theoretical predictions of Acemoglu andRobin-
son (2008) that the more complete the transition to democratic institutions is (i.e., the more
of the different aspects of democracy are realized in the political institutions) the more likely
democratization can successfully improve economic outcomes.
Finally, it is important to note that although we probably have dealt with themost impor-
tant source of unobserved heterogeneity by including city fixed effects and various control
variables selection on unobservables can still be an issue.
However, if I test the likelihood that the estimates are actually biased by unobservables I
follow the strategy developed by Altonji et al. (2005) and applied (among others) by Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) by looking on how strong selection on unobservables relative to se-
lection on observables has to be to completely explain the estimated effect. This can be done
16The interaction term itself is insignificant but has a sizeable positive coefficient (0.14).
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by dividing the coefficient of the variable of interest with a full set of controls (Table 5.2 col-
umn (7)) by the difference between this coefficient and the coefficient of a regression only
including the three PPI measures and city fixed effects. Calculating this ratio for the guild
constitution dummy I arrive at 3.8,meaning that selection onunobservables has to be around
4 times larger than selection on observables to explain away the effect. For the participative
election dummy I arrive at a ratio of 2.6. Hence, it seems unlikely that the estimated results
are fully attributable to unobserved factors.
5.4.2 Testing for Temporal Heterogeneity
A first possibility to uncover the temporal evolution pattern of participative political insti-
tutions is to look at how their effect varied throughout the centuries between their imple-
mentation and 1800 AD. This shed light on whether the effect of, e.g, participative elections
was short-lived or persisting. To explore this I estimate the temporal evolution of the effects
using a more flexible empirical approach. That is, I interact each of the participative politi-
cal institutions measures with dummy variables for each century and re-run the fixed effects
estimations of Table 2. Due to this, equation (5.1) becomes:
ln(POP )ci;t =  +
X
2 
0CITY INSTci;   + 0Xci;t + i + t + c;t + ci;t (5.2)
With  = 1200; 1300; 1400; :::; 1800 and Xci;t representing the set of robust time-varying
controls as used in Table 5.3. Furthermore, I estimate equation (5.2) using one of the par-
ticipative institutions variables each time. The results are reported in Table 5.4. For guild
participation a more or less insignificant, yet declining time pattern emerges with insignifi-
cant coefficients of the interaction terms in all cases. The same, but increasingly pronounced
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pattern is visible for cities with guild constitutions. The guild constitution dummy shows a
large positive effect in 1300AD (after the first wave of guild revolts). This effect then becomes
increasingly smaller and in the end (in 1700AD and 1800AD) shows a large and significantly
negative effect. The large effects, in particular that in 1300AD, could possibly arise due to the
fact that before 1400 AD, the number of cities with guild constitution is very small. Hence,
the clearly declining time pattern of the effect of guild constitutions is the most interesting
aspect here. Consequently, it is important to note, that an F-test of the equality of each inter-
action term’s coefficient indeed reject that the effect of guild constitutions is the same in each
century (F-value= 10.38, p-value= 0.000). The declining temporal pattern suggests that the
guild representatives indeed became part of the oligarchy themselves and were increasingly
engaged in rent-seeking and other activities serving their special interests.
For institutionalized burgher representation, all interactions are insignificant and an F-test
of the equality of the interaction terms cannot reject that they are all the same. This indicates
that there is no temporal heterogeneity in its influence. For participative elections, I see that it
had a large and positively significant effect during the medieval period and becomes insignif-
icant afterwards. However, the coefficient in 1700 AD (0.29) is virtually the same as that in
1300 AD (0.297) and the F-test of equality of coefficients cannot reject that the interaction
terms are identical in each century (F-value = 0.36, p-value = 0.873). Hence, the effect of
election procedures seem not to be different among the centuries. This can be because un-
like guild participation—or more broadly burgher representation—election procedures are
not so prone to degeneration or changes in the political framework.17
17In Table D.2 in the Appendix I report the results of estimating Table 5.4 including the time-invariant
control variables interacted with century fixed effects. The results are almost identical.
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Table 5.4: Temporal Heterogeneity in the Impact of Participative Political Institutions—
Flexible Specification
Dep. Var. ln(Population)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interacted Variable Guild Part.
Index
Guild
Constitution
Inst. Burgher
Representation
Participative
Election
1200Variable 0.140
(0.220)
1300Variable 0.222 0.885*** -0.191 0.429***
(0.143) (0.241) (0.177) (0.125)
1400Variable -0.018 -0.080 0.010 0.297**
(0.093) (0.131) (0.137) (0.133)
1500Variable 0.050 0.122 0.060 0.366***
(0.084) (0.128) (0.113) (0.125)
1600Variable -0.016 -0.188 0.166 0.270
(0.110) (0.215) (0.129) (0.174)
1700Variable -0.137 -0.489* 0.233 0.290
(0.148) (0.283) (0.170) (0.189)
1800Variable -0.188 -0.651** 0.072 0.196
(0.146) (0.267) (0.186) (0.203)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century*Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 457 457 457 457
WithinR2 0.412 0.427 0.402 0.407
Notes. Standard errors clustered on city level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 %
and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. The set of “Robust Controls” includes every variable that was significant (at 10 % level at
least) in the regression including all sets of covariates jointly. These are the archbishop and bishop dummies, the residence city dummy, the
capital, Hanseatic League, and trade city dummies as well as the urban potential measure. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
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5.4.3 Testing for Institutional Degeneration (“Olson Effect”)
The empirical patterns detected in Table 5.4 do not necessarily have to be due to institutional
degeneration, oligarchisation and rent-seeking activities (or their absence). The declining
negative effect of guild rule, for example, could also be due to the fact that the importance of
the guilds generally declined or because the cities became increasingly dependent on territo-
rial rulers again during the early-modern period.18
Testing the existence of an “Olson effect” (i.e., that a positive effect of participative po-
litical institutions becomes increasingly negative as time elapses) more directly can help to
clarify this issue. I test the existence of an “Olson effect” by interacting the four participative
institutions measures with dummy variables indicating whether a certain type of participa-
tive political institution had already existed for one, two, three, four, five or six centuries in a
city in a certain century.19 In consequence, equation (2) is transformed into:
ln(POP )ci;t = +
X
2 
0CITY INSTci; CENT_INSTci; +0Xci;t+i+t+c;t+ci;t
(5.3)
With CENT_INSTci; being dummy variables equal to one if a participative political in-
stitution was in place one, two, three, four, five or six centuries in city i in period  with
 = 1; 2; :::; 6. The other terms in equation (5.3) are similar to equation (5.2). I estimate
equation (5.3) using separate dummy variables for cities with guild participation and for cities
with guild constitution, i.e. I assume that with respect to the “Olson effect”, the effect of
some political voice of guilds is different from the effect of a city government dominated by
18Although, the fact that the effect does not merely become small and insignificant but actually becomes
more and more negative speaks in favor of the degeneration hypothesis.
19There is no institution inmydata set that existed formore than six centuries. If an institutionwas installed,
abandoned and later re-installed, I begin to re-count from one beginning with the re-implementation of the
institution.
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the guilds. The results of estimating equation (5.4) are reported in Table 5.5.
I observe the pattern of an increasingly negative effect only in the case of guild constitu-
tions. Here, the interaction terms show an increasingly negative coefficient from the third
century of existence onward, resulting in a large and significantly negative coefficient for the
5th and 6th century of existence.20 Again, an F-test rejects the null hypothesis that all the in-
teraction terms are the same, implying that an “Olson effect” due to institutional stagnation
and degeneration is really present (F-value = 20.52, p-value = 0.000).21 These results fit to
those of Stasavage (2014) who also finds that the growth advantage of autonomous cities van-
ished after 100 years. He supposes that this declining growth advantage can be traced back
to the negative effect of guild politics on e.g., market entry barriers. However, Stasavage as-
sumes that there is no difference in the politics of a city regardless of whether only merchant
guilds or also craft guilds had political power there. To the contrast, the results in this section
imply that there was an additional, but also short-living affect of the empowerment of craft
guilds.
As before, the guild participation index and institutionalized burgher representation re-
main insignificant and also show no clear temporal pattern.22 Importantly however, I do
again see persistence in the positive effect of election procedures. Until the 4th century of
existence they show almost the same positive and significant coefficient (again the size of the
coefficient is around 0.3).23 Reassuringly, an F-test cannot reject the equality of coefficients—
20Again the large coefficients for the last two centuries are probably due to the small number of cases that
had a guild constitution for 5 or 6 centuries.
21For example, the guilds probably implemented an increasingly economically harmful policy in the cities
they controlled the longer they ruled, i.e. they erected market entry barriers or favored a restrictive migration
policy (e.g. Ogilvie 2004, 2007).
22Consequently, F-tests cannot reject the equality of the interaction terms for both variables.
23As in the case of guild constitutions, the coefficient for the 6th century is due to a very small number of
cities and should hence not be taken too seriously.
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at least when the last coefficient is not taken into account (F-value= 1.27, p-value= 0.287).24
Table 5.5: The Longer, the Worse? The Impact of Length of Existence
Dep. Var. ln(Population)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable GuildParticipation
Guild
Constitution
Inst. Burgher
Representation
Participative
Election
Variable 1. Century 0.006 -0.083 0.095 0.344***
(0.131) (0.133) (0.127) (0.098)
Variable 2. Century 0.143 -0.055 0.101 0.334**
(0.159) (0.172) (0.115) (0.140)
Variable 3. Century 0.056 -0.290 0.138 0.312**
(0.177) (0.225) (0.145) (0.138)
Variable 4. Century 0.064 -0.492 0.031 0.327*
(0.219) (0.304) (0.205) (0.194)
Variable 5. Century -0.203 -0.822* 0.172 0.019
(0.270) (0.452) (0.181) (0.205)
Variable 6. Century 0.032 -1.385*** -0.052 -0.478*
(0.431) (0.228) (0.334) (0.268)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century*Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 457 457 457 457
Within-R2 0.401 0.421 0.398 0.414
Notes. Standard errors clustered on city level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1
%, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. The set of “Robust Controls” includes every variable that was significant
(at 10 % level at least) in the regression including all sets of covariates jointly. These are the archbishop and bishop dummies, the
residence city dummy, the capital, Hanseatic League, and trade city dummies as well as the urban potential measure. Each regression
includes a constant not reported.
24In Table D.3 in the Appendix I report the results of estimating Table 5.5 including the time-invariant
control variables interacted with century fixed effects. The results are almost identical.
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5.5 Concluding Remarks
This study has looked at the question of when political change towards a more democratic
regime can be successful in fostering long-run economic development. The overall answer
emerging from the results of the empirical analysis in this paper is that to be positive for long-
run economic development, it is not enough to implement political institutions in which
larger groups of citizens participate. Instead, it is necessary that more participative politi-
cal institutions also come along with a different policy that is oriented more on public wel-
fare. The results suggest that this was—at least partly—achieved when the city council was
elected by more than one group of citizens. On the one hand, this guaranteed that policy
was relatively more oriented toward public welfare. On the other hand, the opportunity to
deselect council members that were responsible for a bad policy increased the accountabil-
ity of government and decreased oligarchisation tendencies which is also expected to have
positive effects on the policy of the city government. Hence, the implementation of partici-
pative election procedures is not prone to degenerative processes, stagnation, and increasing
rent-seeking resulting in economic policy that served special interests but not public welfare.
Therefore, instead of enlarging the participation of citizens in the existing elitist political sys-
tem, aswas the casewhen letting the craft guilds participate in the city government, changes in
the actual political framework, like allowing citizens to vote for their political representatives
were necessary to achieve sustained prosperity.
Finally, the results also provide evidence that supports the skeptical view of craft guilds as
rent-seeking institutions that erectedmarket-entry barriers to preservemonopolies, increased
prices artificially, and whose policy was primarily geared around furthering the interests of
their members.
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“The existence of a problem of knowledge depends on the
future being different from the past, while the possibility
of the solution of the problem depends on the future being
like the past.”
Frank Knight
6
General Conclusions
Often, economist complain about economic historians that they “[...]are good in
describing the trees, but they do not see the forest”. I would say that this does not exactly
describe the problem economist have with many economic historians. Rather, the problem
seems to be that many economic historians deny that there is a forest at all, claiming that
there are only individual trees scattered around randomly in the landscape of history. In
consequence, economic historians often complain about economist that the only see a for-
est because they want to see one. In other words, economists have a strong tendency towards
economic determinism,while economic historians tend to follow the culturalist tradition and
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view history as a random walk like process of happenstances.1 The results of present studies
do not confirm one of these extreme positions. In fact, they imply that both positions are
right and wrong the same time.
As the thesis shows, economic development indeed often followed systematic patterns of
persistence and non-persistence, of declining, increasing or sustaining prosperity. As such,
historical developments sometimes follow a systematic path that can be understood by look-
ing at economic aspects like the incentive structure of a society or by applying economic con-
cepts like positive feedback and increasing returns. However, chapter four has shown that ex-
ogenous shocks and idiosyncratic circumstances are also essential factors for the understand-
ing of historical events and the determination of development path.
Closely related to this aspect is the question of whether history is deterministic or random
and consequently, whether we can learn something from looking at it for today or not. Here
again, the thesis comes to a differentiated conclusion. Historical events—even as far in the
past as the middle ages—can matter for today as in the case of medieval trade patterns, that
still are visible in today’s patterns of regional prosperity. However, I have also shown that his-
torical events not always have persistent effects as the effects of participative political institu-
tions in late medieval cities disappeared, or at least becamemuch weaker over time. Whether
historical events have persistent effects or not seems to depend on the logic of the develop-
ment processes they trigger. In this respect, the thesis confirms and complements the few
existing studies (e.g. Voigtländer and Voth 2012) showing that persistence in developments
and attitudes exists but only works under certain conditions.
Medieval trade activities had persistent effects because they triggered an increase in agglom-
1For a more detailed discussion of these issues and the different positions towards this matter within de-
velopment economics, the reader is referred to Banerjee and Duflo (2014).
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eration and industry concentration that is self-reinforcing as it follows the logic of positive
feedback and increasing returns.2 Any yet on the other side, the fact that a “man-made” fac-
tor like trade can have such a long-lasting positive influence on economic outcomes suggests
that history has not to be destiny, but that political and economic decisions can have a crucial
influence on the fate of nations and regions.
The case of participative political institutions, on the contrary, is one where the incentives
of the political system and the logic of collective action had worked hand in hand to undo
the potentially positive effects of democratization. The isolated rise of participative political
institutions within the still inherently undemocratic political system of the latemedieval city,
had no chance to succeed in the long-run as it was not fundamental enough to overcome the
detrimental logic of a system inwhich rational actorswere only interested in their ownwelfare
and not in that of the society as a whole. Social dilemmas like this, where there is a contrast
between individual and social rationality—and that closely resemble the structure of a classi-
cal prisoner’s dilemma—can only be solved by the introduction of a full set of self-reinforcing
economic andpolitical rules that are able to alter the logic of the system. These rules can bring
in line individual and social rationality and thus, sustain themselves as everyone profits from
sticking to them. Such a set of economic and political rules was development earliest follow-
ing the “Glorious Revolution” in 17th century England and took another almost 200 years
before they began to significantly pay off during Industrialization.
Furthermore, the findings in chapters four and five also have some implications for ongo-
ing debates in development economics about the determinants of successful political change
and the process of democratization. First, they advocate the view that successful political
2Hence, the findings in chapter two are fully in linewith the classical cases of path-dependent developments
as outlined in David (1985).
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changes are bottom-up changes, originating from inclusive growth that enriches formerly
poor parts of the society. Therefore, it also reminds one about the fact that by no means all
people automatically profit from economic prosperity, as it often seems to be assumed in the
contemporary economic and political discussion. Furthermore, that the isolated increase of
the participativeness of the political institutions was not able to significantly positively in-
fluence economic development suggests that the transition from autocracy to democracy can
only be successful if there is a sharp and complete transition from one system to the other.
Gradual transitions aiming on introducing one element of democracy after the other might
not be successful in the long-run.
To conclude, the landscape of history is not scattered by randomly distributed individual
trees nor by a few, large forests. Rather, there are both, small conglomerations of trees scat-
tered in a random fashion as well as larger and smaller forests. Some of the forests and trees
already exist for a long period of time and are still healthy and prosperous, while other forest
and trees already died and are not visible anymore. New trees continuously emerge around
the existing forests and trees—and the already existing trees could both foster or inhibit the
growing of new ones. Hence, the world today is not the same as yesterday, but some of the
patterns and characteristics of the past are still present in today’s worldwhile others are not—
there is always a part of the world that is random or unconnected to the past. We can learn
from history, but not about everything and in every case.
Hence, any study concerned with the impact of historical phenomena on contemporary
economic outcomes has to be quite careful in working out the mechanism through which
the impact of the historical event could have persisted until today.
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A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Data Appendix
The level of an observation is a NUTS-3 region (for example, in Germany this corresponds
to the “Landkreise”, in France to the “Departments”, and in Italy to the “Provincias”). If
the variables are defined on another NUTS level, this is indicated in the description of the
respective variable. City level information is matched to the NUTS-3 regions by the use of
Eurostat (2007). I use the NUTS-2006 classification, since most of the data is available only
for this version of the NUTS classification. A descriptive overview of all variables used in the
empirical analysis is given in Table A.1 below.
A.1.1 Main Variables
Trade Center. The data on historical trade cities is based on four maps. The first is printed
in Davies and Moorhouse (2002) and includes the “Main trade routes in the Holy Roman
Empire and nearby countries” for the period around 1500 AD, showing the trade routes and
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the cities located on them. Davies and Moorhouse (2002) is a book about the history of the
Polish city of Wroclaw written by a renowned expert on Polish and Eastern European his-
tory, NormanDavies, and RogerMoorhouse. According to Google Scholar it has been cited
around 60 times (as of 24th June 2013) e.g., in articles in the Journal of the Royal Statistical
Association. It is therefore considered to be a reliable source of information about medieval
trade activities.
Because this map only covers the areas of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Eastern
France, Germany, Hungary Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and North Italy I make use
of a secondmappublished inKing (1985) including “Chief trade routes inEurope, Levant and
NorthAfrica 1300-1500CE”. Thismap covers awide area including parts ofNorthAfrica and
theNear East. From thismap I primarily take information about French trade cities, but I also
include cities from other countries that are notmentioned in the first map. The original map
is printed in a chapter entitled the “Currents of Trade: Industry, Merchants and Money” in
“The Flowering of theMiddle Ages” edited by the Oxford-based medieval art historian Joan
Evans. In this chapter, Donald King introduces the most important goods of the medieval
economy, and discusses how they were produced and traded. He places special emphasis on
the patterns of commerce and trade, as well describing the most important centers of com-
merce and trade activity (Fair and market cities etc.). He also discusses the importance of in-
stitutions (like contract security) etc., and the role they played for trade activities. Again, this
volume appears to be a frequently cited source with around 50 citations inGoogle Scholar (as
of 24th June 2013). According to the bibliography of the volume, King (1985) draws heavily
on standard sources for medieval trade including Heyd (1879), Lopez and Raymond (1955)
and Postan and Rich (eds.)(1952).
As a third source I use an overview map of late medieval trade printed in Magocsi (2002),
an historical atlas of central Europe and an often cited source for historical information about
economic, cultural, and political features. He is cited 222 times by Google scholar (as of 24th
June 2013). Among the papers using the information provided by the atlas are the histori-
cal economic papers by Börner and Severgnini (2015) and Dittmar (2011), as well as Becker
et al. (2011). The map contains information on the “economic patterns” in Central Europe
around the year 1450. I primarily took from this map information about Southern Italian
trade cities not included in the other maps. Again, I also include cities mentioned there but
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not in the other two sources. From this map, a city is considered if it is located on a “ma-
jor” or “important” trade route. The map also contains information about members of the
Hanseatic League (and their importance) as well as commercial offices and foreign depots of
theHanseatic League. Further, it also depicts the goods traded over the particular routes and
the areas in which the commodities are typically produced. The map drawn in Magocsi’s at-
las relies on other regional and general historical atlases, like those of Darby and Fuller (eds.)
(1978) orLendl andWagner (1963) forAustria. However,Magocsi also consultedbooks about
the history of particular cities like Dubrovnik (Carter 1972) or Wroclaw (Ochmanski 1982).
Finally, I consult several maps included in Westermanns Atlas zur Weltgeschichte  (Stier
et al. 1956). To be precise, I used the information given by a map depicting the “Hanseatic
League and its Opponents in the 15th century after the Peace of Utrecht”. The map reports
the location of Hanseatic cities, the kontors of the Hanseatic League in other countries and
the main trade routes of the time, as well as the goods traded. The geographical scope of the
map is limited to the part of Germany north of Prague, the Netherlands, and the majority of
today’s Belgium and Poland. If a city is located on one of the trade routes, I include it regard-
less of whether it was a member of the Hanseatic League. Second, I draw information from
a map in the atlas that shows “Western European Trade” in the late medieval age and reports
the course of the “important trade routes” and the cities located along them. The scope of
the map is south-west Europe (Spain and France) but it also includesWest Germany and the
north-west of Italy. Here again, I include a city if it is located on a major trade route. Finally,
I use the information contained in a map regarding “Levant Trade in the Late Medieval and
the Ottoman Invasion”. This map, in addition to other information, delineates the course
of “important” trade routes (both on land and sea) and the cities located on them. I recog-
nize cities on trade routes in the southern part of Germany, Hungary, Italy and most parts
of France as well as parts of Poland.
Although far frombeing the only sources of information onmedieval trade activities, these
four maps seem to contain the most complete cross-national information about important
trade activities in the later medieval period.
Furthermore, I consult additional sources including a list of themembers of theHanseatic
league from Dollinger (1966), a standard source for the history of the Hanseatic League. I
only recognize those cities that, according to Dollinger, “played an important role in the
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Hanseatic League”, or were capitals of thirds and quarters. Moreover, I consult a map con-
taining information about “North-South Trade Routes in the Alps Area in theMedieval Pe-
riod” from Schulte (1966); two very general maps printed in Kinder and Hilgemann (1970)
focusing on Baltic Sea and Levant trading activities in 1400 AD; a map published in Am-
mann (1955) focusing on trade routes for Southern German textile products (Barchent); and
themap “Business Centers andMaritimeTradeRoutes, HighMiddleAges” printed inHunt
and Murray (1999).1 Furthermore, I draw on qualitative information about the importance
of a trade cities from Spufford’s (2002) standard work about medieval trade and commerce
and the monograph about the history of German trade written by Dietze (1923).
In Table A.3, all trade cities and the corresponding regions for which the dummy variable is
equal to one and the source(s) mention the respective city as a trade center are shown. How-
ever, due to space restrictions I do not report any of the sources I consulted for getting in-
formation about the validity of the sample of important trade centers. For example, there
is a three-volume anthology by Escher and Hirschmann (eds.) (2005) in which a group of
researches researchers developed an index of urban centrality for cities in the “Rhine-Meuse
area” for the period 1000 to 1350 AD (i.e., south-west Germany, western Switzerland, eastern
France, large parts of Belgium and the South of the Netherlands). As part of the index of ur-
ban centrality, they collecteddata about the existence andnumber ofmarkets, fairs, trade halls
and the presence and importance of long-distance trade activities. They also have data about
the existence of certain manufacturing activities that are also good indicators of the presence
of trade. They develop a categorical index of centrality from the qualitative information they
collect. The trade cities in the sample that are included in the volume are: Aachen, Antwerp,
Cologne, Dordrecht, Dortmund, Frankfurt,Maastricht,Metz,Münster, Paderborn, Rotter-
dam, Soest and Straßburg. For each of those cities, one or more markets, fairs, or important
long-distance trade is mentioned. But, here, the range goes from Cologne (with 4 markets,
and “very important” fairs and long-distance trade activities) to, e.g., Paderborn ––where it is
stated that it has a fair and long-distance trade. Due to this, it is not easy to say if the informa-
tion provided by this source can be used to validate a city’s importance and thus if it should
be included in the sample. Furthermore, the period for which the index is constructed ends
1Geographical scope, time period and level of generality sometimes differ between these maps, so a cross-
validation is not always possible to a full extent.
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in the middle of the 14th century, and thus earlier than my period of observation. Neverthe-
less, the information provided in the anthology of Escher and Hirschmann (eds.) (2005) can
be useful to select cities that were possibly less important because the markets, fairs or trade
there were comparably limited in scope (i.e., according to the number of markets, halls, fairs
or their importance) or time. Additionally, it provides clear evidence for the outstanding im-
portance of Cologne and, e.g. the over-regional importance (“very important” long-distance
trade or fair) of Dortmund, Frankfurt, Münster and Soest.
As already mentioned, the information in those sources is used primarily to validate the
information printed in themaps. However, as indicated in themain text I sometimes include
cities mentioned in these sources but not in the maps when I am in doubt about the actual
importance of a city in terms of medieval trade.
Furthermore, I construct several trade center dummies using alternative samples of trade
cities (as discussed in the main text). At first, I exclude cities mentioned by only one of my
sources. These cities are: Amberg, Bruck, Fulda, Maastricht, Malbork, Mantoa , Minden,
Orleans, Parma, Pecs, PiotrkowTrybunalski, Plock, Rotterdam, Saint-Malo , Udine, Utrecht
and Zwickau. Second, I exclude cities for which I am not completely sure about their impor-
tance, although they are reported inmore than one ofmy sources. Those cities are Paderborn,
Einbeck, Greifswald, Braniewo, Görlitz, Metz, Palanga, Como, and Stargard. For example,
I exclude Paderborn because despite the fact that it was a member of the Hanseatic League
and lay on the Hellweg no other source mentioned it, and Dollinger (1966) did not consider
it as a Hanseatic city of special importance. Furthermore, the data collected by Escher and
Hirschmann (eds.) (2005) implies that the existing trade activity in Paderborn was of rel-
atively low importance compared to, e.g. Cologne, Münster, Dortmund or other leading
trade cities. Third, I add some cities to the original sample of trade cities. These cities are
cases where a first look at the available information leads to the decision to exclude a trade
city, even if the city is mentioned in one or more of the sources as a place of some relevance
for trade. This is the case, for example, for Anklam, a member city of the Hanseatic League
situated on an important trade route according to amap in Stier et al. (1956). However, none
of the other sources mention Anklam as an important trade center and Dollinger (1966) did
not note a special role for Anklam within the Hanseatic League.
Finally, I build a last alternative sample of trade cities that includes only those cities for
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whichhistorical sources indicate long-run trade activities (i.e., cities thatwere important trade
cities around 1500 AD and that were also important before that time). An overview of these
cities, for the earliest period in which trade activities are reported, and the sources that men-
tion the respective cities are given in Table A.4. This re-coding is based on information pri-
marily derived from Wilhelm Heyd’s two volumes on medieval Levant trade (Heyd 1879).
Heyd provides information about medieval trade activities in the Levant and the most im-
portant parties involved, in chronological order beginning with the end of migration period
(“Barbarian Invasions”). I take the period mentioned in the chapter headings of the chapter
in which the trade activities of a city are firstly mentioned as the period with the earliest au-
thenticated trade activities. If Heyd explicitly reports a date or a time frame then I use this
date/time. Heyd (1879) provides information about the trade activities of Austrian, Belgian,
French, German and Italian cities. Additionally, themonograph about theHanseatic League
written by Dollinger (1966) includes a number of maps depicting, e.g. the main Hanseatic
trade routes and trade cities before 1250, between 1250 and 1350 and 1350 and 1500 (alwaysAD).
Another map reports important trade routes (e.g., the salt way) and the cities that signed the
treaty of Smolensk in 1229 AD. According to Dollinger (1966), this map covers the period
1286 to approximately 1336. I stick to the dates given in thesemaps when assigning the respec-
tive cities the dates when they are mentioned first. All in all, this, along with other maps in
Dollinger (1966), contains information about trade activities in France, Germany, Lithuania
and Poland. Finally, for Germany, Italy and France the work of Dietze (1923), on the history
of German trade, reports significant trade activities and locations since the “pre-historical”
period. I include a city in the sample if Dietze (1923) reports that city to be an important
player in early and high medieval trade.
For Austria, the Czech Republic and Poland information is provided by three digitized
maps from T. Matthew Ciolek’s OWTRAD website. The first is based on a map printed
in Humnicki and Borawska (1969) and shows “Central European Trade Routes 800 – 900
CE”.2 The second map originates from Wojtowicz (1956) and according to the OWTRAD
website reports “Major trade roads in Poland and adjacent border regions 1340–1400 CE”.3
2The map can be found under the following URL:
http://www.ciolek.com/OWTRAD/DATA/tmcCZm0800.html; accessed on June 11th, 2013.
3The original title of the map is (according to the OWTRAD website) “Trade roads
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Form this map I include information about Polish trade cities. The last map from the OW-
TRAD project is based on Rutkowski (1980) and is about ‘Major trade roads in Poland and
adjacent border regions in 1370CE”.4; accessed June 11th, 2013. From thismap, I solely include
the German city of Görlitz since all the other relevant cities in the map were mentioned by
another source depicting trade in an earlier period. Overall I were able to find information
for about 75 of my 115 medieval trade cities.
ln(Distance to Trade Center). This variable is calculated using the ArcGIS Near Tool. It rep-
resents the natural logarithm (ln) of the distance between a region’s centroid and the closest
trade center region in degrees. The variable takes the value 0 for regions that containmedieval
trade cities (i.e. for which the trade center dummy is equal to one).
Centuries of Trade. The variable indicates howmany centuries elapsed since a city was firstly
mentioned as an important trade center according to my information. The variable is coded
by the author. Theminimumnumber of centuries is six (from 1500ADuntil nowadays). Six
is also the value if I did not find information about earlier significant trade activities in the
region.
ln(Population Density). A region’s Population Density comes from the Eurostat regional
statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_r_d3dens&lang=en;
accessed on October 10th 2012). The values are from 2009.
ln(Relative GDP Density). This variable is calculated using the following formula (Roos
2005):
rdi =
Yi=
P
Yi
Ai=
P
Ai
Where rdi is the relative GDPDensity of a region. Yi is a region’s GDP (calculated by multi-
plying the GDP per capita with the population density) andAi is a region’s area. Therefore,
the relative GDPDensity is the GDP density of a region (GDP per km2) relative to the aver-
age density of all other regions. Alternatively, it is the ratio of a regions share of GDP relative
to its share of a country’s overall area. In consequence, if the relative GDP Density is larger
than one this means that a region shows concentration of economic activity higher than the
at the times of Casimir the Great”). The map is available from the OWTRAD website at
http://www.ciolek.com/OWTRAD/DATA/tmcPLm1370a.html; accessed June 11th, 2013.
4Themapcanbe accessedunder theURLhttp://www.ciolek.com/OWTRAD/DATA/tmcPLm1370.html
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average region in a country (Roos 2005). For the empirical estimations, I take the natural
logarithm of the variable, so that it is greater than zero for above average levels of spatial eco-
nomic concentration. GDP per capita, the population density and the area of a region are all
from the sources listed in this appendix.
A.1.2 Control Variables
Altitude. The Altitude of a region is taken from the website gpsvisualizer.com(accessed at
November 8th 2012) and based on the coordinates of its centroid.
Bishop. Dummy variable equal to one if a region includes a city that was seat of a bishop
(or, in France and Italy, of an archbishop) in 1500 AD. The variable is coded according to in-
formation from thewebsite http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org (accessed onNovember 27th,
2012). For bishoprics in theHoly Roman Empire Oestreich andHolzer (1970b) are addition-
ally consulted. When therewere doubts as towhether a diocese or archbishopricwas founded
before 1000 AD,Wikipedia and the catholic encyclopedia
(http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/; accessed on November 27th, 2012) were consulted.
Capital. A dummy variable equal to one if a region includes the capital of a sovereign state.
Coded by the author.
Education. I measure the human capital of a NUTS-2 region with the share (in percent) of
persons aged 25-64 to have attained tertiary education. The variable is obtained from the Eu-
rostat regional statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_11&lang=en; accessed
on October 10th, 2012). I took the values from 2009.
Hanseatic League. Binary variable equal to one if a region contains at least one city that was
a member of the Hanseatic League. Coded according to Dollinger (1966).
Imperial City. A Dummy Variable equal to one if a region includes at least one city that was
an imperial city in the Holy Roman Empire. The variable is coded following Oestreich and
Holzer (1970a). They provide a list of cities mentioned as ”Reichsstädte” in the Reichsma-
trikel of 1521 (sometimes called the “Wormser Matrikel”). However, there is a considerable
amount of uncertainty about when, and after how long, a city actually becomes an imperial
city and what criteria have to be fulfilled. Indeed there are cases where it is not clear if a city
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mentioned in the Reichsmatrikel was actually an imperial city or not. There are also some
cities (e.g., Düren or Chemnitz) that lost their status as an imperial city after a short period of
time or at least prior to 1500 AD. Moreover, according to Wikipedia there seem to be some
Dutch cities such as Kampen, Deventer, and Zwolle that became imperial cities in 1495 but
are not mentioned in Oestreich and Holzer (1970a) or the Reichsmatrikel. I am nevertheless
aware that the reliability of some sources, particularly for the Wikipedia article, cannot be
verified. What is more, I are interested in the long-run effect that the status of an imperial
city can have on the development of a city. For this reason it might suffice to include the cities
mentioned in the Reichsmatrikel, and that had the status of an imperial city not only over
a short time period. This is also why we do not exclude Düren since it was imperial city for
more than 200 years (from around 1000AD to 1241 AD)when it became property of the earl
of Jülich.
Imperial Road. Dummy variable equal to one if a region contains at least one city that was
located on an important imperial road, i.e. the Via Imperii, the Via Regia or the Via Re-
gia Lusatiae Superioris. The variable is coded according to information provided by Kühn
(2005), the entry “HoheLandstraße” in the online version of “MeyersGroßesKonversations-
Lexikon” (http://www.zeno.org/Meyers-1905/A/Hohe%20Landstra%DFe;
accessed December 18th, 2012), a map from a website of the federal government of the Ger-
man State Saxony on regional development
(http://www.landesentwicklung.sachsen.de/download/Landesentwicklung/
ED-C_III_Via_Regia_Verlauf.jpg; accessed December 18th, 2012) and wikipedia entries.
Inequality. I measure inequality as the ratio of average workers compensation to the GDP
per capita. The Sources of GDP per capita and average workers compensation are as listed in
this appendix.
Latitude. The values of this variable represent the latitude in decimal degrees of a region’s
centroid and are obtained from a GIS map of NUTS territories provided by the Eurostat
GISCODatabase.
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/GISCO/geodatafiles/NUTS_2010_03M_SH.zip;
accessed on November 8th, 2012).
Latitude. The values of this variable represent the latitude in decimal degrees of a region’s
centroid and are obtained from a GIS map of NUTS territories provided by the Eurostat
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GISCODatabase.
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/GISCO/geodatafiles/NUTS_2010_03M_SH.zip;
accessed on November 8th, 2012).
Longitude. The values of this variable represent the longitude in decimal degrees of a region’s
centroid and are obtained from a GIS map of NUTS territories provided by the Eurostat
GISCODatabase.
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/GISCO/geodatafiles/NUTS_2010_03M_SH.zip;
accessed on November 8th, 2012).
ln(Agricultural Suitability). Variable originates from Ramankutty et al. (2002). It measures
the probability of an area to be cultivated. This probability of cultivation is calculated ac-
cording to the climatic conditions (temperature, sunshine hours etc.) and the soil quality
(pH value, waterholding capacity etc.).
ln(Area). The natural logarithm of a region’s area is taken from the Eurostat regional statis-
tics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_r_d3area&lang=en;
accessed on January 10th, 2013). As always, I use the values from 2009.
ln(Distance to Border). The variable represents the natural logarithm of the distance between
a region’s centroid and the closest point of the country’s border. It is calculated using the Ar-
cGIS Near Tool. The coordinates of borderlines are taken from a GIS map of EU countries
provided by the Eurostat GISCODatabase
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/GISCO/geodatafiles/CNTR_2010_03M_SH.zip;
accessed on January 10th, 2013).
ln(Distance to Coast). The variable represents the natural logarithm of the distance between
a region’s centroid and the closest point of a country’s coastline. It is calculated using the
ArcGIS Near Tool. The coordinates of a country’s coastlines are taken from the GIS map
“Corine land cover 2000 coastline” provided by European Environment Agency (EEA)
(http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/corine-land-cover-2000-coastline; accessed
on November 8th, 2012).
ln(Distance to River). The variable represents the natural logarithm of the distance between
a region’s centroid and the closest point of a country’s major waterway (e.g., in Germany
these are Elbe, Danube, Rhine and Oder). It is calculated using the ArcGIS Near Tool. The
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coordinates of the rivers are taken from the GIS map “WISE Large rivers and large lakes”
provided by European Environment Agency (EEA) (http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/data/wise-large-rivers-and-large-lakes; accessed on November 8th, 2012).
ln(EmployeesCompensation). Natural logarithmof averageof employees compensation (wages,
salaries and employer’s social contributions) at NUTS-2 level measured at current prices and
from the year 2009. Data was obtained from the Eurostat regional statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_r_e2rem&lang=en;
accessed on October 10th, 2012).
ln(Fixed Capital). Gross fixed capital formationbyNUTS-2 regionsmeasured for 2009. Data
is obtained from the Eurostat regional statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_r_e2gfcfr2&lang=en;
accessed on October 10th, 2012).
ln(Neighborhood GDP p.c.). Variable contains the distance weighted average GDP per capita
of regions within a 150km radius around the considered city. Variable is computed by the
author using the Stata command “nearstat”.
Number of Trade Regions x–y kilometers away. Four variables reporting the absolute number
of regions harboring a medieval trade center in (i) 0–50km, (ii) 50–100km, (iii) 100–150km
and (iv) 150-250km away from the considered city. Variable is computed by the author using
the Stata command “nearstat”.
ln(Distance to Roman Road). Variable reporting the distance of a regions centroid to the clos-
est Roman Road in degrees. The distances are calculated on the basis of a GIS map of the
ancient Roman road network provided by the Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civi-
lizations (DARMC). The shapefile can be downloaded here:
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4KitLDpLpYfN3hKM3E2YWltWm8/edit?usp=sharing;
accessed on February 20th, 2014.
Longitude. The values of this variable represent the longitude in decimal degrees of a region’s
centroid and are obtained from a GIS map of NUTS territories provided by the Eurostat
GISCODatabase
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/GISCO/geodatafiles/NUTS_2010_03M_SH.zip;
accessed on November 8th, 2012).
Mining Region. Dummy variable equal to one if in a region at least one ore or coal mine (or
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mining firm) is located. The information on which the coding is based originate from the
structural business statistics included in the Eurostat regional statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=sbs_r_nuts06_r2&lang=en;
accessed on January 28th, 2012).
Mountain Region. Categorical variable equal to one if more than 50% of a population in a
region live in mountainous areas according to the ESPON (European Observation Network
for Territorial Development and Cohesion) regional typologies project. Thus, the variable is
equal to one if more than 50% of a region’s population live in a mountain area; it is two if
more than 50% of a region’s surface is covered by mountain areas; and it is three if a region
has more than 50% of its surface covered bymountain areas andmore than 50% of the popu-
lation live in mountain areas. It is zero when a region fulfills none of these criteria. The data
and an explanation of the classifications can be downloaded from
http://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/ToolsandMaps/ESPONTypologies
/Typologies_metadata_data_final.xls(accessed on November 8th, 2012).
Patents. Total number (over all IPO section and classes) of patent applications submitted to
the European Patent Office (EPO) in each region in 2009. Data available from the Eurostat
regional statistics database
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=pat_ep_ripc&lang=en;
accessed on October 10th, 2012).
Printing Press before 1500 AD. Dummy variable equal to one if at least one city in a region
had adopted printing technology before 1500 AD. The coding is based on information in
Benzing (1982), Clair (1976) and the Incunabula Short Title Catalogue (ISTC) of the British
library (http://www.bl.uk/catalogues/istc/index.html; accessed onNovember 18th, 2012). A
region is included if any of these sources mention a city in this region.
Quality of Government. The European Regional Quality of Government Index (EQI) as
developed by the Quality of Government Institute at the university of Gothenburg in Den-
mark. The index is constructed in a similar way to the World Governance (WGI) Indica-
tors of the World Bank (further information on the index design and data can be found at:
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1362/1362471_eqi—correlates-codebook.pdf;
accessed on January 28th 2013). The data on which the index is based were collected in 2009.
In Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Hungary the index report values at NUTS-1 level in
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the other countries in the dataset it reports values at NUTS-2 level. The data can be down-
loaded from
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1362/1362473_eqi-and-correlates–qog-website-.xlsx
(accessed on January 28th, 2013).
Residence City. Binary variable that represents important residence cities (of Dukes, Kings…)
in theHolyRomanEmpire or theGermanReich (after 1871). The coding follows aWikipedia
list at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Residenzstadt (accessed February, 24th 2013) andKöbler
(1988). It also includes residences of electors (“Kurfürsten’’) and prince-bishoprics. Further-
more, it represents the capitals or residence cities of Italian duchies, kingdoms and republics
(e.g., Venice, Lombardy, Sardinia, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, Naples or the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies). For all other countries it marked the capitals of pre-existing states or kingdoms,
duchies etc. (e.g., in Poland it includes the residence of the kings of the Kingdom of Poland,
in Lithuania the residence of the grand duke of Lithuania…). The coding here follows the
author’s information or different versions of Putzgers Historical Atlas (Bruckmüller (eds.)
2011 and Baldamus et al. (eds.) 1914).
Unemployment. I measure the average annual unemployment rate (in percent) of a region
in 2009 (including people above the age of 15). Data is from the Eurostat regional statistics
database (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfst_r_lfu3rt&lang=en;
accessed on October 10th, 2012).
University before 1500. Dummy variable equal to one if at least one city in a region has a uni-
versity founded before 1500 AD. Coding according to Eulenburg (1994), Kinder and Hilge-
mann (1970) andRüegg (1993). A city is recognized if it is mentioned by any of these sources.
If there were doubts about the founding date of a university (or contradicting dates) Can-
toni and Yuchtman (2014) or Wikipedia were used as validation. Since I am only interested
in the long-run effect of universities, cities with very short periods with universities like, e.g.
Vicenza or Piacenza are not coded as having a university.
A.1.3 City Level Variables
Most of the city-level variables used for the panel analysis originate from the Bosker et al.
(2013) data set. The reader is referred to their data Appendix for detailed information on the
data. The Data Appendix to Bosker et al. (2013) is available here:
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http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00284/suppl_file/
REST_a_00284_data_appendix.pdf (accessed on April, 8th 2014). The trademedieval trade
measures and the neighborhood effects variable are coded by the author and describe below
in more detail. However, I choose to include that version of their urban potential variable
that follows DeVries (1984), i.e. the contribution of another city to a city’s urban potential
does not only depend on distance but takes additionally into account whether one or both
cities are located at sea or a navigable river. All used variables not part of the Bosker et al.
(2013) data set are described below.
Centuries of Trade. The variable indicates how many centuries elapsed since a city was
firstly mentioned as an important trade center according to my information. The minimum
number of centuries is 0 (i.e, in the period before a city became a trade city or for cities that
never became important trade centers) themaximumnumber is eleven (corresponding to the
eleven centuries for which I have data).
ln(Distance to Trade City). Variable represents the geodesic distance between a city and the
closest trade city in degrees. The variable takes the value 0 for cities that are coded as trade
cities (i.e. for which the trade center dummy is equal to one). The variable takes into account
that the number of trade cities varied by centuries.
Imperial City. A Dummy Variable equal to one if a city was an imperial city in the Holy
Roman Empire. The variable is coded following Oestreich and Holzer (1970a). They pro-
vide a commented list of citiesmentioned as imperial cities (“Reichsstädte”) in theReichsma-
trikel of 1521 (sometimes called the “WormserMatrikel”). This variable takes into account the
available information about when a city took on the status of an imperial city (the so-called
“Reichsunmittelbarkeit”). Such information suffers from a marked amount of uncertainty.
However, the German version of Wikipedia provides a list of imperial cities including infor-
mation about the approximate date the city become imperial city. This information is often
based on corresponding decrees of kings or emperors of the Holy Roman Empire available
in the Regesta Imperii, an archive of all documentary and historiographic documents of the
Roman-German kings until Maximilian I (http://www.regesta-imperii.de/startseite.html).
This archive is maintained by the “Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz”
and is a reliable source of historical information.
Still, not all the dates in the list are validated by these sources. In these cases, we rely on
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available information from city history or other sources to assign a date. Despite these ef-
forts, sometimes sources mention different dates or rely on other criteria. We then proceed
by assuming the date seeming most plausible from what we infer from city history. Where
it was impossible to find satisfactory information, we code the city as an imperial city from
1500 AD onward.
Trade City. The trade city dummy is coded according to the procedure described in de-
tail below and follows that of the trade center dummy on regional level. The cities coded
as trade cities (with the year since they are coded as trade city) are:Amsterdam (since 1500),
Ancona (since 1500), Antwerpen (since 1500), Augsburg (since 900), Avignon (since 1300),
Bari (since 1100), Bayonne (since 800), Berlin (since 1500), Bologna (since 1400), Bordeaux
(since 1500), Brunswick (since 800), Bremen (since 1100), Brno (since 900), Bruges (since
900), Budapest (since 1400), Cologne (since 1500), Como (since 1500), Deventer (since 1400),
Dordrecht (since 1500), Erfurt (since 1100), Florence (since 1400), Frankfurt am Main (since
800), Frankfurt an der Oder (since 1100), Gdansk (since 1400), Genova (since 1100), Ghent
(since 1200), Graz (since 1500), Görlitz (since 1400), Hamburg (since 1200), Hanover (since
800), Hildesheim (since 1400), Innsbruck (since 1500), Kampen (since 1400), Krakow (since
900), Kutna Hora (since 1500), Leipzig (since 800), Limoges (since 1100), Linz (since 900),
Lucca (since 1200), Lyons (since 1500), Lübeck (since 1200), Lüneburg (since 1400), Magde-
burg (since 900),Mantoa (since 800),Marseille (since 900),Metz (since 1400),Milano (since
1400), Montpellier (since 1100), Münster (since 1200), Napoli (since 1100), Narbonne (since
1100), Nuremberg (since 800), Olmouc (since 900), Orleans (since 1500), Osnabrück (since
1500), Padova (since 800), Paris (since 1500), Parma (since 1400), Perpignan (since 1500), Pest
(since 1400), Pisa (since 1300), Poznan (since 1400), Praha (since 900), Prato (since 800), Re-
gensburg (since 800), Reims (since 1500), Roma (since 1100), Rostock (since 1400), Salzburg
(since 1500), Siena (since 1200), Soest (since 1200), St. Malo (since 1500), Stralsund (since
1300), Straßbourg (since 1200), Torun (since 1400), Toulouse (since 1500), Tours (since 1500),
Treviso (since 800), Troyes (since 800), Udine (since 800), Ulm (since 800), Utrecht (since
1500), Venice (since 1100), Verona (since 800), Warsaw (since 1400), Vienna (since 1300) and
Wroclaw (since 1400). The panel version of the variable takes into consideration information
about the period in which a city became an important center of trade. This information is
depicted in Table A.4. The consulted historical sources usually only provide basic informa-
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tion about when a city became important (e.g., “during the 14th century” or “before the 10th
century”). As a result, I still have to choose the exact period fromwhich I code a city as being
an important trade center. Here, I stick to the following rule: If the source states simply “9th
century” I code the city as a trade city from the year 900 AD onward. If the source reports,
e.g., “before the 14th century” I code the city as a trade city from 1300ADonwards. If it states
“between the 13th and 14th century” we code the city as being a trade city from 1400 AD on-
ward. If a city signed the treaty of Smolensk in 1229 ADwe code it as being a trade city since
1200AD. In the case of Straßbourg, Dollinger (1966) reports the city to be important “before
1250 AD”. In this case we coded Straßbourg as being a trade city since 1200 AD. In general, if
two different periods or years are available we always choose the later year.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Data Overview—Regional Level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Altitude 839 279.230 320.194 -6.200 2472.600
Bishop 839 .098 .297 0 1
Capital 839 0.011 0.103 0 1
Centuries of Trade 839 1.088 2.823 0 13
Commercial Importance 839 0.67 0.955 0 5
Commercial Importance Alt. 839 1.46 0.866 0 5.357
Education 832 24.211 6.319 8.4 48.6
Hanseatic League 839 0.108 0.311 0 1
Imperial City 839 0.069 0.254 0 1
Imperial Road 839 0.045 0.208 0 1
Inequality 825 1.134 0.921 0.037 8.425
Latitude 839 49.460 3.088 38.245 55.939
ln(Agricultural Suitability) 839 0.429 0.186 0 0.693
ln(Area) 839 7.032 1.297 3.575 9.400
ln(Distance to Border) 839 -0.825 1.083 -5.532 1.16
ln(Distance to Coast) 839 0.308 1.204 -5.566 1.882
ln(Distance to River) 839 -.675 1.322 -7.185 1.944
ln(Distance to Trade Center) 839 0.432 0.272 0 1.665
ln(Employees Compensation) 825 9.867 0.924 7.086 12.331
ln(Fixed Capital) 803 9.141 0.818 6.802 11.494
ln(Neighborhood GDP p.c.) 839 2.531 -2.121 4.3
ln(Night Light Intensity) 839 2.723 0.648 1.43 4.143
ln(Population Density) 839 5.351 1.137 2.709 9.964
ln(Relative GDPDensity) 839 -.077 1.262 -2.461 6.194
ln(Distance Roman Road) 839 -1.47 2.161 -8.594 2.16
Longitude 839 10.228 5.012 -4.091 25.573
Mining Region 839 0.228 0.420 0 1
Mountain Region 839 0.479 1.022 0 3
Number of Trade Regions(0–50km) 839 0.558 0.756 0 4
Number of Trade Regions(50–100km) 839 1.776 1.444 0 7
Number of Trade Regions(100–150km) 839 2.785 1.902 0 9
Number of Trade Regions(150–250km) 839 8.143 4.149 0 21
Patents 803 83.094 89.654 0.286 764.717
Printing Press before 1500 839 0.199 0.4 0 1
Quality of Government 839 72.130 17.163 10.18 97.61
Residence City 839 0.067 0.25 0 1
Trade Center 839 0.137 0.344 0 1
Unemployment 582 8.237 3.435 1.9 19.1
University before 1500 839 0.052 0.223 0 1
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Table A.2: Descriptive Data Overview—City Level Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Archbishop 3982 0.088 0.283 0 1
Bishop 3982 0.374 0.484 0 1
Capital 3982 0.029 0.169 0 1
Centuries of Trade 3982 0.708 1.963 0 11
Communal Institutions 3982 0.331 0.471 0 1
Ecozone=3 3982 0.047 0.212 0 1
Ecozone=4 3982 0.771 0.42 0 1
Ecozone=6 3982 0.069 0.254 0 1
Elevation 3982 132.423 149.121 -4 1085
Free-Prince 3982 0.368 0.482 0 1
Imperial City 3982 0.024 0.153 0 1
Large State 3982 0.593 0.491 0 1
Latitude 3982 47.37 3.835 38.9 54.783
ln(Distance to Trade City) 3982 3.82 1.839 0 6.61
ln(Population) 1533 2.834 0.674 1.792 6.312
Longitude 3982 8.92 5.836 -4.483 22.683
Number of Trade Cities (0–50km) 3982 0.291 0.594 0 4
Number of Trade Cities (50–100km) 3982 1.819 2.075 0 11
Number of Trade Cities (100–150km) 3982 3.032 2.774 0 14
Parliament 3982 0.261 0.439 0 1
Plundered 3982 0.036 0.217 0 3
River 3982 0.646 0.478 0 1
Roman Road 3982 0.215 0.411 0 1
Roman Road Hub 3982 0.71 0.454 0 1
Sea 3982 0.157 0.364 0 1
Terrain Ruggedness 3982 56.229 72.838 0.466 559.45
Trade City 3982 0.158 0.365 0 1
University 3982 0.069 0.253 0 1
Urban Centrality Index 3982 2.429 1.021 0 6
Urban Potential 3982 14.906 17.513 0.703 200.06
Notes. The 3982 observations mean 3982 city-year pairs as there is data for 11 periods in time in the Bosker et al. (2013)
data set.
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A.2 Robustness Checks
The results have proven to be robust to the inclusion of many important covariates and to
endogeneity issues. However, there remain some additional concerns about the robustness
of the obtained estimates. To account for these issues, I conduct various robustness checks.
There is a considerable amount of uncertainty in the historical sources and information on
which the identification of important medieval trade centers is based. For example, there is a
different degree of uncertainty about the extent and locationof trade activities, and the course
of main routes, i.e. the actual importance of a particular trade route at a certain point in time
is not always clear. This uncertainty is a natural result of the qualitative —and therefore to
some extent always subjective—nature of the collected information and the scarce amount of
general information about the medieval period and the trade activities during that time. In
consequence, it is adequate to test whether the empirical results hold, when alternative sam-
ple of trade cities are used in the regressions. I therefore re-estimate the results that depend on
the trade center dummy (in Panel A of Table 2.2 and 2.6) using the four different alternative
samples of trade regions.
At first, I recode citiesmentionedbyonly oneofmy sources as havingno trade city. Second,
I recode cities reported in someof themaps or sources that donot actually lie on awell-known
and important trade route; were not important members of the Hanseatic League; or are
not mentioned by any of my other historical sources as being of notable importance in later
medieval trade. What is more, I also conduct the empirical analysis with a sample of trade
cities including additional cities mentioned by some of the sources, but for which I—having
consulted several different sources about the history of the respective places—are in doubt of
their actual importance during the middle ages, at least over a longer period.5 Finally, I try to
ensure that I do not include trade cities that only experienced significant trade activities for
a short period —and thus not long enough to result in a lock-in to a superior development
path. To achieve this, I construct a fourth alternative sample of trade centers considering only
those cities for which I found records of recognizable trade activities in periods before the late
15th century. These cities and the respective sources providing the information are listed in
5In the Data Appendix I provide more detailed information on every of these alternative samples, i.e. the
recoded cities and the exact criteria on which the recoding is based.
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Table A.4. The Results are depicted in Table A.5.
As one can infer from this table, the results typically change onlymarginally with the alter-
native trade center variables. However, with the last sample of trade cities containing cities
with reported trade activities in earlier periods, the coefficient of the trade center dummy be-
comes considerably smaller and actually becomes insignificant—at least in the cross-sectional
regression. However, this might also be due to the loss ofmuch of the variance and the intro-
duction of additional noise in the trade center variable. In sum, none of my conclusions and
general results are invalidated by the alternative samples of trade cities or by systematic differ-
ences in the size ofNUTS-3 regions. As such, the results are robust to considerable changes in
the sample due to uncertainty of historical information andunderlying data selection criteria.
Another robustness check accounts for the obvious considerable differences in the size of
the NUTS-3 regions resulting from political decisions as well as differences in population
density across the included countries. In the previous estimations, I already included the area
of a individualNUTS-3 region as a control variable. However, the size of theNUTS-3 regions
probably varies more between than within countries. In consequence, I include a country’s
average NUTS-3 region area as a supplementary control and re-estimate the specifications in
column (6) of Table 2.2. The results are shown in Table A.6 Panel A. An alternative way to
account for the considerable differences in the size of NUTS-3 regions and to test robustness
to different sub-samples is to run the regressions in Table 2.2 column (6) without Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands (the countries with small NUTS-3 regions). This is done in
TableB.2Panel B. Finally, Iweight the observations by the ln of the area of theNUTS-3 region
and re-estimate the regression in Table 2.2 column (6). The results of this task are reported
in Table A.6 Panel C. Finally, I only consider regions located in the 40th to 80th percentile
of the region area distribution to look whether the results still hold if only relatively equally
large regions are included. The results of this exercise are reported in Panel D of Table A.6.6
None of these modifications does lead to insignificant medieval trade measures. In the case
of the weighted regressions in Panel C the coefficients actually become even larger.
Furthermore, in Table A.7, I estimate the regressions including neighbor GDP per capita
6Since the number of observations is reduced to 251 in this case I substitute NUTS-2 dummies with the
NUTS-1 dummies.
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using a spatial lag, a spatial error and a mixed spatial model.7 Those are employed to show
that spatial autocorrelation (whether explicitly modelled or in the error term) does not bias
the estimates and also that simultaneity arising from the spatial lag variable does not lead to a
distortion of the results. This is necessary asMoran’s I tests of the OLS specification in Table
2.2 column (6) show that there is spatial autocorrelation.8 However, Lagrange Multiplier
(LM) tests of spatial autocorrelation in the error and of the spatial lag variables reveal that a
spatial error model is suitable as the impact of the spatial lag is not statistically different from
zero.9. I nevertheless run a spatial lag model and a mixed spatial model as I include neighbor
GDP per capita also due to other reasons than controlling for autocorrelation, namely to
account for a region’s second nature geography. Thus, I have to know whether and how the
simultaneity problem created by including neighbor characteristics biases the estimates. The
resulting coefficients of the medieval trade measures are about the same as in the standard
OLS case, although theymarginally smaller in all cases. Usually, the coefficients of the spatial
error model are slightly lower than those obtained by the other two models.
In Table A.8 I do the same for the city level panel estimates in Table 2.6 column (1). Here,
Moran’s I again indicate the presence of spatial autocorrelation regardless ofwhich trademea-
sure is used.10 Moreover, the LMtests always indicate that there is a significant impact both of
the spatial lag and the spatial error variable, so that the spatialmixedmodels is suitable. How-
ever, in Table A.8 I again show the estimates of all three models (spatial lag, spatial error and
spatialmixedmodel). In any case, the included spatial lags and or errors are highly significant.
Nevertheless, the coefficients of the trade measures are virtually identical to those obtained
in Table 2.7, column (1) using standard estimation techniques for panel data. Moreover, they
7Thismeans I estimate equations (1) and (2) usingMaximumLikelihoodprocedures as implementedby the
Stata command spmlreg. In case of the spatial lag model, the procedure generates the spatially lagged variable
generated based on a spatial weights matrix with inverse distance weights. In the case of the spatial error model,
I assume a spatial autoregressive model in the error term and in the case of mixed spatial model I allow for both.
8In Panel A column (6) where the trade center dummy serves as dependent variable I= 7:524, in Panel B
(distance to nearest trade center) it is 7.533 and in Panel C (centuries of trade) it is 7.524 (p   value < 0:01
in each case). The values are based on OLS regression of Table 2.2 column (6) but without the Neighborhood
GDP variable.
9Values and standard errors of the robust LM test are available from the author upon request.
10The exact Moran’s I values are 2.317 (p   value = 0:024) in the case of the trade center dummy; 2.23
(p  value = 0:024) in the case of the distance to trade center variable and 2.215 (p  value = 0:027) for the
century of trade variables. The values are based on the regressions in Table 2.6 column (1) Panels A–C without
the Urban Potential measure.
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are more or less identical regardless of which spatial model is used.
InTableA.9 finally, I account for that I do not include trade cities in some of the neighbors
of the considered countries (e.g., I do not include Spain in the analysis, but France). For the
border regions to these not included countries the distance variable thereforemight be biased
as the actually closest trade center is located in Spain and not in France (but I do not have
included cities in Spain). To overcome this issue, I delete the 50 regions that are located at
a border to a country that is not included in the analysis and re-estimate the specifications
in Table 2.2 Panel B. They reveal that most often, the point estimates are actually larger or
approximately the same than in the standardOLS case, implying that if there is a bias resulting
from this issue it is not large and downward biased the estimates.
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Table A.6: Robustness to Accounting for Different NUTS-3 Region Size and Sub-Samples
Dep. Var. ln(GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Trade Measure Trade Center Dummy ln(Distance to Trade Center) Centuries of Trade
Panel A: Including Average Area
0.105*** -0.107*** 0.0131***
(0.025) (0.041) (0.003)
Obs. 839 839 839
Adj. R2 0.853 0.8852 0.853
Panel B: Without Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands
0.139*** -0.166*** 0.0159***
(0.03) (0.049) (0.004)
Obs. 326 326 326
Adj. R2 0.937 0.935 0.936
Panel C: Observation weighted by NUTS-3 region area
0.118*** -0.121*** 0.0144***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.003)
Obs. 839 839 839
Adj. R2 0.874 0.873 0.874
Panel D: Region Area in 40–80% percentile
0.153*** -0.136** 0.0203***
(0.037) (0.061) (0.005)
Obs. 251 251 251
Adj. R2 0.706 0.693 0.706
Notes. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 %
and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a NUTS-3 region. The included controls are identical to those in Table 2.2 column
(6). In Panel A a variable reporting the average area of a country’s NUTS-3 regions is added to the specification. In Panel C, the
observations are weighted (with analytical weights) by the ln of the NUTS-3 region’s area. Each regression includes a constant
not reported.
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TableA.8:SpatialR
egression
M
odelsofTable2.7,colum
n
(1)
D
ep.Var.
ln(G
D
P
percapita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
M
odel
SpatialLag
M
odel
SpatialError
M
odel
SpatialM
ixed
M
odel
SpatialLag
M
odel
SpatialError
M
odel
SpatialM
ixed
M
odel
SpatialLag
M
odel
SpatialError
M
odel
SpatialM
ixed
M
odel
TradeCity
0.350***
0.351***
0.320***
(0.035)
(0.032)
(0.032)
ln(D
istancetoTradeCity)
-0.0757***
-0.0761***
-0.0696***
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
CenturiesofTrade
0.0596***
0.0597***
0.0564***
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.005)
VarianceR
atio
0.464
0.471
0.804
0.459
0.462
0.888
0.467
0.473
0.735
SquaredCorrelation
0.464
0.439
0.292
0.459
0.441
0.262
0.467
0.444
0.318
O
bs.
1,533
1,533
1,533
1,533
1,533
1,534
1,533
1,533
1,533
N
otes.R
obuststandard
errorsarereported
in
parentheses.Coefficientisstatisticallydifferentfrom
zero
atthe***1%,**5%
and
*10
%
level.Theunitofobservation
isacity.Thecontrolsareidenticalto
that
includedin
Table2.6colum
n
(1)in
them
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text.Each
regression
includesaconstantnotreported.
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Table A.9: Distance toTrade Center andContemporary EconomicDevelopment—Without
External Border Regions
Dep. Var. ln(GDP per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Distance to Trade Center) -0.261*** -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.149*** -0.0979*** -0.101**
(0.04) (0.033) (0.041) (0.033) (0.03) (0.041)
NUTS-1 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NUTS-2 Dummies No No No No No Yes
Basic Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Environment and Location Yes No No No Yes Yes
Region Characteristics No Yes No No Yes Yes
Historical Region Characteristics No No Yes No Yes Yes
Growth Covariates No No No Yes Yes No
Obs. 789 789 789 501 501 789
Adj. R2 0.719 0.795 0.727 0.870 0.9 0.814
Notes.Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level.
Theunit of observation is aNUTS-3 region. Thebasic geographic controls include a region’s latitude, longitude and altitude. The “Regional
Environment and Location” controls include the ln distances of a region’s centroid to the nearest border, coast point or river as well as the
distance weighted sum of theGDP per capita of all NUTS-3 region in a radius around 150 kilometers around the consideredNUTS-3 region
and four variables indicating the number ofmedieval trade regions 0–50,50–100, 100-150 and 150–250 kilometers away. Region characteristic
controls include dummies for regions including a country’s capital, are classified as mountain regions and with ore or coal mines (this latter
variable is not included in column (6) as it would be collinear with the NUTS-2 fixed effects). Furthermore, it encompasses the ln of a
regions area and the ln of a regions agricultural suitability. The historical region characteristics consist of a dummy variables indicating
regions with a city serving as seat of a bishop in 1500 AD, with a university founded before 1500 AD, that adopted printing technology
before 1500 AD, contain cities that weremembers of theHanseatic League, with former imperial cities, that were residence cities of a secular
ruler or were located on an Imperial road. Moreover it includes the ln of the distance of a regions centroid to the closest Roman road. The
growth covariates encompass a region’s unemployment rate, number of registered patents, average firm ln fixed capital stock, average worker
compensation. Furthermore, it includes the share of people aged between 25-64 with tertiary education on NUTS-2 level, the quality of
government index on NUTS-1/ NUTS-2 level and the ratio of an average workers compensation to a region’s GDP per capita as inequality
measure. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
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A.3 Discussion of Exceptional Cases and Additional Historical Evidence
A.3.1 Discussion of Exceptional Cases
Obviously, there are exceptions to this story, i.e. cities and regions becoming large and im-
portant agglomerations without being important centers of medieval trade. For example,
this is true for Stuttgart (the sixth largest German city today) andMunich two of the richest
and economically most prosperous cities and agglomeration areas in present day’s Germany.
Stuttgart only became important after the Napoleonic Wars when it became the capital of
the newly founded kingdom of Württemberg. The rise of Munich (today the third largest
city in Germany) followed a similar pattern, albeit as the capital of a kingdom and residence
of a bishop for a longer period (and later archbishop) Munich only began to become a large
city after the late 18th century. Again, it experienced significant population growth in the
nineteenth century after the Napoleonic Wars until World War I. Bavaria, andMunich as its
center, remained relatively poor until the 1950s (when, e.g., the Siemens corporation moved
its headquarter from Berlin to Munich). Additionally, the Ruhr Area, the largest agglomer-
ation in Germany, largely results from its rich endowments in coal and iron making it one of
the most important nucleus of German industrialization.
A.3.2 Additional Historical Evidence
A.3.2.1 EvidenceontheFunctioningofMarktesandtheExistenceofanUr-
ban RuralWage Gap
Of course, the medieval city was a highly cartelized and regulated economy with dominant
guilds and significant rent-seeking activities (e.g., Braudel 1986). However, as Braudel (1986)
concludes, since the 13th century something akin to market integration (to some extent) ex-
isted with prices varying in themarkets of cities every week according to supply and demand.
Furthermore, the increasing spread of the “Verlagssystem” might have limited the power of
the guilds. Concerning the urban rural wage differential, evidence in general is limited for
this period. Braudel (1986) notes that, in general, and due to the power of guilds, the wages
in the city can usually be considered as higher than those in rural areas. IndeedMunro (2002),
when comparing the real wages in England and Flanders between 1300 and 1500, found that
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the real wages in the cities were higher than in rural areas and showed a higher downward
rigidity. In addition, van Bavel and van Zanden (2004) notice that in pre-industrial societies
the relationship between city size and nominal wages was usually positive.
A.3.2.2 Further Evidence on the Importance of the Church for Economic
Development in theMiddle Ages
King (1985) describes the importance of the church for commercial activities and trade, i.e.
he mentions that in many cases the local fairs and markets are managed and organized by
the church. Pounds (2005) and Nicholas (1997) additionally emphasize the importance of
bishops for the development of cities in theEarlyMiddleAge,when traditional trade declined
during the economic depression in the eighth and ninth century. Finally, Hunt andMurray
(1999) notice the significance of the church for city development and commerce arising from
fostering ecclesiastical tourism and pilgrim activities. Pilgrim activities are also identified by
Escher and Hirschmann (eds.) (2005) as an important factor of city development and urban
centrality.
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A.4 Additional Results
A.4.1 The Determinants ofMedieval Trade
For a valid empirical investigation of the impact of medieval trade on economic development
it is essential to know about the determinants of medieval trade activities. Therefore, I have a
look at the factors determining whether a city became a trade city during themedieval or not.
Based on the literature on the origins of European cities (Bosker and Buringh 2012, Ho-
henberg and Lees 1996) and medieval trade (e.g., Lopez 1976, Pounds 1974, Dollinger 1966)
one can identify four type of factors that potentially had an impact on the location of me-
dieval trade activities: (i) location fundamentals (first-order geography) like location on the
coast (ii) second nature geography (a city’s position in the urban network/ market potential)
(iii) a city’s importance and history with regard to political or ecclesiastical aspects, like being
the seat of an archbishop or having a university and (iv) a city’s political environment (e.g.
presence or absence of institutions of self-governance, being a city state etc.).
Each of these kind of factors intuitively should have an influence on the patterns of me-
dieval trade centers. It is evident that trade cities frequently emerged on rivers or on the coast
because transport via water was fast and cheap. Archbishops and the administration they
come alongwithwere an important source of demand and universities provided both the hu-
man capital and the population increase necessary for trade. Institutions of self-governance
on the other hand probably delivered the institutional and political prerequisites for trade
(e.g. Greif 2006, Stasavage 2011). Concerning second-nature geography the direction of the
impact is not a priori clear, on the one hand a high urban or market potential (i.e. location in
a densely populated and highly urbanized area) could be favorable for trade as there is more
potential demand to satisfy. On the other hand, already existing large cities or trade centers
could hamper the development of a city and leading it to remain in the shadow of its more
important neighbors (e.g, Bosker and Buringh 2012).
To answer the question about the actual importance of each of these factors for medieval
trade patterns I constructed a cross sectional data set based on the panel data set used in sec-
tion 4.3 of the main paper. Basically, I take the Bosker et al. (2013) data set and supplement it
with time-variant versions of the three medieval trade variables. The data set is used for the
regressions is then constructed as follows: First, for each city the century in which it became
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a trade city is recognized. Next, the values of the variables before this century are included in
the data set to circumvent reverse causality issues. For cities that did not become trade cities
the values of 1500ADare included in the data set. For example, Gdansk became an important
trade city in the 14th century. In consequence, for Gdansk the data set contains the variable
values in 1300 AD. The German city of Flensburg on the other hand, is not considered as a
trade city and I include the variable values of 1500 AD for Flensburg. Consequently, I do not
include cities that already were trade cities in 800 AD—the first period in the data—as for
them, no previous period is available.11. This leaves me with 346 of the 362 cities in the data
set.
Tomeasure location fundamentals I include dummies for locationon the coast or a river, as
well as variables documenting a city’s elevation, terrain ruggedness (standard deviation of el-
evation), the probability that a city will be cultivated (depending on soil quality and climatic
conditions) and a categorical variable classifying the study area in four different ecological
zones according to their agricultural productivity (depending on the maximum production
of grain equivalents of potential agricultural land)where zone two represents the highest pro-
ductivity and zone five the lowest. Second nature geography is measured by a cities Christian
urban potential (i.e., the population of all the other Christian cities in the sample inversely
weighted by their distance to the considered city) andMuslimurban potential as well as three
dummy variables reporting the number of trade cities 50km, 50–100km and 100–150km away
from the city under consideration.12 To capture relevant city characteristics I include dummy
variables indicating the presence of a bishop or archbishop and the existence of a university.
Furthermore, I include a variable reporting the number of times a city was plundered in the
century before. At last, the political environment of the city is captured by a dummy variable
reporting whether a city had a city council or not, was located in a large territorial state and
had an non-absolutist political regime (the De Long and Shleifer ”Free-Prince” variable). A
descriptive overview of the variables is given in Table A.10.
11I also conducted the regressions including these cities and the results are virtually identical. Regressions
not shown but available upon request
12As in themain text, urbanpotential is calculated according to themethodology ofDeVries (1984). Further
explanations on this are available in the main text (section 4.3). To include the three different distance bands
separately follows the approach of Bosker and Buringh (2012) who found that 2nd nature geography has a non-
linear effect on the development of cities.
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I conduct probit regressions using the trade city dummy as dependent variable and the
proxy variables discussed above as explanatory variables and additionally add country dum-
mies to each regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries. The re-
sults of the estimations are reported in Table A.11. In columns (1)–(4) of Table A.11 I consider
each type of factors separately and in column (5) I add all variables jointly to the regression.
The results show that all four types of factors contribute to the explanation of medieval
trade. Location fundamentals, with exception of soil quality and terrain ruggedness, show
large and highly statistically significant average marginal effects. Hence, cities with favorable
geographic and bio-geographic location had a considerably higher probability of becoming
a trade city than others. The same holds true for second nature geography. Both urban po-
tential measures as well as the number of trade cities in different distance bands have a sig-
nificantly negative impact on the probability to become a trade city. This is in line with the
notion of an “urban shadow effect” where the presence of existing trade cities or larger urban
centers hampers the development of a city. Looking at city characteristics, only the presence
of a bishop or archbishop seem to have a significant positive effect on the probability of be-
ing a trade center. This confirms historical evidence on the importance of the church for
medieval commerce and city development (Baker andHolt 2004, Bosker and Buringh 2012).
To the contrast, universities and being plundered have no robust impact. Finally, among the
variables representing the political environment of a city the existence of institutions of self-
governance has a positive impact on becoming a trade city and being located in a large state
has a negative impact. Both confirms findings of previous research (e.g. Bosker et al. 2013,
Greif 2006, Stasavage 2011) on these matters as it is evident from the historical literature that
city states with more or less pronounced political independence often became trade cities as
they were economically more prosperous than cities governed by territorial rulers.
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Table A.10: Descriptive Data Overview—Data Set to Explain Location of Medieval Trade
Cities
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Archbishop 346 0.095 0.294 0.00 1.00
Bishop 346 0.361 0.481 0.00 1.00
Christian Urban Potential 346 13.274 7.616 1.28 60.60
Communal Institutions 346 0.491 0.501 0.00 1.00
Ecozones 346 3.882 0.868 2.00 6.00
Elevation 346 132.962 149.148 -4.00 1085.00
Free-Prince 346 0.728 0.445 0.00 1.00
Large State 346 0.506 0.501 0.00 1.00
Muslim Urban Potential 346 1.734 0.979 0.73 5.92
No. of Trade Cities (0-50km) 346 0.416 0.706 0.00 4.00
No. of Trade Cities (100-150km) 346 4.211 2.967 0.00 14.00
No. of Trade Cities (50-100km) 346 2.520 2.283 0.00 11.00
Plundered 346 0.029 0.168 0.00 1.00
River 346 0.633 0.483 0.00 1.00
Sea 346 0.162 0.369 0.00 1.00
Soil Quality 346 0.779 0.210 0.02 1.00
Terrain Ruggedness 346 57.228 73.705 0.47 559.45
Trade City 346 0.217 0.413 0.00 1.00
University 346 0.075 0.264 0.00 1.00
Notes. This table shows the descriptives of the data set used for the regressions in Table A.11. This data
set is constructed as follows: First, for each city the century in which it became a trade city is recognized.
Then the values of the variables before this century are included in the data set to circumvent reverse
causality issues. For cities that do not become trade cities that values of 1500 AD are included in the data
set.
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Table A.11: Determinants of Medieval Trade—Probit Regressions
Dep. Var. Trade City
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Location Fundamentals Second Nature Geography
City Characteristics and
History
Politics All
Sea 0.170*** 0.553***
(0.06) (0.107)
River 0.208*** 0.332***
(0.055) (0.055)
Elevation -0.0005** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Terrain Ruggedness -0.0001 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)
Soil Quality 0.0212 0.0528
(0.117) (0.077)
Ecozone=3 -0.123 -0.180**
(0.144) (0.079)
Ecozone=4 0.0560 -0.102*
(0.088) (0.058)
Ecozone=5 0.0362 -0.126
(0.125) (0.086)
Muslim Urban Potential 0.0177 -0.146***
(0.0286) (0.039)
Christian Urban Potential -0.0139** -0.0339***
(0.006) (0.005)
No. of Trade Cities (0-50km) -0.0877** -0.0219
(0.042) (0.025)
No. of Trade Cities (50-100km) -0.0316* -0.0173**
(0.017) (0.009)
No. of Trade Cities (100-150km) -0.0294*** -0.0164**
(0.01) (0.007)
Bishop 0.195*** 0.0928***
(0.05) (0.03)
Archbishop 0.339*** 0.135***
(0.067) (0.04)
University -0.0156 0.0065
(0.083) (0.044)
Plundered 0.234** 0.0889
(0.106) (0.055)
Communal Institutions 0.125** 0.0608*
(0.052) (0.036)
Free-Prince -0.386*** -0.0268
(0.068) (0.059)
Large State -0.0590 -0.116***
(0.061) (0.035)
Obs. 346 346 346 346 346
Pseudo-R2 0.1856 0.2965 0.1703 0.1769 0.6782
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Average marginal effects are reported. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of
observation is a city. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
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A.4.2 Baseline Regression Specification with Conley’s (1999) Standard Er-
rors
First, I present bivariateOLS regressions of the natural logarithm of aNUTS-3 region’s GDP
per capita on medieval trade measures. Afterwards, I estimate equations one and two using
NUTS-2 fixed effects. They are included to exploit withinNUTS-2 region variation and thus
reducing heterogeneity. I then also add a set of basic geographic controls, including latitude,
longitude and altitude of a NUTS-3 region. The latter set of variables should capture the
general geographic pattern of development in central Europe. This means, that economic
development roughly increases from South to North (i.e., with increasing latitude) and de-
creases, in the sample, from West to East (i.e., with increasing longitude). Furthermore, it
is widely acknowledged that regions with higher altitude are more difficult to reach—which
seems especially relevant for trade—and have less favorable climates, thus I expect a negative
influence of altitude.
The results of these regressions are shown inTableA.12. There, I report two different stan-
dard errors above each coefficient. First, in parentheses, heteroskedasdicity robust standard
errors are reported. Below those, in brackets, I present standard errors accounting for the
possible presence of spatial autocorrelation using Conley’s (1999) method.13
A glance at the estimation results confirms my expectations. Regions with medieval trade
centers (cities) show a significantly higher GDP per capita than regions without such cities.
The coefficient of the trade center dummy remains stable and significant at 1% level, regardless
of which combination of control variables and fixed effects is used. According to column (3)
of Table A.12, where I include the region dummies as well as the basic geographic controls,
regions with medieval trade centers have a GDP per capita that is on average around 30%
higher than regions without medieval trade centers. This means that the effect of medieval
trade is not only statistically but also economically of considerable significance.
This also holds true for the coefficients of the distance to trade center. They are always
highly significant and, quantitatively, are in the same range as that of the trade center dummy
13I tested the existence of spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable using Moran’s I. An I of 0.151
(p-value=0.000) indicates the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation. Conley’s (1999) standard errors are
obtained using a cutoff point of three degrees (approx. 330 km) after which the spatial correlation is assumed
to be zero. I experimented with several different cutoff points and this cutoff produced the most conservative
standard errors.
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(apart from the bivariate case in column (4)). Furthermore, they show the anticipated neg-
ative sign. At last, the centuries since importance in trade variable is always significant and
shows the theoretically proposed positive sign. The clear positive relationship between con-
temporary GDP per capita and medieval trade centers is also illustrated graphically in Figure
1a, a partial regression plot of the Trade Center Dummy based on the full baseline specifica-
tion in column (3). In Figure 1b the same is done for the negative relationship between the
distance to a medieval trade center and the present GDP per capita and in Figure 1c for the
relationship between centuries since importance in trade and GDP per capita.
In general, the two different types of standard errors do not vary substantially (apart from
the bivariate case). In view of this, heteroskedasdicity robust standard errors are used for all
remaining specifications.
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A.4.3 Medieval Trade, Population Density and Regional Economic Devel-
opment
To explicitly establish the relationship between medieval trade, contemporary economic ag-
glomeration and regional economic development it is a straightforward strategy to conduct
a causal mediation analysis following Imai et al. (2010). Mediation analysis enables to dis-
entangle direct and indirect effects—via determining agglomeration—of medieval trade on
contemporary development. Since I cannot rule out the possibility that there are direct effects
or—amounting to the same—indirect effects of medieval trade working via other channels,
thismethodology seems to be appropriate formy setting. The estimationofmediation effects
is based on a set of three different linear estimation equations (Imai et al. 2010):
Ycijk = 1 + 1Tcijk + 
0
11Xcijk + j + cijk1 (A.1)
Mcijk = 2 + 2Tcijk + 
0
21Xcijk + j + cijk2 (A.2)
Ycijk = 3 + 3Tcijk + Mcijk + 
0
31Xcijk + j + cijk3 (A.3)
Where Ycijk represents the ln of a region’s average night light intensity in a NUTS-3 region
(as a proxy for regional economic development) , Tcijk represents one of the three medieval
trade measures (treatment variables).14 Mcijk represents the mediating variable, that is ln
population density as agglomerationmeasure.15 Xcijk is defined as before and stands for a set
of NUTS-3 level covariates and j are NUTS-2 region fixed effects. The epsilons represent
the error terms.
14A region’s average night light intensity is obtained from a shapefile of the National Geophysical Data
Center (NGDC) (available here: http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html; accessed on
August 2th, 2014). There are shapefiles visualizing the average visible, stable nighttime lights and cloud free
coverages for every year between 1992 and 2012. I choose—as in the cross sectional analysis in the main text—
the shapefile for 2008. We use the version of the shapefile where ephemeral events such as fires and background
noise are removed and only light from cities, towns and other sites with persistent lightning are included. It
also includes gas flares, however, for the area of this study no gas flares are detected. Night light intensity is
measured by integer numbers ranging from 1–63 and the resolution of the data are 30x30 arcseconds (i.e., one
value represents the average night light intensity of an area of 0.86 km squared). For the presented results, we
aggregate the data on NUTS-3 region level using the ArcGIS zonal statistics tool. For a more comprehensive
descriptionof the night light data and a detailed discussionof technical issues the reader is referred toHenderson
et al. (2012).
15The results would be similar if one would use relative GDP density as agglomeration/ industry concen-
tration measure instead. Results not shown but available from the author upon request.
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The “average causal mediation effect” (ACME) is estimated by the product of the coeffi-
cients 2 and  (2) or as the difference 1   3 and is obtained through a two-step pro-
cedure described in detail in Imai et al. (2010). The ACME represents the indirect effect of
medieval trade on average night light intensity, i.e. that part of the overall effect of medieval
trade running through agglomeration. Correspondingly, 1 measures the total (average) ef-
fect of medieval trade on average ln night light intensity and 3 represents the direct effect
of medieval trade, i.e. that part of the effect not mediated by agglomeration (but perhaps by
other factors). In consequence, this methodology of separating direct and indirect effects en-
ables to calculate how far the total effect ofmedieval tradeworks via increased agglomeration.
I expect 2 > 0 in the case of the trade center dummy and the centuries of trade variable and
2 < 0 in the case of the distance to trade center variable. Moreover, I also hypothesize that,
on average, the majority of the effect of medieval trade should run through agglomeration.
This leadsme to expect theACME to be significantly different from zero and greater than the
direct effect (j2j > j3j). Moreover, since it holds that 1 = 2 + 3 equation (1) is re-
dundant given equations (2) and (3) and therefore only those two equations are estimated by
a regression.16 Last, I assume  > 0, i.e. a significant positive direct effect of agglomeration
on regional GDP per capita.
The results of the mediation analysis are presented in Table A.13.
Columns (1) to (3) show the results for the estimation of equation (1), i.e. the total effect
of medieval trade on ln night light intensity. They show a economically and statistically sig-
nificant impact of the medieval trade measures on current night light intensity.
Turning to the estimation of equation (4) (columns (4) to (6)) I see, as expected, that all
three measures of medieval trade are strong predictors of contemporary population density.
The coefficients are both significant from a statistical and economical point of view. The
coefficient of the trade center dummy for instance implies that regions with an important
medieval trade center shows on average around a 55% higher relative GDP density than non
trade center regions. What is more, the results clearly show that a higher distance to a trade
center corresponds to a higher distance to areas that are densely populated. Thus, according
to those estimates, there is a significant and robust positive relation betweenpresent day’s spa-
16From this it follows that the coefficients for equation (2) are calculated according to above formula and
the corresponding standard errors are estimated using the delta method.
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tial distribution of population and medieval trade. Moreover, from the estimations of equa-
tion (3) (columns (7) to (9)) I see that the significant effect of the medieval trade measures on
a region’s average night light intensity does completely disappear when I include population
density in the regression estimation. Population density by contrast, enters with a positive
and significant sign in each of the three regressions. Thus, areas with a high concentration
of population are also the regions with higher economic development (as measured by night
light intensity). Most importantly, this also implies that most of the observed strong effect
ofmedieval trade on regional development levels works through its impact on the patterns of
agglomeration. In line with this, the ACME is always significant and often even larger than
the total effect of medieval trade as shown in the first four columns, indicating that the in-
significant remaining direct effect of medieval trade is quite small and even negative in some
cases.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the effect of medieval trade indeed runs through agglom-
eration as proposed in this paper.
190
Ta
bl
eA
.13
:M
ed
iev
al
Tr
ad
e,
Po
pu
lat
io
n
D
en
sit
ya
nd
R
eg
io
na
lE
co
no
m
ic
D
ev
elo
pm
en
t—
M
ed
iat
io
n
An
aly
sis
U
sin
gN
igh
t
Li
gh
tI
nt
en
sit
y
(1)
(2
)
(3)
(4
)
(5)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
Es
tim
at
io
n
of
Eq
ua
tio
n
(1)
(T
ot
al
Ef
fec
t)
Es
tim
at
io
n
of
Eq
ua
tio
n
(2
)
Es
tim
at
io
n
of
Eq
ua
tio
n
(3)
(D
ire
ct
Ef
fec
t)
D
ep
.V
ar
.
ln
(N
igh
tL
igh
tI
nt
en
sit
y)
ln
(P
op
ul
at
io
n
D
en
sit
y)
ln
(N
igh
tL
igh
tI
nt
en
sit
y)
ln
(P
op
ul
at
io
n
D
en
sit
y)
0.
516
1**
*
0.
516
6*
**
0.
513
7*
**
(0
.0
13)
(0
.0
13)
(0
.0
13)
Tr
ad
eC
en
ter
0.
17
23
***
0.
33
69
***
-0
.0
02
1
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
19
)
ln
(D
ist
an
ce
to
Tr
ad
eC
en
ter
)
-0
.20
02
***
-0
.4
12
3*
**
0.
01
21
(0
.0
7)
(0
.1)
(0
.0
3)
Ce
nt
ur
ies
of
Tr
ad
e
0.
02
35
***
0.
04
2*
**
0.
00
19
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
02
)
N
U
TS
-2
D
um
m
ies
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ba
sic
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
cC
on
tro
ls
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ci
ty
En
vir
on
m
en
ta
nd
Lo
ca
tio
n
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
R
eg
io
n
Ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
H
ist
or
ica
lR
eg
io
n
Ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
AC
M
E
(T
ot
al
Ef
fec
t-D
ire
ct
Ef
fec
t)
0.
17
49
***
-0
.21
16
***
0.
02
16
***
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
05
)
R
2
0.
89
5
0.
89
3
0.
89
5
0.
97
2
0.
97
2
0.
97
3
O
bs
.
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
83
9
N
otes
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
de
rro
rs
ar
er
ep
or
ted
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
Co
eff
ici
en
ti
ss
ta
tis
tic
all
yd
iff
er
en
tf
ro
m
ze
ro
at
th
e*
**1
%,
**5
%
an
d*
10
%
lev
el.
Th
eu
ni
to
fo
bs
er
va
tio
n
is
a
N
U
TS
-3
re
gio
n.
Th
e“
R
eg
io
na
lE
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
nd
Lo
ca
tio
n”
co
nt
ro
ls
in
clu
de
th
el
nd
ist
an
ce
so
fa
re
gio
n’s
ce
nt
ro
id
to
th
en
ea
re
st
bo
rd
er
,c
oa
st
po
in
to
rr
ive
ra
sw
ell
as
th
e
di
sta
nc
ew
eig
ht
ed
su
m
of
th
eG
D
P
pe
rc
ap
ita
of
all
N
U
TS
-3
re
gio
ni
na
ra
di
us
ar
ou
nd
150
ki
lo
m
ete
rs
ar
ou
nd
th
ec
on
sid
er
ed
N
U
TS
-3
re
gio
na
nd
fo
ur
va
ria
bl
es
in
di
ca
tin
g
th
en
um
be
ro
fm
ed
iev
al
tra
de
re
gio
ns
0–
50
,50
–1
00
,1
00
-15
0
an
d
150
–2
50
ki
lo
m
ete
rs
aw
ay
.
R
eg
io
n
ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ic
co
nt
ro
ls
in
clu
de
ad
um
m
ies
fo
rr
eg
io
ns
in
clu
di
ng
a
co
un
try
’s
ca
pi
ta
la
nd
ar
ec
las
sif
ied
as
m
ou
nt
ain
re
gio
ns
.F
ur
th
er
m
or
ei
te
nc
om
pa
sse
st
he
ln
of
ar
eg
io
ns
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
ls
ui
ta
bi
lit
y.
A
re
gio
n’s
ar
ea
is
no
ti
nc
lu
de
d
in
th
e
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
co
lu
m
ns
(4
)–
(6
)a
sa
re
ai
sm
ec
ha
ni
ca
lly
co
rre
lat
ed
wi
th
po
pu
lat
io
n
de
ns
ity
.T
he
hi
sto
ric
al
re
gio
n
ch
ar
ac
ter
ist
ics
co
ns
ist
of
ad
um
m
yv
ar
iab
les
in
di
ca
tin
g
re
gio
ns
wi
th
ac
ity
se
rv
in
ga
ss
ea
to
fa
bi
sh
op
in
150
0
AD
,w
ith
au
ni
ve
rsi
ty
fo
un
de
d
be
fo
re
150
0
AD
,t
ha
ta
do
pt
ed
pr
in
tin
gt
ec
hn
ol
og
yb
efo
re
150
0
AD
,c
on
ta
in
cit
ies
th
at
we
re
m
em
be
rs
of
th
eH
an
se
at
ic
Le
ag
ue
,w
ith
fo
rm
er
Im
pe
ria
lc
iti
es
,t
ha
tw
er
er
es
id
en
ce
cit
ies
of
as
ec
ul
ar
ru
ler
or
we
re
lo
ca
ted
on
an
im
pe
ria
lr
oa
d.
M
or
eo
ve
r,
it
in
clu
de
st
he
ln
of
th
ed
ist
an
ce
of
ar
eg
io
ns
ce
nt
ro
id
to
th
ec
lo
se
st
R
om
an
ro
ad
.E
ac
h
re
gr
es
sio
n
in
clu
de
sa
co
ns
ta
nt
no
tr
ep
or
ted
.A
llr
es
ul
ts
or
igi
na
te
fro
m
am
ed
iat
io
n
an
aly
sis
us
in
gt
he
m
eth
od
de
ve
lo
pe
di
n
Im
ai
et
al.
(2
01
0,
20
11)
.A
CM
E
m
ea
ns
“A
ve
ra
ge
Ca
us
al
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
Ef
fec
t”
an
di
sc
alc
ul
at
ed
as
sh
ow
ni
nt
he
ta
bl
e.
Th
ec
oe
ffi
cie
nt
s
in
co
lu
m
n
(1)
–(
3)
ar
ec
alc
ul
at
ed
as

1
=

2

+

3
(i.
e.
as
su
m
of
th
eA
CM
Es
an
d
th
er
es
pe
cti
ve
co
eff
ici
en
ts
in
co
lu
m
n
(7
)–
(9
)).
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
fo
rt
he
m
an
d
th
e
AC
M
E
ar
ee
sti
m
at
ed
us
in
gt
he
de
lta
m
eth
od
.I
tr
ep
re
se
nt
st
he
eff
ec
to
fm
ed
iev
al
tra
de
on
ln
av
er
ag
en
igh
tl
igh
ti
nt
en
sit
yr
un
ni
ng
th
ro
ug
h
its
im
pa
ct
on
re
lat
ive
G
D
P
de
ns
ity
(i.
e.,
th
ei
nd
ire
ct
eff
ec
to
fm
ed
iev
al
tra
de
).
191
B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Data andDescriptive Statistics
B.1.1 Variable Definitions and Coding
The three main independent variables introduced in this section are all based on the sources
and constructed according to themethodology introduced and discussed in the previous sec-
tion (see also Table B.1).
Participative Election. A dummy variable indicating whether the citizens of a town could
elect all or parts of the city government (i.e., one of the councils, magistrates, judges etc.) ei-
ther directly or indirectly (through a community assembly or through an electoral collage.
In Germany, Austria and Switzerland the citizens most often participated in the election of
the city council (or one of them, usually the so called “Großer Rat” [great council]). In Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, conversely, the burghers would often elect the magistrate of the
city via a sworn council (in the German lands the magistrate was most often was elected by
the council or appointed by the ruler of the city). The following cities are coded as having
such a inclusive/ participative election procedures (the period in which it existed is given in
parentheses):
Austria, Belgium and France
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Salzburg (around 1500), Leuven (1400–1800), Strasbourg (1500–1800)
Germany
Aachen (1600–1800), Bamberg (1400–1800), Bautzen (1400–1800), Brunswick (1400–1800),
Bremen (around 1200), Cologne (1400–1800), Dessau (1400–1800), Elberfeld (1400–1800),
Frankfurt amMain (1700 and 1800), Freiberg (around 1400), Halle (around 1400), Münster
(Westphalia) (1300–1500),Nuremberg (1400–1800),Osnabruck (1400–1800), Potsdam (1400
and 1500), Schwerin (1400–1600), Soest (1300–1800), Ulm (1400–1500), Würzburg (1300–
1500)
Netherlands and Switzerland
Arnhem (1300–1800), Deventer (1300–1800), Dordrecht (1300–1600), Hoorn (1500–1800),
Leeuwarden (1500–1800), Middelburg (1300–1500), Zwolle (1300–1800), Basel (1300–1800),
Geneva (1400–1800)
Burgher Representation. Dummy variable equal to one if there was some form of institu-
tionalized burgher representation in a city. ”Institutionalized” means that it is not enough,
that (as it seems to be the case in many cities) the citizens sometimes (i.e., not on a regular
basis) had the possibility to voice their opinion in a meeting of the council or that represen-
tatives of the citizens could give advice or meet with the government of the town in specific
situations (times of crisis, a new constitution etc.). Instead, there should be a community as-
sembly, or e.g., a “Großer Rat” (“Great Council”) or “Äußerer Rat” (“Outer Council”) that
meets regularly and that has at least constitutionally guaranteed the citizens a say in somemat-
ters of city politics. The following cities are coded as having such institutionalized burgher
representation in the city government ( with the period in which it existed in parentheses):
Austria, Belgium and France
Innsbruck (1400–1800), Linz (1600–1800), Salzburg (1500–1800),Vienna (1300–1500), Bruges
(1400–1800), Ypres (1500–1800), Colmar (1400–1800)Germany
Berlin (around 1500), Bonn (1300–1800), Bremen (1500–1800), Dessau (1400–1800), Düssel-
dorf (1500–1700), Emden (1500–1800), Erfurt (1400–1600), Flensburg (1500–1800), Frank-
furt am Main (1700 and 1800), Frankfurt an der Oder (1600–1800), Goslar (1500–1800),
Gotha (1500–1800),Halberstadt (1200–1600),Halle (around 1400),Hamburg (1700 and 1800),
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Hanau (1600–1800), Hanover (1300–1800), Heidelberg (1500–1800), Hildesheim (around
1200),Kassel (around 1300 and 1500–1800),Krefeld (1500–1800), Leipzig (1400–1500), Lüneb-
urg (1700–1800),Magdeburg (around 1200a and 1400–1800),Mainz (around 1400),Mannheim
(1700–1800), Münster (Westphalia) (around 1200 and 1500 to 1600), Munich (around 1400
and around 1800), Nördlingen (1300–1500), Nuremberg (1300–1500 and around 1800), Pas-
sau (1500–1800), Potsdam (1400–1700), Quedlingburg (1300 and 1400), Regensburg (1300–
1800), Rostock (1600–1800), Schwerin (1700–1800), Soest (1300–1800), Stralsund (1600–
1800), Ulm (1300–1600), Würzburg (1300–1500)
Netherlands and Switzerland
Geneva (1400–1800)
Guild Participation Index. A categorical variable equal to zero if (craft) guilds were not
allowed to participate in the city council (the “Kleine Rat” (“Small Council”/ “Inner Coun-
cil”) which was usually the most important and powerful political institution of the city.
The variable is equal to one if the guilds participate in the council, i.e., had a constitution-
ally guaranteed number of council members, but not the right to hold more than half of the
seats. The variable is equal to two in cities with a so-called “Zunftverfassung” (“guild con-
stitution”), which is where the majority or even all members of the city council were repre-
sentatives (masters, members) of a guild. The following cities are coded as having craft guilds
participating in the city council (=1 or =2 indicates whether guild members were in the ma-
jority or not in the city council; period in which this was the case in parentheses):
Austria, Belgium and France
Graz (1400 and 1500=1; 1500=2), Innsbruck (1400–1800=1), Vienna (1400 and 1500=1),Antwerp
(1400–1800=1), Bruges (1400–1800=2), Brussels (1500–1800=1),Gent (1400 and 1500=2), Ypres
(1400–1800=1), Liege (1400–1700=2), Leuven (1400–1800=1), Namur (1400–1800=1), Tour-
nai (1500–1800=1), Colmar (1400–1800=2), Strasbourg (1300 and 1400=1; 1500–1800=2)
Germany
Aachen (1500=1;1600–1800=2), Ansbach (1500–1800=1), Augsburg (1400 and 1500=2), Bam-
berg (1500–1800=1), Berlin (1300 and 1500=1), Brunswick (1400=1, 1500–1800=2), Chem-
nitz (1300 and 1500–1800=1), Cologne (1400–1800=2),Dresden (1500–1800=1), Erfurt (1300–
1600=1), Frankfurt am Main (1300–1800=1), Freiburg (1300 and 1400=1; 1500 and 1600=2),
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Goslar (1300–1800=2), Halberstadt (1300 and 1400=1), Hanover (1400–1800=1), Hildesheim
(1400–1800=1), Kassel (1300 and 1500–1800=1), Leizig (1300–1500=1), Magdeburg (1400–
1800=2), Mainz (1400=1), Nördlingen (1400=1; 1500=2), Osnabrück (1400=1; 1500–1800=2),
Speyer (1400–1800=2), Trier (1400 and 1500=1; 1600–1800=2), Ulm (1400–1500=2; 1600–
1800=1), Worms (1300 and 1400=1; 1500=2), Würzburg (1300–1500=1)
Netherlands and Switzerland
Arnhem (1500, 1600 and 1800=1), Dordrecht (1400–1800=1), Hoorn (1500–1800=1), Mid-
delburg (1500=1), Utrecht (1400 and 1500=2), s-Hertogenbosch (1400–1600=1), Basel (1400–
1800=2), Bern (1300–1500=1), Zurich (1400–1800=2)
B.1.2 Definition and Sources of the Additional Variables
ln(Population). Reports the natural logarithmof a cities population in thousands of people in
a particular year. City population figures are taken from Bosker et al. (2013). They are based
on updated population figures fromBairoch et al. (1988) and other sources (see theData Ap-
pendix of Bosker et al. (2013) available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/
doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_data_
appendix.pdf;
accessed on February 9th, 2014) However, because Bosker et al. (2013) only report city popu-
lation values above 5,000 inhabitants smaller values are supplemented by resorting toBairoch
et al. (1988) and De Vries (1984)—both commonly used sources for historical city popu-
lations (also used in Cantoni 2013, Acemoglu et al. 2002, Acemoglu et al. 2005, Dittmar
2011 and Nunn and Qian 2011, among others). In some estimations we also use the interpo-
lated figures for missing values between 1500 and 1800 from the University of Utrecht’s Cen-
tre of Global Economic History (CGEH) City Population Database (available from http:
//www.cgeh.nl/sites/default/files/def%20europe.xls];
accessed on February 9th, 2014).
Printing Press before 1500 AD. Dummy variable equal to one if a city had adopted print-
ing technology before 1500 AD. The coding is based on information in Benzing (1982), Clair
(1976) and the Incunabula Short Title Catalogue (ISTC) of the British library (http://
195
www.bl.uk/catalogues/istc/index.html; accessedonNovember 18th, 2012).
A region is included if any of these sources mention a city in this region.
Trade City. Dummy variable equal to one if a city is considered to be an important (i.e., in-
ternational or over-regional) trade center in the pre-modern period. The variable is coded
according to various different sources (e.g., historical trade route maps, and monographs
about medieval trade activities). The exact construction and the sources used are extensively
discussed in chapter 3 and the accompanying Data Appendix.
Table B.1: Descriptive Overview of the Economic and Social Outcome Variables
Variable Obs.Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Population) 596 2.537 0.812 0.693 5.513
Printing Press before 1500 AD 1144 0.143 0.351 0 1
Trade City 1144 0.194 0.396 0 1
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B.2 Coding Examples and Special Cases
B.2.1 Coding of Schwaz
Schwaz is part of the “Österreichisches Städtebuch” and I consulted several existing publica-
tions about the history of the city (of which none reports the existence of any participative
political institutions—in accordance with the “Österreichisches Städtebuch”), I decided to
include Schwaz in the sample.
B.2.2 Coding of Geneva
The same holds true for Geneva. Although I carefully searched for existing German or En-
glish publications about the city history, I found little information. However, there is ev-
idence provided by the encyclopedia “Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz” (Historical Ency-
clopedia of Switzerland) which is edited by “Schweizerisches Gesellschaft für Geschichte”
(“Swiss Society of History”) and the “Schweizerischen Akademie der Geistes- und Sozial-
wissenschaften” (“Swiss Academy for Philosophy and Social Science”) and is available in a
printed and a web-based version (which I consulted). This encyclopedia clearly classifies
Geneva as a city ruled by patricians. According to these source (and the other sources e.g.,
about Basel and Zurich) there were only four major Swiss cities with a strong participation
of the guilds in the city government (Basel, Zurich, Schaffhausen and St. Gallen). I therefore
also chose to includeGeneva and to code it as not having guilds participation in the city coun-
cil. Despite this, the “Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz” also contains an article for the city
of Geneva (as for most other cities in Switzerland) that provides detailed and source-based
information about the government and the political institutions of Geneva from the begin-
ning of its history until today. From this I inferred that the citizens of Geneva could elect
(beginning in 1309) political representatives—the so-called “Syndics” (or “Prokuratoren”)—
via a “general council” that could act in the name of the citizens of Geneva in various political
measures and also played the role of judges. Therefore, I code Geneva as having elections and
some kind of burgher representation from 1400 onward. None of the results would change
if I were to exclude Schwaz and Geneva from the sample of countries.
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B.2.3 Coding ofMecklenburg
Another special case isMecklenburg, which is today a small village (with around 3000 inhabi-
tants). It was of certain importance during the earlierMiddle Ages as the Princes of Schwerin
built their castle atMecklenburg which is why later the whole principality/ duchy came to be
named after this village. This is why later the whole the principality/ duchy was called after
this place. However, the castle was destroyed in the early 14th century and nothing other than
a village developed there (the residences of the princes and later dukes of “Mecklenburg”were
at Schwerin and Stargard). This explains why I was unable to find any source of information
about it and why it is not even contained in the “Deutsche Städtebuch”. However, since
Mecklenburg did not even have city rights I decided to include it in the data set and to code
the three variables under consideration as zero throughout the whole observation period.
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C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Data Appendix
C.1.1 Guild Revolt and Participative Political Institutions Variables
Participative Election. A dummy variable indicating whether the citizens of a town could
elect all or some parts of the city government (i.e., councils, magistrates, judges etc.) either
directly or indirectly (through a community assembly or through an electoral college. In
Germany, Austria and Switzerland the citizens most often participated in the election of the
city council (or one of them, usually the so called “Großer Rat” [great council]). In Belgium
and the Netherlands, conversely, the burghers would usually elect the magistrate of the city
via a sworn council (in theGerman lands themagistrate wasmost often elected by the council
or appointed by the ruler of the city). Following cities are coded as having such participative
election procedures (the period in which it existed is in parentheses):
Burgher Representation. Dummy variable equal to one if there existed some form of insti-
tutionalized burgher representation in a city. ”Institutionalized”means that it is not enough,
that—as seems to be the case inmany cities—the citizens are sometimes (i.e., not on a regular
basis) given the possibility to voice their opinion in ameeting of the council or that represen-
tatives of the citizens could give advice or meet with the government of the town in specific
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situations (crisis, new constitution etc.). Instead there should be a community assembly, or
e.g., a “Großer Rat” (“Great Council”) or “Äußerer Rat” (“Outer Council”) that meets reg-
ularly and that has at least constitutionally guaranteed the citizens a voice in somematters of
city politics.
Guild Participation. A categorical variable equal to zero if (craft) guilds were not allowed
to participate in the city council (the “KleineRat” (“Small Council”/ “InnerCouncil”)which
was normally the most important and powerful political institution of the city. The variable
is equal to one if the guilds participate in the council, i.e., have a constitutionally guaranteed
number of council members.
Guild Constitution. Dummy variable equal to zero if the guild were not allowed to par-
ticipate in the city council or id they did not have the right to send more than half of the
members. The variable is equal to one in cities with a so-called “Zunftverfassung” (“guild
constitution”), that is where the majority or even all members of the city council were repre-
sentatives (masters, members) of a guild.
Guild Revolt. Dummy variable equal to one if there was at least one guild revolt in a city
regardless of whether it was successful (i.e., resulted in political participation) or not. The
cities with at least one unsuccessful revolts were Bremen, Frankfurt an der Oder, Görlitz,
Hamburg, Lübeck, Lüneburg, Mechelen, Nuremberg, Passau, Regensburg and Rostock.
Share of Cities with Guild Participation (within 150km). This set of variables reports the
share of citieswith guild participation (i.e., forwhich the guild participation variable is greater
than 0)within a radius of 0–150kmaround the respective city. The variable is calculated using
the Stata command nearstat. It should capture the possible existence of neighborhood or
spillover effects of the guild revolutions for the nearby cities.
C.1.2 Explanatory Variables
C.1.2.1 Variables from the Bosker et al. (2013) Data Set
The following explanatory variables originate from the city-level panel data set constructed
by Bosker et al. (2013) (and for example also used in Dincecco and Gaetano Onorato 2013).
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Therefore the reader is referred to the Data Appendix of the study of Bosker et al. (2013),
which provides a detailed and extensive description and discussion of each variable. The data
appendix is available here: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/
10.1162/REST_a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_data_appendix.
pdf (accessed on
February 9th, 2014). Thus, in what follows only a short definition of each variable from this
data set will be provided.
Agricultural Productivity. Dummy variable reporting the soil quality of the fields sur-
rounding a city. It combines information about climate (e.g., temperature, precipitation...)
and soil quality (carbon density, water holding capacity etc.) in an index indicating the prob-
ability that a certain location will be cultivated.
Archbishop. Dummy variable equal to one if a citywas the official residence of an archbishop.
Bishop. Dummy variable equal to one if a city was official residence of a bishop (but not an
archbishop).
Urban Potential. Following De Vries’ (1984) concept of “Urban Potential”, the variable rep-
resents a city’s (Christian) urban potential as the distance weighted sumof the size of all other
Christian cities with a least 10000 inhabitants in the sample of Bosker et al. (2013) and taking
into accountwhether or not one or both of two considered cities is located at a place favorable
for long-distance trade (i.e, is located at sea or at a river). (For details of the construction the
reader is referred to section 3.2.3 of the paper of Bosker et al. (2013) and to Table A.5 in the
supplementary appendix available here: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/
doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_esupp.
pdf; accessed on Feburary 9th, 2014).
C.1.2.2 Other Explanatory Variables
Imperial City. A Dummy Variable equal to one if a city was an imperial city in the Holy
Roman Empire. The variable is coded following Oestreich and Holzer (1970a). They pro-
vide an annotated list of cities mentioned as imperial cities (“Reichsstädte”) in theReichsma-
trikel of 1521 (sometimes called the “WormserMatrikel”). This variable takes into account the
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available information about when a city took on the status of an imperial city (the so-called
“Reichsunmittelbarkeit”). Such information suffers from a marked amount of uncertainty.
However, the German version of Wikipedia provides a list of imperial cities including infor-
mation about the approximate date they bacome imperial cities. This information is often
based on corresponding decrees of kings or emperors of the Holy Roman Empire available
in the Regesta Imperii, an archive of all documentary and historiographic documents of the
Roman-German kings until Maximilian I (http://www.regesta-imperii.de/
startseite.html). This archive is maintained by the “Akademie der Wissenschaften
und der Literatur Mainz” and is a reliable source of historical information.
Still, not all the dates in the list are validated by these sources. In these cases, I rely on avail-
able information from city history or other sources to assign a date. Despite these efforts,
sometimes sources mention different dates or rely on other criteria. In such cases, I may pro-
ceed by assuming the date seems most plausible from what I infer from the city’s history.
Where it was impossible to find satisfactory information, the city is coded as an imperial city
from 1500 AD onward.
Residence City. Dummy Variable equal to one if a city was the official residence (capital)
of a secular or ecclesiastical ruler (an earl, a prince, a duke, an archbishop etc.). The vari-
able is coded according to the information provided in the “Deutsche Städtebuch” and the
various other sources listed in Table A.1. For robustness, a list of important residence cities
in today’s Germany is also consulted, available at the German wikipedia (http://de.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Residenzstadt (accessed February, 24th 2013).
Proto-Industry. The variable is equal to one if a city can considered to be an important center
of textile production or of metallurgy and equal to two if both industries were present. Oth-
erwise it is equal to zero. The information on textile centers originates from Carus-Wilson
(1952), Escher and Hirschmann (2005) and Gutmann (1988). Information on centers of the
metal industry are from Escher and Hirschmann (2005), Gutmann (1988), Nef (1952) and
Sprandel (1968).
Trade City. Dummy variable equal to one if a city is considered to be an important (i.e.,
international or over-regional) trade center in the respective century. The variable is coded
according to various different sources like maps of historical trade routes as printed inDavies
andMoorhouse (2002), Kinder and Hilgemann (1970), King (1985), Magocsi (2002) or Stier
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et al. (1956) as well as monographs onmedieval trade activities like Spufford (2002) or on the
history of Hanseatic League (like Dollinger 1966). The cities listed as trade cities in the pe-
riod before a revolt (or in 1500 AD if there was no revolt) are Altona, Amsterdam, Augsburg,
Brunswick, Bremen, Cologne, Deventer, Erfurt, Frankfurt amMain, Frankfurt an der Oder,
Ghent, Hamburg, Linz, Lübeck, Lüneburg, Magdeburg, Metz, Münster, Nuremberg, Re-
gensburg, Rostock, Rotterdam, Salzburg, Soest, Stralsund, Ulm and Vienna.
Table C.1 provides an descriptive overview of all the variables used in the empirical analysis
in the paper.
Table C.1: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agricultural Productivity 104 0.611 0.211 0.02 0.978
Archbishop 104 0.058 0.234 0 1
Bishop 104 0.202 0.403 0 1
Guild Constitution 104 0.212 0.410 0 1
Guild Participation 104 0.490 0.502 0 1
Guild Revolt 104 0.596 0.493 0 1
Imperial City 104 0.135 0.343 0 1
Institutionalized Burgher Representation 104 0.212 0.410 0 1
Participative Election 104 0.163 0.372 0 1
Proto-Industry 104 0.221 0.502 0 2
Residence City 104 0.144 0.353 0 1
Trade City 104 0.260 0.441 0 1
Textile Industry 104 0.154 0.363 0 1
Urban Potential 104 13.056 5.637 4.915 36.857
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D
Appendices to Chapter 5
D.1 Descriptive Statistics and Data
The data set of participative political institutions in pre-modern Europe is described in detail
iinh chapter 2 and most of the used control variables are explained in the Data Appendix to
theBosker et al. (2013) studywhich is available online at: http://www.mitpressjournals.
org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00284/suppl_file/REST_a_00284_
data_appendix.pdf (accessed on February 9th, 2014). Therefore, these data is not de-
scribed in detail here. I provide descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis in
TableD.1. For the variables not described in one of these papers, I provide a short description
in in the next paragraphs.
Brethren of Common Life. Binary variable equal to one if a city had a house of the Brethren
of Common Life by 1400 AD according to Akcomak et al. (2015).
Hanseatic League. Binary variable equal to one if a city was a member of the Hanseatic
League. Coded according to Dollinger (1966). In most cases, information about when a
city became a member of the Hanseatic League ( as well as when the city left the League) is
also provided in Dollinger (1966). If there was no information in Dollinger (1966), reliable
information about the city’s history was sought (e.g., form the official webpage of the city or
the monographs about the history of the city reported in Table A.1).
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Imperical Circle. The imperial circle dummies report in which imperial circle a city was lo-
cated in 1500 AD. The data is from Rubin (2014). Imperial City. A Dummy Variable equal
to one if a city was an imperial city in the Holy Roman Empire. The variable is coded fol-
lowing Oestreich and Holzer (1970a). They provide an annotated list of cities mentioned as
imperial cities (“Reichsstädte”) in theReichsmatrikel of 1521 (sometimes called the “Wormser
Matrikel”). This variable takes into account the available information aboutwhen a city took
on the status of an imperial city (the so-called “Reichsunmittelbarkeit”). Such information
suffers from a marked amount of uncertainty. However, the German version of Wikipedia
provides a list of imperial cities including information about the approximate date they be-
came imperial cities. This information is often based on corresponding decrees of kings or
emperors of the Holy Roman Empire available in the Regesta Imperii, an archive of all doc-
umentary and historiographic documents of the Roman-German kings until Maximilian
I (http://www.regesta-imperii.de/startseite.html). This archive is
maintained by the “Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz” and is a reliable
source of historical information.
Still, not all the dates in the list are validated by these sources. In these cases, I rely on avail-
able information from city history or other sources to assign a date. Despite these efforts,
sometimes sources mention different dates or rely on other criteria. In such cases, I may pro-
ceed by assuming the date seems most plausible from what I infer from the city’s history.
Where it was impossible to find satisfactory information, the city is coded as an imperial city
from 1500 AD onward.
ln(Distance to Wittenberg. Variable reporting the natural logarithm (ln) of a city’s geodetic
distance (in kilometers) to the German city of Wittenberg from which Protestantism spread
out. Variable is calculated using the geodist command in Stata.
Printingpress before 1500 AD. Dummy variable equal to one if a city had adopted printing
technology before 1500 AD. The coding is based on information in Benzing (1982), Clair
(1976) and the Incunabula Short Title Catalogue (ISTC) of the British library (http://
www.bl.uk/catalogues/istc/index.html; accessedonNovember 18th, 2012).
Residence City. Dummy Variable equal to one if a city was the official residence (capital) of
a secular or ecclesiastical ruler (an earl, a prince, a duke, an archbishop etc.). The variable
is coded according to the information provided in the “Deutsche Städtebuch” and the var-
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ious other sources listed in Table A.1. For robustness, a list of important residence cities
in today’s Germany is also consulted, available at the German wikipedia (http://de.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Residenzstadt (accessed February, 24th 2013).
Staufer City. Dummy variable equal to one i a city was in the sphere of influence of the noble
family of the Staufer. Variable is coded according to Jacob (2010) who provides informa-
tion about cities in Germany that were founded by a member of the Staufer family. Further-
more information in the “LexikonGeschichte Baden-Württemberg” (Historical Encylopedia
Baden-Württemberg) available at this url http://www.s-line.de/homepages/
m-ebener/KarteIII-4%20(Staufer).html (accessed on Feburary 26th, 201)
about places with “‘Königspfalzen” (royal palaces) of the Staufer is used and the informa-
tion about Staufian palaces and city foundations given in Planitz (1966).
Trade City. Dummy variable equal to one if a city is considered to be an important (i.e., in-
ternational or over-regional) trade center in the pre-modern period. The variable is coded ac-
cording to various different sources (e.g., historical trade routemaps, andmonographs about
medieval trade activities). For more information on the coding of this variable, the reader is
referred to chapter 2.
214
Descriptive Overview of Panel Data Set
Variable ObsMean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agricultural Suitability 891 0.603 0.221 0.02 0.978
Archbishop 891 0.074 0.262 0 1
Bishop 891 0.209 0.407 0 1
Capital City 891 0.015 0.120 0 1
Free-Prince 891 0.456 0.498 0 1
Guild Constitution 891 0.065 0.247 0 1
Guild Participation 891 0.162 0.368 0 1
Guild Participation Index 891 0.232 0.566 0 2
Hanseatic League 891 0.079 0.269 0 1
Imperial City 891 0.111 0.314 0 1
Institutionalized Burgher Representation 891 0.395 0.489 0 1
Large State 891 0.473 0.500 0 1
ln(Distance toWittenberg) 891 5.549 0.672 3.165 6.615
ln(Population) 457 2.442 0.789 0.693 5.513
Parliament 891 0.111 0.314 0 1
Participative Election 891 0.092 0.289 0 1
Plundered 891 0.025 0.169 0 2
Printingpress before 1500 AD 891 0.135 0.342 0 1
Residence City 891 0.116 0.320 0 1
River 891 0.852 0.355 0 1
Sea 891 0.086 0.281 0 1
Staufer City 891 0.071 0.256 0 1
Terrain Ruggedness 891 55.326 88.044 0.719 559.45
Trade City 891 0.208 0.406 0 1
University 891 0.071 0.256 0 1
Urban Potential 891 12.858 13.884 0.839 198.620
D.2 B. Additional Results and Robustness Checks
In Tables B.1 and B.2 I re-estimate Tables 4 and 5 including time-invariant variables, i.e. ter-
rain ruggedness, soil quality and location at a river or at a sea that are interacted with century
dummies to be used in a fix effects regression. Including these variables ensures that these
time-invariant characteristics of cities—and their possibly time-varying effects—do not cause
the results obtained in the regressions in themain text. The results obtainedwith these inter-
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action terms included are virtually identical to those in the main text, if anything, the results
are even stronger and the observed tendencies are more pronounced. Thus, the results are
robust to the inclusion of these variables.
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The Longer, the Worse? The Impact of Length of Existence
Dep. Var. ln(Population)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable GuildParticipation
Guild
Constitution
Inst. Burgher
Representation
Participative
Election
Variable 1. Century 0.025 -0.108 0.085 0.399***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.126) (0.106)
Variable 2. Century 0.178 -0.057 0.147 0.387**
(0.166) (0.179) (0.117) (0.149)
Variable 3. Century 0.077 -0.358 0.238* 0.348**
(0.186) (0.250) (0.139) (0.162)
Variable 4. Century 0.084 -0.599* 0.146 0.377*
(0.224) (0.329) (0.209) (0.203)
Variable 5. Century -0.158 -0.991** 0.161 0.032
(0.293) (0.487) (0.188) (0.213)
Variable 6. Century 0.123 -1.125*** -0.033 -0.512**
(0.385) (0.318) (0.342) (0.239)
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century*Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Invariant Controls*Century FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 457 457 457 457
Within-R2 0.494 0.518 0.493 0.512
Notes. Standard errors clustered on city level are reported in parentheses. Coefficient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and
*10 % level. The unit of observation is a city. The set of “Robust Controls” includes every variable that was significant (at 10 % level at least)
in the regression including all sets of covariates jointly. These are the archbishop and bishop dummies, the residence city dummy, the capital,
Hanseatic League, and trade city dummies as well as the urban potential measure. Each regression includes a constant not reported.
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